fix(jobs-agent): validate relay message sender before dispatch - #1393
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Cr0wTom wants to merge 3 commits into
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fix(jobs-agent): validate relay message sender before dispatch#1393Cr0wTom wants to merge 3 commits into
Cr0wTom wants to merge 3 commits into
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…nfigured job server
vmenge
requested changes
Sep 4, 2026
…otify-after-rejection test
…0-jobs-sender-validation-relay-messages
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The jobs agent dispatched relay
JobNotify/JobExecution/JobCancelwithout checkingmsg.from— any relay entity that can address the Orb in the jobs namespace could run privileged jobs or cancel live ones.Fix: new
is_authorized_sender(Service + configuredtarget_service_id+ configuredrelay_namespace) evaluated before any payload decode; anything else is dropped with a bounded, escaped rejection log (payload never logged). Fleet-safety basis: the relay routes by identity triple and a client sends with the identity it connected as, so the job-server provably owns the configured triple — otherwise the agent's ownJobRequestNextwould never reach it today. Sender-label authenticity itself is relay-server work (SEC-2708).Tests: authorization matrix + payload classification units; adversarial integration tests (second relay client as
unexpected-service, andfleet-cmdrwith the wrong entity type) assert the rejection log fires, the rejected job never runs, and the agent keeps serving the legitimate server. Full suite green natively.Mitigates: VULN-6325 (fixed); external disclosure report (Sep 2026), sender-validation finding. Complements SEC-2708.