fix: prevent path traversal in download_file via Content-Disposition header#180
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kartikganesh wants to merge 1 commit into
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fix: prevent path traversal in download_file via Content-Disposition header#180kartikganesh wants to merge 1 commit into
kartikganesh wants to merge 1 commit into
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…header A malicious server could return a Content-Disposition header with a filename containing path traversal sequences (e.g. "../../.bashrc"), causing files to be written outside the intended download directory. This fix applies os.path.basename() to sanitize the filename after extraction from headers or URL, ensuring it cannot escape the target directory. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
download_file()where a malicious server could return aContent-Dispositionheader with directory traversal sequences (e.g.filename="../../.bashrc")join_path(), allowing file writes outside the intended download directoryos.path.basename()to strip directory components from the extracted filenameSecurity Impact
Severity: High
Type: CWE-22 (Path Traversal)
A malicious HTTP server can cause arbitrary file writes on the filesystem by responding with a crafted
Content-Dispositionheader:Any application using
fsutil.download_file()to download from untrusted URLs is affected.Test plan
download_filewith normal URLs still works../sequences are sanitized to just the basenamefilename="../../../") fall back to UUID name🤖 Generated with Claude Code