Fix int overflow in tensor byte-size calculation

[Forbiddem]

BUG=#3552

Re-submission of #3551. That PR was auto-closed by the stale bot on 2026-06-22 before any review took place — the only outstanding gate was the maintainer-approved CI matrix (approval-gate / call-*), which was never triggered for an external contributor. The PR could not be reopened (the closed-PR head ref had become detached and both API reopen and push-to-branch were refused), so I'm re-submitting the identical commit. CLA is signed and the local tests pass.

Summary

BytesRequiredForTensor, TfLiteEvalTensorByteLength, and
AllocateOutputDimensionsFromInput in
tensorflow/lite/micro/memory_helpers.cc all multiply tensor shape dimensions
into a signed 32-bit int element_count running product before assigning the
result to a size_t byte count. Shape dimensions and the element type size
come from the (untrusted) flatbuffer model, so a model with a shape such as
[65536, 65536] over a 4-byte element type produces a product of 2^32, which
wraps to 0 in the original code and yields *bytes = 0. Subsequent buffer
arithmetic in the allocator then operates on a tensor whose advertised size
is 0 while its dimensions imply ~17 GiB of storage, opening a memory
corruption surface when a model is loaded from an untrusted source.

This PR:

• Performs the running product in size_t, matching the result type, and
  rejects negative shape dimensions with kTfLiteError.
• Guards every multiplication (shape * shape and elements * type_size)
  against overflow of size_t and returns kTfLiteError when the next
  multiplication would wrap.
• Propagates the previously discarded status of TfLiteTypeSizeOf in
  AllocateOutputDimensionsFromInput.

Test plan

• make -f tensorflow/lite/micro/tools/make/Makefile memory_helpers_test
  builds clean.
• gen/linux_x86_64_default_gcc/bin/memory_helpers_test — all 10 cases
  pass, including the 3 new regression tests:
  • TfLiteEvalTensorByteLengthDoesNotTruncateAcrossInt32Boundary — shape
    [65536, 65536] float32 now reports 17,179,869,184 bytes on 64-bit
    size_t platforms (previously: 0), and kTfLiteError on 32-bit
    size_t platforms.
  • TfLiteEvalTensorByteLengthRejectsSizeTOverflow — a shape that
    overflows even a 64-bit size_t is rejected with kTfLiteError.
  • TfLiteEvalTensorByteLengthRejectsNegativeDimension — a negative
    shape dimension is rejected with kTfLiteError.

Notes for review

• The overflow checks use std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max() / x, which is
  portable and MSVC-safe — deliberately not __builtin_mul_overflow, which
  would break the call-windows build.
• @veblush — since this is a memory-safety fix for untrusted-model parsing,
  would you be able to approve the workflow run and take a look when you have a
  moment? Happy to switch the manual checks to any form the tree prefers and to
  address any other feedback.