feat: v0.15.0 — verified crate distribution (payload kinds + export-cargo) - #37
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…argo) varve becomes a general verified-artifact distributor: a tool binary is just bytes with an exec bit, and so is a crate. First adapter is Cargo. REQ-KIND-001 — each layer entry declares a payload `kind` (tool|crate|wit| zephyr-module|sdk|wasm-component) in its signed annotations. Verification is unchanged (every kind is a signed digest checked against the trust root); a `tool` entry carries no kind annotation, so pre-kind layers keep byte-identical payloads. An unknown kind is refused at the boundaries that act on it (deposit, each kind-consuming export); install is deliberately kind-agnostic (lays down signed bytes uniformly) so an older varve still installs what it can from a future-kind layer. REQ-CRATE-001 — `varve export-cargo` materialises a Cargo local registry (the .crate files + index) from a layer's verified crate entries and emits a .cargo/config.toml source-replacement, so a consumer builds fully offline. The cksum Cargo verifies IS varve's signed sha256 of the .crate — no new trust path. Proven by a REAL `cargo build --offline` against an exported registry, plus a full CLI dogfood (deposit crate-kind -> install -> export-cargo). REQ-RELVER-001 — a release now fails unless the git tag matches the workspace Cargo.toml version (the version-guard job gates the whole release). Fixes the v0.14.0 miss where binaries reported 0.13.1. Version bumped to 0.15.0. Independently reviewed (VER-REVIEW-v0.15.0, verdict pass): the reviewer re-ran every suite and ran its own wrong-cksum tamper experiment (Cargo rejected it offline), and found two minor gaps fixed here — the unknown-kind claim narrowed to its true scope, and export-cargo now re-hashes on-disk bytes against the signed digest itself. Roadmap re-planned distribution-first: v0.16.0 Corrosion (transparent) + rules_rust (vendored export); conformance/archive to v0.18-0.19. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019TNtfRjLNhEz82G2ggeeNu
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v0.15.0 — varve distributes verified crates
First step of the general verified-artifact distributor arc (crates → WIT → Zephyr → SDK). A tool binary is just bytes with an exec bit; so is a crate. The trust core is untouched.
REQ-KIND-001 — typed payload kinds
Each layer entry declares a
kind(tool | crate | wit | zephyr-module | sdk | wasm-component) in its signed annotations. Verification is unchanged (every kind is a signed digest against the trust root). Atoolentry carries no kind annotation → pre-kind layers keep byte-identical payloads. Unknown kinds are refused where they're consumed (deposit + exports); install is kind-agnostic (forward-compat).REQ-CRATE-001 — offline builds through Cargo, no git server
varve export-cargomaterialises a Cargo local registry + a.cargo/config.tomlsource-replacement from a layer's verifiedcrateentries. The cksum Cargo verifies is exactly varve's signed sha256 of the.crate— same trust anchor, Cargo re-checks on its own terms. Proven by a realcargo build --offlineagainst an exported registry (the honest oracle), plus a full CLI dogfood.varve export-cargo --layer 2026.08.0 --out ./vendored # copy ./vendored/.cargo/config.toml into your project, then: cargo build --offlineREQ-RELVER-001 — a binary reports the version it's tagged as
A
version-guardrelease job fails the build if the git tag ≠ Cargo.toml version, gating the whole pipeline. Fixes the v0.14.0 miss (binaries reported 0.13.1). Version bumped to 0.15.0 — so this release's own binaries are correct.Independent review — VER-REVIEW-v0.15.0, verdict pass
The clean-room reviewer re-ran every suite (127 lib + offline + 34 CLI) and ran its own tamper experiment (wrong cksum → Cargo rejects offline, proving the oracle non-vacuous). Two minor gaps it found were fixed before release: the unknown-kind claim narrowed to its true scope, and
export-cargonow re-hashes on-disk bytes against the signed digest itself.Next (planned in rivet)
cargo vendor-shapedexport-crates-vendor; a Bazel spike gates the claim).Gate
127 lib + offline + 34 CLI tests green; clippy + fmt clean;
--lockedsynced;rivet validate+ verification-evidence (103 steps) + claim-check (12) + review-check (2 verdicts) all green.🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_019TNtfRjLNhEz82G2ggeeNu