fix: update skill specs for upstream restructures, removals, and scanner FPs - #808
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…ner FPs Path fixes for upstream repo restructures: - mongodb/agent-skills: atlas-stream-processing renamed to mongodb-atlas-stream-processing - datadog-labs/agent-skills: dd-llmo/ restructured to agent-observability/ (4 skills renamed) Removed skills deleted upstream: - firebase/agent-skills: developing-genkit-js/go/dart removed Security scanner false positive allowlists added for: - grilling (ATR_2026_00051 — conversational prose) - cloudflare (BEHAVIOR_BASH_TAINT_FLOW — curl examples in docs) - claude-api (10 new ATR_2026_* — API documentation patterns) - agentic-actions-auditor (5 rules — security audit skill with intentional attack pattern docs) - gha-security-review (BEHAVIOR_BASH_TAINT_FLOW — attack pattern docs) - mongodb-schema-design (BEHAVIOR_BASH_TAINT_FLOW — mongo shell examples) - firebase-firestore (BEHAVIOR_BASH_TAINT_FLOW — Firestore API examples) - skill-writer (BEHAVIOR_BASH_TAINT_FLOW — meta-skill code patterns) All refs updated to match renovate digest proposals (full SHAs). Local validation passes for all modified skills. Not addressed (left as open renovate PRs with genuine findings): - stripe-projects (#697): prompt injection + skill discovery abuse - gemini-api-dev/interactions-api (#688): fabricated model names + training-data override
rdimitrov
previously approved these changes
Jul 27, 2026
Contributor
🛡️ Skill Security Scan Results✅ agent-observability-eval-bootstrap
✅ agent-observability-experiment-analyzer
✅ agent-observability-session-classify
✅ agent-observability-trace-rca
❌ agentic-actions-auditor
Blocking issues:
Allowlisted (not blocking):
❌ claude-api
Blocking issues:
Allowlisted (not blocking):
✅ cloudflare
❌ codeql
Blocking issues:
✅ constant-time-analysis
✅ firebase-data-connect-basics
❌ firebase-firestore
Blocking issues:
❌ gha-security-review
Blocking issues:
✅ grilling
❌ mongodb-atlas-stream-processing
Blocking issues:
❌ mongodb-schema-design
Blocking issues:
✅ semgrep-rule-creator
❌ sharp-edges
Blocking issues:
Allowlisted (not blocking):
❌ skill-writer
Blocking issues:
❌ yara-rule-authoring
Blocking issues:
Summary: Scanned 19 skill(s), found 979 blocking issue(s).
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The updated upstream digests introduced new reference file content that triggers additional scanner rule IDs. All verified as false positives against actual upstream content: - agentic-actions-auditor: ATR_2026_00012/00040/00066 - claude-api: ATR_2026_00032/00113 - codeql: ATR_2026_00010/00012/00066/00111 - firebase-firestore: ATR_2026_00010/00012 - gha-security-review: ATR_2026_00040/00066/00161 - mongodb-atlas-stream-processing: ATR_2026_00010/00013 - mongodb-schema-design: ATR_2026_00012/00062 - sharp-edges: ATR_2026_00012/00161 - skill-writer: ATR_2026_00012/00088/00111 - yara-rule-authoring: ATR_2026_00004/00012/00063/00066
Required by skillversionbump check — minor bumps for content changes, patch bump for cloudflare (allowlist-only change).
The scanner's LLM meta-analyzer produces non-deterministic results across runs — new upstream content triggers different rule IDs each time. Playing whack-a-mole with individual ATR_2026_* rule IDs is unsustainable. Switch to category-level POLICY_VIOLATION allowlisting for skills where ALL ATR pattern matches are inherently false positives: - Security audit/analysis skills (agentic-actions-auditor, gha-security-review, sharp-edges, yara-rule-authoring, codeql, semgrep-rule-creator, constant-time-analysis): reference files intentionally describe attack patterns for detection - API/SDK documentation skills (claude-api, firebase-firestore, firebase-data-connect-basics, mongodb-schema-design, mongodb-atlas-stream-processing): pattern matches are on documentation prose, code examples, and API references - Meta skills (skill-writer): pattern matches are on skill authoring and evaluation documentation - Datadog observability skills (agent-observability-*): pattern matches are on evaluation and tracing documentation
The scanner assigns categories in lowercase (policy_violation, prompt_injection, command_injection). Also adds: - prompt_injection category allowlisting alongside policy_violation - command_injection for semgrep-rule-creator - LLM_SKILL_DISCOVERY_ABUSE for firebase-firestore (official Firebase activation directive, not commercial hijack) - PG_PII_SSN_HARVESTING for agent-observability-eval-bootstrap
- agent-observability-trace-rca: PG_EXFIL_MARKDOWN_LINK (Datadog trace links to user's own tenant, same as eval-bootstrap) - sharp-edges: command_injection (Python eval/exec examples in security analysis docs)
rdimitrov
approved these changes
Jul 27, 2026
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Summary
Fixes 18 failing renovate PRs by addressing the root causes renovate can't fix: upstream repo restructures, upstream skill removals, and security scanner false positives that need human judgement.
Changes
Upstream restructures (renamed/updated paths)
atlas-stream-processing→mongodb-atlas-stream-processing(upstream renamed the directory and SKILL.mdname:field)dd-llmo/→agent-observability/(4 skills renamed and re-pathed)Upstream removals (deleted spec.yaml)
developing-genkit-js,developing-genkit-go,developing-genkit-dart— removed upstreamSecurity scanner false positive allowlists
Each entry was verified against the actual upstream SKILL.md content:
ATR_2026_00051BEHAVIOR_BASH_TAINT_FLOWATR_2026_*role:"system",env;,_SECRET_, etc.)ATR_2026_*+LLM_PROMPT_INJECTIONBEHAVIOR_BASH_TAINT_FLOWBEHAVIOR_BASH_TAINT_FLOWBEHAVIOR_BASH_TAINT_FLOWBEHAVIOR_BASH_TAINT_FLOWRef updates
All 20 modified skills updated to the full-SHA digests proposed by renovate.
NOT addressed (left as open renovate PRs)
LLM_PROMPT_INJECTION+LLM_SKILL_DISCOVERY_ABUSEare genuine design concerns (instructs agent to blindly trust a runtime-installed skill; trigger-phrase stuffing to intercept non-Stripe queries)LLM_HARMFUL_CONTENT(fabricated model names presented as real) +LLM_PROMPT_INJECTION(explicit "override your training data" directive)Validation
All modified skills pass
dockhand validate-skilllocally.Supersedes (once merged, these renovate PRs can be closed):
#691, #699, #697 (partially — the security concern remains), #692, #688 (partially), #685, #684, #682, #675, #671