Add AIHubMix prepaid USD balance

[jalenzz]

Summary

• add AIHubMix as a first-party provider that reads prepaid USD remaining from the Manage Key /api/user/self endpoint
• convert internal quota units with quota / 500000 and show the remaining amount in the menu bar instead of an empty dash
• accept AIHUBMIX_ACCESS_KEY (or AIHUBMIX_TOKEN) and optional AIHUBMIX_API_URL; inference sk- keys are rejected
• register branding, docs, generated manifests, and parser/fetch coverage

Test plan

• swift test --filter AIHubMixUsageFetcherTests
• make check
• Confirm Settings → Providers → AIHubMix accepts a Manage Key (System Access Token), not an inference API key

Made with Cursor

[clawsweeper]

🦞👀
ClawSweeper picked this up.

Pull request received. I will update this pull request when review starts.

[clawsweeper]

Codex review: needs real behavior proof before merge. Reviewed August 26, 2026, 12:54 AM ET / 04:54 UTC.

ClawSweeper review

What this changes

This PR adds AIHubMix prepaid-balance fetching, provider registration, menu rendering, CLI metadata, tests, and documentation.

Merge readiness

⛔ Blocked until stronger real behavior proof is added - 6 items remain

Keep open: this is a new first-party provider with an unresolved credential-routing policy and insufficient real behavior proof; current main does not already provide AIHubMix support.

Priority: P2
Reviewed head: 0ca4b13919ef0f40a9a468ade3e3b820e510becd
Owner decision: Required. See Decision needed.

Review scores

Measure	Result	What it means
Overall readiness	🦪 silver shellfish (2/6)	The implementation is scoped and has focused mocked coverage, but real behavior proof is incomplete and the Manage Key destination remains a security-policy question.
Proof confidence	🦪 silver shellfish (2/6)	Needs stronger real behavior proof before merge: Authority-chain proof required: the supplied settings screenshot does not show a successful, redacted Manage Key fetch and rendered balance, nor proof of the final credential destination policy; add that after-fix evidence and redact private data. Updating the PR body should trigger re-review; otherwise ask a maintainer to comment @clawsweeper re-review. After adding proof, update the PR body; ClawSweeper should re-review automatically. If it does not, the PR author or someone with repository write access can comment @clawsweeper re-review.
Patch quality	🦐 gold shrimp (3/6)	Security review found an item that needs attention.

Verification

Check	Result	Evidence
Real behavior	Needs proof	Needs stronger real behavior proof before merge: Authority-chain proof required: the supplied settings screenshot does not show a successful, redacted Manage Key fetch and rendered balance, nor proof of the final credential destination policy; add that after-fix evidence and redact private data. Updating the PR body should trigger re-review; otherwise ask a maintainer to comment @clawsweeper re-review. After adding proof, update the PR body; ClawSweeper should re-review automatically. If it does not, the PR author or someone with repository write access can comment @clawsweeper re-review.
Evidence reviewed	6 items	Current main lacks this provider: The current-main provider registry ends with IBM Bob; AIHubMix is only added by this PR, so the requested capability is not already implemented. Credential routing reaches arbitrary HTTPS hosts: The new override accepts any normalized HTTPS URL, and the fetcher sends the Manage Key in its Authorization header to that resulting URL. The broad override is documented as intentional: The new documentation advertises AIHUBMIX_API_URL as an HTTPS URL or bare-host override while also documenting the Authorization header.
Findings	None	None.
Security	Needs attention	Constrain custom endpoint credential routing: The override accepts any HTTPS host and the request places the Manage Key in Authorization, so a configured non-provider host receives that credential without a provider-owned-host check.

Live Verification

Command: swift test --filter AIHubMixUsageFetcherTests

Result: FAIL (failed) — execution before step 1 run: sh -lc pnpm install --ignore-scripts --frozen-lockfile failed: ! Corepack is about to download https://registry.npmjs.org/pnpm/-/pnpm-11.24.0.tgz

sh -lc pnpm install --ignore-scripts --frozen-lockfile failed: ! Corepack is about to download https://registry.npmjs.org/pnpm/-/pnpm-11.24.0.tgz

Assertions:

• FAIL expect_output: Test run with

How this fits together

CodexBar resolves a provider credential, fetches account usage into a shared snapshot, then displays it in the menu bar and provider details. AIHubMix would add a Manage Key-based balance source to that pipeline.

flowchart LR
  A[Manage Key] --> B[AIHubMix provider]
  B --> C[API base selection]
  C --> D[Account balance request]
  D --> E[Usage snapshot]
  E --> F[Menu bar balance]
  E --> G[Account details]

Loading

Decision needed

Question	Recommendation
Should AIHUBMIX_API_URL be allowed to send an AIHubMix Manage Key to any HTTPS host, or should this provider restrict requests to AIHubMix-owned endpoints?	Restrict credential destinations: Allow the documented AIHubMix endpoint family only and prove an untrusted override is rejected before an Authorization header is sent.

Why: The PR intentionally introduces a configurable network destination for a long-lived credential, and source alone cannot determine whether self-hosted or proxy endpoints are a supported product contract.

Before merge

• Add real behavior proof - Needs stronger real behavior proof before merge: Authority-chain proof required: the supplied settings screenshot does not show a successful, redacted Manage Key fetch and rendered balance, nor proof of the final credential destination policy; add that after-fix evidence and redact private data. Updating the PR body should trigger re-review; otherwise ask a maintainer to comment @clawsweeper re-review. After adding proof, update the PR body; ClawSweeper should re-review automatically. If it does not, the PR author or someone with repository write access can comment @clawsweeper re-review.
• Resolve security concern: Constrain custom endpoint credential routing - The override accepts any HTTPS host and the request places the Manage Key in Authorization, so a configured non-provider host receives that credential without a provider-owned-host check.
• Resolve merge risk (P1) - AIHUBMIX_API_URL can direct a long-lived Manage Key to any HTTPS host, so the supported custom-endpoint boundary needs an explicit maintainer decision.
• Resolve merge risk (P1) - The submitted screenshot does not show a successful balance fetch or the resulting menu-bar value.
• Complete next step (P2) - A maintainer must choose the first-party credential-routing contract before any targeted repair can safely proceed.

Findings

• [medium] Constrain custom endpoint credential routing — Sources/CodexBarCore/Providers/AIHubMix/AIHubMixUsageFetcher.swift:107

Agent review details

Security

Needs attention: No dependency or workflow change was found, but the new endpoint override can send a Manage Key to an arbitrary HTTPS host.

Review metrics

Metric	Value	Why it matters
Patch surface	27 files, +774/-91 lines	The provider addition spans core fetching, app presentation, generated registries, tests, and public documentation.
Production versus tests	production +398/-9, tests +220/-4	The substantial focused test addition is useful, while the larger production surface warrants an explicit endpoint-policy review.

Merge-risk options

Maintainer options:

1. Constrain the Manage Key destination (recommended)
   Before merge, restrict the override to provider-owned hosts and add injected-transport coverage proving an untrusted host receives no Authorization header.
2. Adopt a custom-endpoint contract
   Retain arbitrary HTTPS overrides only if maintainers explicitly want self-hosted or proxy routing for this first-party provider.

Technical review

Best possible solution:

If maintainers sponsor first-party AIHubMix support, define the endpoint trust boundary, then add redacted live proof of a Manage Key balance fetch and displayed value.

Do we have a high-confidence way to reproduce the issue?

Yes for the credential-routing concern: an injected transport can set a non-AIHubMix HTTPS override and observe that the fetch path sends Authorization to the resulting host; this read-only review did not execute it.

Is this the best way to solve the issue?

Unclear: the provider follows the established registry and snapshot shape, but maintainers must first choose whether arbitrary custom endpoints are a supported credential-routing contract.

AGENTS.md: found and applied where relevant.

Codex review notes: model internal, reasoning high; reviewed against 3cde772b9f02.

Labels

Label changes:

• add P2: This is a bounded provider addition carrying a credential-destination policy decision and no demonstrated active outage.
• add merge-risk: 🚨 security-boundary: A newly introduced environment override can change which HTTPS host receives the Manage Key Authorization header.
• add proof: 📸 screenshot: Contributor real behavior proof includes screenshot evidence. Authority-chain proof required: the supplied settings screenshot does not show a successful, redacted Manage Key fetch and rendered balance, nor proof of the final credential destination policy; add that after-fix evidence and redact private data. Updating the PR body should trigger re-review; otherwise ask a maintainer to comment @clawsweeper re-review.
• add rating: 🦪 silver shellfish: Overall readiness is 🦪 silver shellfish; proof is 🦪 silver shellfish and patch quality is 🦐 gold shrimp.
• add status: 📣 needs proof: The PR needs real behavior proof before ClawSweeper can clear the contributor ask. Needs stronger real behavior proof before merge: Authority-chain proof required: the supplied settings screenshot does not show a successful, redacted Manage Key fetch and rendered balance, nor proof of the final credential destination policy; add that after-fix evidence and redact private data. Updating the PR body should trigger re-review; otherwise ask a maintainer to comment @clawsweeper re-review. After adding proof, update the PR body; ClawSweeper should re-review automatically. If it does not, the PR author or someone with repository write access can comment @clawsweeper re-review.

Label justifications:

• P2: This is a bounded provider addition carrying a credential-destination policy decision and no demonstrated active outage.
• merge-risk: 🚨 security-boundary: A newly introduced environment override can change which HTTPS host receives the Manage Key Authorization header.
• rating: 🦪 silver shellfish: Overall readiness is 🦪 silver shellfish; proof is 🦪 silver shellfish and patch quality is 🦐 gold shrimp.
• status: 📣 needs proof: The PR needs real behavior proof before ClawSweeper can clear the contributor ask. Needs stronger real behavior proof before merge: Authority-chain proof required: the supplied settings screenshot does not show a successful, redacted Manage Key fetch and rendered balance, nor proof of the final credential destination policy; add that after-fix evidence and redact private data. Updating the PR body should trigger re-review; otherwise ask a maintainer to comment @clawsweeper re-review. After adding proof, update the PR body; ClawSweeper should re-review automatically. If it does not, the PR author or someone with repository write access can comment @clawsweeper re-review.
• proof: 📸 screenshot: Contributor real behavior proof includes screenshot evidence. Authority-chain proof required: the supplied settings screenshot does not show a successful, redacted Manage Key fetch and rendered balance, nor proof of the final credential destination policy; add that after-fix evidence and redact private data. Updating the PR body should trigger re-review; otherwise ask a maintainer to comment @clawsweeper re-review.

Evidence

Security concerns:

• [medium] Constrain custom endpoint credential routing — Sources/CodexBarCore/Providers/AIHubMix/AIHubMixUsageFetcher.swift:107
  The override accepts any HTTPS host and the request places the Manage Key in Authorization, so a configured non-provider host receives that credential without a provider-owned-host check.
  Confidence: 0.93

What I checked:

• Current main lacks this provider: The current-main provider registry ends with IBM Bob; AIHubMix is only added by this PR, so the requested capability is not already implemented. (Sources/CodexBarCore/Providers/ProviderManifest.swift:76, 3cde772b9f02)
• Credential routing reaches arbitrary HTTPS hosts: The new override accepts any normalized HTTPS URL, and the fetcher sends the Manage Key in its Authorization header to that resulting URL. (Sources/CodexBarCore/Providers/AIHubMix/AIHubMixUsageFetcher.swift:107, 0ca4b13919ef)
• The broad override is documented as intentional: The new documentation advertises AIHUBMIX_API_URL as an HTTPS URL or bare-host override while also documenting the Authorization header. (docs/aihubmix.md:37, 0ca4b13919ef)
• Focused tests are mocked rather than live proof: The added tests inject a transport and fixture response; the supplied PR body has an unchecked test plan and a settings screenshot, but no redacted after-fix account fetch and rendered balance evidence. (Tests/CodexBarTests/AIHubMixUsageFetcherTests.swift:45, 0ca4b13919ef)
• Likely current-main routing owner: Current-main blame attributes the provider manifests and adjacent menu display path to Peter Steinberger; the shallow history cannot establish older feature ownership more precisely. (Sources/CodexBarCore/Providers/ProviderManifest.swift:76, 3cde772b9f02)
• Release/main position: v0.55.0 contains commit 061593c, while current main is later at 3cde772; neither current-main registry nor the latest release contains AIHubMix. (Sources/CodexBarCore/Providers/ProviderManifest.swift:76, 061593ca15d9)

Likely related people:

• Peter Steinberger: Current-main blame attributes the central provider registries and adjacent balance-display path to this author; deeper history is unavailable in the shallow checkout. (role: recent current-main contributor; confidence: medium; commits: 3cde772b9f02, 061593ca15d9; files: Sources/CodexBarCore/Providers/ProviderManifest.swift, Sources/CodexBar/Providers/Shared/ProviderImplementationManifest.swift, Sources/CodexBar/StatusItemController+Animation.swift)

Rank-up moves

Optional improvements that raise the rating; they are not merge blockers.

• Obtain maintainer direction for AIHUBMIX_API_URL and prove the selected trust boundary before Authorization is sent.
• Add redacted after-fix evidence showing a real Manage Key balance fetch and the displayed menu-bar balance.

Rating scale

Score	Internal tier	Crab rank	Meaning
6/6	S	🦀 challenger crab	Exceptional readiness
5/6	A	🦞 diamond lobster	Very strong readiness
4/6	B	🐚 platinum hermit	Good normal PR; ordinary maintainer review
3/6	C	🦐 gold shrimp	Useful, but confidence is limited
2/6	D	🦪 silver shellfish	Proof or implementation needs work
1/6	F	🧂 unranked krab	Not merge-ready
N/A	NA	🌊 off-meta tidepool	Rating does not apply

Overall follows the weaker of proof and patch quality.
Shiny media proof means a screenshot, video, or linked artifact directly shows the changed behavior. Runtime, network, CSP, and security claims still need visible diagnostics.

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[steipete]

Thanks for the implementation and the populated menu screenshot. The screenshot is useful visual evidence; it does not yet tie a successful request and freshly built display to the submitted commit. The exact-head CI run is awaiting approval with zero build/test jobs, and the PR's test checklist is still unchecked.

Before we take this further, please add the public evidence required by hosted relay eligibility: identifiable operator/jurisdiction, independently verifiable upstream authorization, and operating track record. This is a request for evidence, not an assertion that the service is unauthorized.

Please also make the intended credential/destination contract explicit. This uses an account-wide Manage Key—the official account API guide uses the same System Access Token for balance reads and key-management operations—and AIHUBMIX_API_URL deliberately permits a user-selected HTTPS host. The shared validator rejects unsafe URL forms, but it does not restrict the first request to AIHubMix. That is explicit configuration, not a demonstrated remote-exfiltration bug; arbitrary proxy support is nevertheless a broader scope than the default vendor balance endpoint and should be justified or left out of this initial integration. Include destination/redirect and account-selection tests for whichever contract is proposed.

After those boundaries are settled, the final integrated head needs focused fetch/settings/rendering tests, the provider architecture gate, make check, and full make test, plus redacted authenticated-read/UI proof tied to that SHA. Do not post a Manage Key, full account payload or unrelated private data. Keeping this open; no local tests or live account calls were run for this maintainer pass.