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Hall of Fame Entry: g00siferdev-py — Root Access & Fixed All Vulns#34

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Hall of Fame Entry: g00siferdev-py — Root Access & Fixed All Vulns#34
g00siferdev-py wants to merge 4 commits into
theowni:mainfrom
g00siferdev-py:main

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Hall of Fame Submission

Player: @g00siferdev-py
Achievement: Root Access & Fixed All Vulns

I completed the full exploit chain against the intentionally vulnerable application and then patched all identified vulnerabilities in my fork.

Exploit chain demonstrated

  1. Mass assignment / privilege escalation — PATCH /profile with role: Chef
  2. OS command injection — /admin/stats/disk?parameters=;whoami
  3. IDOR — GET /orders/{other_user_order_id}
  4. Information disclosure — unauthenticated GET /debug
  5. JWT algorithm confusion / none attack
  6. Weak password reset PIN brute force
  7. IP-spoofable admin password reset
  8. Hardcoded fallback database password

Patched fork

The fork is kept public as proof of work.

…ssment

- Patch mass assignment in PATCH /profile and PUT /profile
- Fix OS command injection in /admin/stats/disk (shell=False + allowlist)
- Require Chef auth on /debug and redact sensitive env vars
- Enable JWT signature verification (VERIFY_SIGNATURE=True)
- Strengthen password reset PIN to 8 digits / 10 min expiry
- Enforce object ownership on /orders/{order_id}
- Replace IP-spoofable /admin/reset-chef-password check with Chef role auth
- Remove hardcoded fallback Postgres password
- Restrict update_user helper to allowed fields only
- Add Hall of Fame entry and solution write-up for g00siferdev-py
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