fix(ci): Prevent command injection in ci-metadata workflow#19899
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fix(ci): Prevent command injection in ci-metadata workflow#19899
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This pull request has gone three weeks without activity. In another week, I will close it. But! If you comment or otherwise update it, I will reset the clock, and if you apply the label |
Move GitHub context interpolation into an environment variable to prevent potential command injection attacks. The github.event.pull_request.head.sha and other GitHub context data can contain arbitrary user input and should not be directly interpolated into shell scripts. References: - Parent ticket: https://linear.app/getsentry/issue/VULN-1328 - Child ticket: https://linear.app/getsentry/issue/JS-1972 - https://docs.github.com/en/actions/learn-github-actions/security-hardening-for-github-actions#understanding-the-risk-of-script-injections Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
This PR fixes a high-severity security vulnerability where GitHub context data was being directly interpolated into a shell script, potentially allowing command injection attacks.
Changes
github.event.pull_request.head.shaand related GitHub context expressions into an environment variableCOMMIT_SHA_EXPR"$COMMIT_SHA_EXPR")Security Impact
Before this fix, an attacker could potentially inject malicious code through pull request metadata, which would be executed in the GitHub Actions runner with access to secrets and code.
After this fix, the GitHub context data is safely passed through an environment variable, preventing command injection.
References