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chore(deps): update github-actions (major)#170
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renovate/major-github-actions

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@renovate

@renovate renovate Bot commented Jul 8, 2026 •
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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Type Update Change
actions/checkout action major v6.0.2 → v7.0.1
actions/setup-go action major v6.4.0 → v7.0.0
actions/setup-node action major v6.4.0 → v7.0.0
slackapi/slack-github-action action major v3.0.3 → v4.0.0
sorenlouv/backport-github-action action major v11.0.0 → v12.0.4

Release Notes

actions/checkout (actions/checkout)

v7.0.1

Compare Source

v7.0.0

Compare Source

v7

Compare Source

v6.1.0

Compare Source

v6.0.3

Compare Source

actions/setup-go (actions/setup-go)

v7.0.0

Compare Source

What's Changed
New Contributors

Full Changelog: actions/setup-go@v6...v7.0.0

v7

Compare Source

v6.5.0

Compare Source

actions/setup-node (actions/setup-node)

v7.0.0

Compare Source

What's Changed
Enhancements:
Bug fixes:
Documentation updates:
Dependency update:
New Contributors

Full Changelog: actions/setup-node@v6...v7.0.0

v7

Compare Source

v6.5.0

Compare Source

What's Changed

Full Changelog: actions/setup-node@v6.4.0...v6.5.0

slackapi/slack-github-action (slackapi/slack-github-action)

v4.0.0: Slack GitHub Action v4.0.0

Compare Source

Major Changes

  • b1974f0: build: parse yaml with more strict multiline indentation rules

    Internal dependencies of js-yaml@v5 make YAML parsing more strict and compliant with the YAML specification. Indentation is now required for values that span multiple lines against the base value.

    See the YAML line prefixes spec for the expected indentation rule:

      channel: "C0123"
  text: "first line

- second line"
+   second line"
Patch Changes
  • 654bb72: chore: provide global fetch proxied configurations with updates to web api and webhook packages

v4.0

Compare Source

v4

Compare Source

v3.0.5: Slack GitHub Action v3.0.5

Compare Source

Patch Changes
  • 96fddbe: fix: revert multiline yaml parsing indentation change

v3.0.4: Slack GitHub Action v3.0.4

Compare Source

Patch Changes
sorenlouv/backport-github-action (sorenlouv/backport-github-action)

v12.0.4

Compare Source

What's Changed

Full Changelog: sorenlouv/backport-github-action@v12.0.0...v12.0.4

v12.0.3

Compare Source

What's Changed

Full Changelog: sorenlouv/backport-github-action@v12.0.0...v12.0.3

v12.0.2

Compare Source

What's Changed

Full Changelog: sorenlouv/backport-github-action@v12.0.0...v12.0.2

v12.0.1

Compare Source

What's Changed

Full Changelog: sorenlouv/backport-github-action@v12.0.0...v12.0.1

v12.0.0

Compare Source

Update backport to 12.0.0

v12

Compare Source

Configuration

📅 Schedule: (UTC)

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🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.

♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

👻 Immortal: This PR will be recreated if closed unmerged. Get config help if that's undesired.

  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

@github-actions

github-actions Bot commented Jul 8, 2026 •
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Claude finished @renovate[bot]'s task in 1m 53s —— View job

Review

Mechanical bump. Only one substantive risk worth flagging.

⚠️ Potential breaking change: actions/checkout v7 blocks fork-PR checkout under pull_request_target

Per the v7 changelog, actions/checkout#2454 "Block checking out fork PR for pull_request_target and workflow_run" — this is exactly the pattern used in .github/workflows/claude-code-review.yaml:

  • Line 4: reusable workflow (workflow_call) — invoked by callers that (per the in-file comment on line 17) use pull_request_target so secrets are available for fork PRs "by design"
  • Line 30: ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} — the fork PR head SHA
  • Lines 42–51: an entire "Setup fork as origin for Claude" step, so fork PRs are explicitly a supported path

If the v7 block is a hard failure (not opt-in), every Claude code-review run on a fork PR will start failing at the checkout step after this merges and callers pick up @main. Callers include downstream repos, so the blast radius extends beyond this repo.

Please verify against v7's actual behavior before merging:

  1. Read actions/checkout PR #2454 — does v7 add a new input (e.g. allow-fork-pr or similar) to opt back into the old behavior, or is it a hard block?
  2. If a hard block: either keep checkout@v6 on claude-code-review.yaml (and any downstream workflow that runs under pull_request_target + checks out head.sha), or drop the reusable workflow's fork-PR support.
  3. If opt-in escape hatch exists: add the required input on line 28 with a comment explaining why fork PRs are intentionally allowed here.

Note: ai-pr-review.yaml is not affected — its job gates on github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository (line 43), skipping fork PRs entirely.

Not an issue

  • sorenlouv/backport-github-action v11→v12: backport.yaml only passes standard inputs (github_token, auto_backport_label_prefix, add_original_reviewers), none of which appear affected by the v12 release notes (release automation + npm dep bumps only).
  • SHA pinning is consistent across all 38 files (9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 for checkout, 8a6c0381851f43f9f1fddc7303f0e9015eb57b62 for backport).
    · Branch

github-actions[bot]
github-actions Bot approved these changes Jul 8, 2026
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Approved by the shared auto-approve workflow because this PR matched the approval criteria.

For more information, see https://github.com/loft-sh/github-actions?tab=readme-ov-file#auto-approve-bot-prs.

@renovate
renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/major-github-actions branch from 8a5e40a to 72611a3 Compare July 9, 2026 08:10
@github-actions

github-actions Bot commented Jul 9, 2026 •
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Claude finished @renovate[bot]'s task in 4m 14s —— View job

Review

Renovate rebased/force-pushed (commit 72611a3, 08:10 UTC) with no substantive change from the diff reviewed yesterday. The primary risk still stands.

⚠️ actions/checkout v7 fork-PR block breaks claude-code-review.yaml

Per the v7.0.0 changelog: actions/checkout#2454 "Block checking out fork PR for pull_request_target and workflow_run". This is exactly what claude-code-review.yaml is designed to do:

  • L4: workflow_call reusable workflow.
  • L16-17: comment explicitly states callers invoke it via pull_request_target so secrets are available for fork PRs "by design".
  • L28-30: actions/checkout@v7 with ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} — the fork PR head SHA.
  • L42-51: dedicated "Setup fork as origin for Claude" step, i.e. fork PRs are a first-class supported path.

If v7 hard-blocks (rather than opt-in warns), every caller running claude-code-review.yaml@main will fail at the checkout step on fork PRs after merge — blast radius includes downstream repos consuming this reusable workflow.

I could not verify v7's exact behavior against upstream (gh api, curl, and WebFetch are all sandboxed in this job). Please confirm one of the following before merging:

  1. Hard block, no bypass: keep checkout@v6.0.3 on claude-code-review.yaml (a bare-minimum fix; the rest of the repo can safely go to v7).
  2. Opt-in via input (e.g. some new allow-fork-pr / equivalent): add it on L28-32 with a comment linking to #2454 and justifying why fork PRs are intentionally allowed here.
  3. Detection by ref vs. event, not eventName: verify the specific check by reading src/input-helper.ts.

Fix this →

Not an issue

  • ai-pr-review.yaml is safe — gated on github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository (L43), so fork PRs are skipped upstream of checkout.
  • sorenlouv/backport-github-action v11→v12: backport.yaml passes only github_token, auto_backport_label_prefix, add_original_reviewers — none touched by the v12 release notes (CI automation + npm bumps only).
  • SHA pins are consistent and match the claimed tags across all 39 files.

Todos:

  • Verify actions/checkout v7 fork-PR block affects claude-code-review.yaml
  • Verify sorenlouv/backport v11→v12 input compatibility
  • Verify SHA pins match across changed files
  • Post review
    · Branch

@renovate
renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/major-github-actions branch from 72611a3 to 17add75 Compare July 14, 2026 03:16
@github-actions

github-actions Bot commented Jul 14, 2026 •
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Claude finished @renovate[bot]'s task in 2m 27s —— View job

Review

No substantive change since the last review. Primary risk still stands and remains unverified against the v7 source (sandbox in this job blocks curl, wget, gh api, and WebFetch to github.com — same limitation as prior run).

⚠️ actions/checkout v7 fork-PR block likely breaks claude-code-review.yaml

Per the v7.0.0 changelog: actions/checkout#2454 "Block checking out fork PR for pull_request_target and workflow_run". This is a first-class supported path in claude-code-review.yaml:

  • L4: workflow_call reusable workflow.
  • L16-17: comment states callers invoke it via pull_request_target so secrets are available on fork PRs by design.
  • L28-30: checkout@v7 with ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} — the fork head SHA.
  • L42-51: dedicated "Setup fork as origin for Claude" step, confirming fork PRs are supported.

If v7's block is a hard fail (no opt-in), every claude-code-review.yaml@main invocation on a fork PR will fail at the checkout step after merge — blast radius includes downstream repos consuming this reusable workflow.

Verify one of the following before merging (cannot verify from this sandbox):

  1. Hard block, no bypass → keep checkout@v6.0.3 (SHA 08eba0b27e820071cde6df949e0beb9ba4906955) on claude-code-review.yaml only. Rest of repo can go to v7. Fix this →
  2. Opt-in input exists (e.g. allow-fork-pr or similar in v7's action.yml) → add it on L28-32 with a comment linking to #2454.
  3. Block only fires on specific ref shapes you don't hit → confirm by reading v7's src/input-helper.ts / src/git-source-provider.ts.

Not an issue

  • ai-pr-review.yaml — gated on github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository (L43), fork PRs skipped upstream of checkout.
  • sorenlouv/backport-github-action v11→v12 — backport.yaml passes only github_token, auto_backport_label_prefix; v12 release notes are CI automation + npm dep bumps only.
  • SHA pins consistent across all 39 files (9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 for checkout, 8a6c0381851f43f9f1fddc7303f0e9015eb57b62 for backport).

Todos:

  • Confirm risk still applies after 2026-07-14 rebase
  • Attempt v7 source verification (blocked by sandbox — same as prior run)
  • Re-check backport v12 input compatibility
  • Post review
    · Branch

@renovate
renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/major-github-actions branch from 17add75 to c9d0157 Compare July 16, 2026 01:12
@github-actions

github-actions Bot commented Jul 16, 2026 •
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Claude finished @renovate[bot]'s task in 1m 45s —— View job

Review

No substantive change since the prior review. Same primary risk, still unverified against v7 source (sandbox blocks curl, gh api to external repos, and WebFetch requires interactive permission — same limitation as prior three runs).

⚠️ actions/checkout v7 fork-PR block likely breaks claude-code-review.yaml

Per v7.0.0 changelog: actions/checkout#2454 "Block checking out fork PR for pull_request_target and workflow_run". This is exactly the pattern in .github/workflows/claude-code-review.yaml:

  • L4: workflow_call — github.event_name inside is inherited from caller.
  • L16-17: comment states callers invoke via pull_request_target by design.
  • L28-30: checkout@v7 with ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} — the fork head SHA.
  • L42-51: dedicated "Setup fork as origin for Claude" step; fork PRs are a first-class supported path.

If v7's block is hard (no opt-in), every claude-code-review.yaml@main run on a fork PR fails at the checkout step after merge. Blast radius includes downstream repos consuming this reusable workflow.

Verify one of the following before merging (I cannot from this sandbox):

  1. Hard block, no bypass → keep checkout@v6.0.3 (SHA 08eba0b27e820071cde6df949e0beb9ba4906955) on claude-code-review.yaml only. Fix this →
  2. Opt-in input exists (e.g. allow-fork-pr in v7's action.yml) → add it on L28-32 with a comment linking to #2454.
  3. Block only fires on ref shapes you don't hit → confirm by reading v7's src/input-helper.ts / src/git-source-provider.ts.

Not an issue

  • ai-pr-review.yaml — gated on head.repo.full_name == github.repository (L43), fork PRs skipped upstream of checkout.
  • sorenlouv/backport-github-action v11→v12 — backport.yaml passes only github_token, auto_backport_label_prefix, add_original_reviewers; v12 release notes are CI automation + npm dep bumps only.
  • SHA pins consistent across all 42 files (9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 for checkout, 8a6c0381851f43f9f1fddc7303f0e9015eb57b62 for backport).
  • Confirm risk still applies after 2026-07-16 rebase
  • Attempt v7 source verification (blocked by sandbox — same as prior runs)
  • Re-check backport v12 input compatibility
  • Post review
    · Branch

@renovate
renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/major-github-actions branch from c9d0157 to 4266e73 Compare July 16, 2026 05:46
@github-actions

github-actions Bot commented Jul 16, 2026 •
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Claude finished @renovate[bot]'s task in 1m 34s —— View job

Review

No substantive change since the prior review. Same primary risk, still unverified against v7 source (WebFetch requires interactive permission not granted in this job, and gh api to external repos is sandboxed — same limitation as prior four runs).

⚠️ actions/checkout v7 fork-PR block likely breaks claude-code-review.yaml

Per v7.0.0 changelog: actions/checkout#2454 "Block checking out fork PR for pull_request_target and workflow_run". This is exactly the pattern in .github/workflows/claude-code-review.yaml:

  • L4: workflow_call — github.event_name inside is inherited from caller.
  • L16-17: comment states callers invoke via pull_request_target so secrets are available on fork PRs by design.
  • L28-30: checkout@v7 with ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} — the fork head SHA.
  • L42-51: dedicated "Setup fork as origin for Claude" step; fork PRs are a first-class supported path.

If v7's block is hard (no opt-in), every claude-code-review.yaml@main run on a fork PR fails at the checkout step after merge. Blast radius includes downstream repos consuming this reusable workflow.

Verify one of the following before merging (I cannot from this sandbox):

  1. Hard block, no bypass → keep checkout@v6.0.3 (SHA 08eba0b27e820071cde6df949e0beb9ba4906955) on claude-code-review.yaml only. Fix this →
  2. Opt-in input exists (e.g. allow-fork-pr in v7's action.yml) → add it on L28-32 with a comment linking to #2454.
  3. Block only fires on ref shapes you don't hit → confirm by reading v7's src/input-helper.ts / src/git-source-provider.ts.

Not an issue

  • ai-pr-review.yaml — gated on head.repo.full_name == github.repository (L43), fork PRs skipped upstream of checkout.
  • sorenlouv/backport-github-action v11→v12 — backport.yaml passes only github_token, auto_backport_label_prefix, add_original_reviewers; v12 release notes are CI automation + npm dep bumps only.
  • SHA pins consistent across all 45 files (9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 for checkout, 8a6c0381851f43f9f1fddc7303f0e9015eb57b62 for backport).
  • Confirm risk still applies after 2026-07-16 rebase
  • Attempt v7 source verification (blocked by sandbox — same as prior runs)
  • Re-check backport v12 input compatibility
  • Post review
    · Branch

@renovate
renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/major-github-actions branch from 4266e73 to 2aa467c Compare July 17, 2026 11:32
@github-actions

github-actions Bot commented Jul 17, 2026 •
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Claude finished @renovate[bot]'s task in 1m 35s —— View job

Review

No substantive change since the prior review. Same primary risk, still unverified against v7 source (this run: WebFetch, curl, wget, and gh api to external repos all require permission not granted in the sandbox — same limitation as prior five runs).

⚠️ actions/checkout v7 fork-PR block likely breaks claude-code-review.yaml

Per v7.0.0 changelog: actions/checkout#2454 "Block checking out fork PR for pull_request_target and workflow_run". This is exactly the pattern in .github/workflows/claude-code-review.yaml:

  • L4: workflow_call — github.event_name inside is inherited from caller.
  • L16-17: comment states callers invoke via pull_request_target so secrets are available on fork PRs by design.
  • L28-30: checkout@v7 with ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} — the fork head SHA.
  • L42-51: dedicated "Setup fork as origin for Claude" step; fork PRs are a first-class supported path.

If v7's block is hard (no opt-in), every claude-code-review.yaml@main run on a fork PR fails at the checkout step after merge. Blast radius includes downstream repos consuming this reusable workflow.

Verify one of the following before merging (I cannot from this sandbox):

  1. Hard block, no bypass → keep checkout@v6.0.3 (SHA 08eba0b27e820071cde6df949e0beb9ba4906955) on claude-code-review.yaml only. Fix this →
  2. Opt-in input exists (e.g. allow-fork-pr in v7's action.yml) → add it on L28-32 with a comment linking to #2454.
  3. Block only fires on ref shapes you don't hit → confirm by reading v7's src/input-helper.ts / src/git-source-provider.ts.

Not an issue

  • ai-pr-review.yaml — gated on head.repo.full_name == github.repository (L43), fork PRs skipped upstream of checkout.
  • sorenlouv/backport-github-action v11→v12 — backport.yaml passes only github_token, auto_backport_label_prefix; v12 release notes are CI automation + npm dep bumps only. New v6→v7 checkout on L66 also runs on pull_request_target (closed), but with default ref (base commit, not fork head), so the v7 block should not apply — worth spot-verifying.
  • SHA pins consistent across all 47 files (9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 for checkout, 8a6c0381851f43f9f1fddc7303f0e9015eb57b62 for backport).
  • Try WebFetch to verify v7 fork-PR block behavior (blocked — permission required, same as prior runs)
  • Re-check claude-code-review.yaml still uses the risky pattern (yes, unchanged)
  • Re-check backport v11→v12 input compatibility (still safe)
  • Post review
    · Branch

@renovate
renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/major-github-actions branch from 2aa467c to af7a7b6 Compare July 21, 2026 01:49
@github-actions

github-actions Bot commented Jul 21, 2026 •
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Claude finished @renovate[bot]'s task in 1m 53s —— View job

Review

Renovate rebased since the prior review — actions/checkout target moved from v7.0.0 → v7.0.1 (SHA 3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1). The v7.0.0 fork-PR block (from #2454) is still in v7.0.1 (patch bump only), so the primary risk stands. Still unverified against source — sandbox blocks curl, wget, and gh api to external repos, and WebFetch requires interactive permission not granted here (same limitation as prior six runs).

⚠️ actions/checkout v7 fork-PR block likely breaks claude-code-review.yaml

Per the v7.0.0 changelog: actions/checkout#2454 "Block checking out fork PR for pull_request_target and workflow_run". This is exactly the pattern in .github/workflows/claude-code-review.yaml:

  • L4: workflow_call — github.event_name inside is inherited from caller.
  • L16-17: comment states callers invoke via pull_request_target so secrets are available on fork PRs by design.
  • L28-30: checkout@v7.0.1 with ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} — the fork head SHA.
  • L42-51: dedicated "Setup fork as origin for Claude" step; fork PRs are a first-class supported path.

If the v7 block is hard (no opt-in), every claude-code-review.yaml@main run on a fork PR fails at the checkout step after merge. Blast radius includes downstream repos consuming this reusable workflow.

Verify one of the following before merging (cannot from this sandbox):

  1. Hard block, no bypass → keep checkout@v6.0.3 (SHA 08eba0b27e820071cde6df949e0beb9ba4906955) on claude-code-review.yaml only. Fix this →
  2. Opt-in input exists (e.g. allow-fork-pr in v7's action.yml) → add it on L28-32 with a comment linking to #2454.
  3. Block only fires on ref shapes you don't hit → confirm by reading v7's src/input-helper.ts / src/git-source-provider.ts.

Not an issue

  • ai-pr-review.yaml — gated on head.repo.full_name == github.repository (L43), fork PRs skipped upstream of checkout.
  • sorenlouv/backport-github-action v11→v12 — backport.yaml passes only github_token, auto_backport_label_prefix, add_original_reviewers; v12 release notes are CI automation + npm dep bumps only. The v7 checkout on L66 also runs under pull_request_target (closed) but uses default ref (base commit, not fork head), so the block should not apply.
  • SHA pins consistent across all 47 files (3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 for checkout, 8a6c0381851f43f9f1fddc7303f0e9015eb57b62 for backport).
  • Try to verify v7 fork-PR block (blocked by sandbox — same as prior six runs)
  • Re-check claude-code-review.yaml still uses the risky pattern (yes, unchanged; now on v7.0.1)
  • Re-check backport v11→v12 input compatibility (still safe)
  • Post review
    · Branch

@renovate
renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/major-github-actions branch from af7a7b6 to ccbdb38 Compare July 21, 2026 19:24
@github-actions

github-actions Bot commented Jul 21, 2026 •
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Claude finished @renovate[bot]'s task in 1m 14s —— View job

Review

No substantive change since the prior review (2026-07-21 01:49 UTC, same day). Still on checkout@v7.0.1 (SHA 3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1). Same primary risk, still unverified against v7 source (WebFetch, gh api to external repos, curl, and git ls-remote to github.com all require permission not granted in this sandbox — 7th consecutive run with the same limitation).

⚠️ actions/checkout v7 fork-PR block likely breaks claude-code-review.yaml

Per v7.0.0 changelog: actions/checkout#2454 "Block checking out fork PR for pull_request_target and workflow_run". Confirmed unchanged in .github/workflows/claude-code-review.yaml:

  • L4: workflow_call — github.event_name is inherited from the caller.
  • L16-17: comment explicitly states callers invoke via pull_request_target so secrets are available on fork PRs by design.
  • L28-30: checkout@v7.0.1 with ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} — the fork head SHA.
  • L42-51: dedicated "Setup fork as origin for Claude" step; fork PRs are a first-class supported path.

If v7's block is hard (no opt-in), every claude-code-review.yaml@main run on a fork PR will fail at the checkout step after merge. Blast radius includes downstream repos consuming this reusable workflow.

Verify one of the following before merging (cannot from this sandbox):

  1. Hard block, no bypass → keep checkout@v6.0.3 (SHA 08eba0b27e820071cde6df949e0beb9ba4906955) on claude-code-review.yaml only. Fix this →
  2. Opt-in input exists (e.g. allow-fork-pr in v7's action.yml) → add it on L28-32 with a comment linking to #2454.
  3. Block only fires on ref shapes you don't hit → confirm by reading v7's src/input-helper.ts / src/git-source-provider.ts.

Not an issue

  • ai-pr-review.yaml — gated on head.repo.full_name == github.repository (L43), fork PRs skipped upstream of checkout.
  • backport.yaml L66 checkout — runs on pull_request_target: closed, but with default ref (base commit); L167 checkout uses github.event.pull_request.merge_commit_sha, which is a base-repo SHA post-merge, not a fork SHA. Neither should trip the v7 block.
  • sorenlouv/backport-github-action v11→v12 — backport.yaml L75 passes only github_token and auto_backport_label_prefix; v12 release notes are CI automation + npm dep bumps only.
  • SHA pins consistent across all 48 files (3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 for checkout, 8a6c0381851f43f9f1fddc7303f0e9015eb57b62 for backport).
  • Attempt v7 source verification (WebFetch, gh api, curl, git ls-remote all blocked — 7th consecutive run)
  • Re-check claude-code-review.yaml still uses the risky pattern (yes, unchanged; still on v7.0.1)
  • Re-check backport v11→v12 input compatibility (still safe)
  • Post review
    · Branch

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