feat: audit grant access and bound grant lifetime - #13
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Add ExperienceFinalizationService: one call that loads a completed captured run, evaluates its own closed verification round, checks host authorization and the host's storage decision, reflects, creates the record as Candidate, and commits its initial lifecycle event to Validated or Quarantined. Record, reflection and event IDs derive from the run, so a retry re-derives them and converges instead of duplicating. Required checks can now name the evaluator kind that may satisfy them, and Core and Storage.Postgres each expose a service-registration extension. The MAF adapter finalizes a fully captured run through the host's resolver. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add IExperienceCandidateSource with a PostgreSQL implementation: scope, status and confidence filtering plus a full-text match over a generated tsvector column added by migration 0003. Core's ExperienceRetrievalService applies expiry and environment eligibility, then ranks candidates on relevance, confidence, recency, status and environment compatibility with configurable validated weights, exposing every normalized component and effective weight. Retrieval is bounded by a timeout that returns an empty result with a timeout signal rather than throwing, caller cancellation stays distinct, and a capped candidate pool is reported through Truncated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add IExperienceEmbeddingIndex and a domain-typed embedding generator port, with a new AgentExperience.Storage.Postgres.Vectors package implementing them over plain Npgsql and Pgvector. Embeddings are derived data: indexing runs after the canonical commit, embeds only the sanitized retrieval summary of an eligible record, and writes conditionally on the record's exact revision, so a stale write is rejected and a deleted record is never recreated. Retrieval gains a vector channel merged with the text channel under the same eligibility, timeout and ceiling. A model or dimension mismatch, an unavailable provider, or a vector-channel failure produces an explicit flagged text-only result rather than an incompatible comparison. The vectors package owns and applies its own schema, so a text-only deployment never runs CREATE EXTENSION vector. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add ExperienceContextProvider, a simple-tier AIContextProvider the host adds to ChatClientAgentOptions.AIContextProviders. It retrieves ranked experience before an invocation, re-checks every candidate against the same eligibility rules retrieval applies, asks the host's injection decision, and injects a delimited Historical Reference carrying source, confidence, applicability and an evidence summary -- never raw payload content, never a cut record. Limits drop whole records and record every omission. Retrieval that is empty, times out or fails leaves the agent running normally. Labeling marks the content untrusted; the authorization boundary is what denies an unauthorized tool call, and a test proves it does when the model obeys injected text. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add IExperienceGrantStore and migration 0005: an administrator, with authority the host supplies explicitly, grants one record to a recipient scope with a reason and an expiry. The grant row and its audit event commit together, and a unique partial index allows at most one active grant per recipient, so revoking the grant an administrator knows about ends that recipient's access. Reads widen in SQL only: get, text search and vector search match their exact scope or an active grant, evaluated against the database clock. Writes, lifecycle commits, history and enumeration stay owner-only. The read that applied the predicate marks a record as shared, so Core and the injection provider keep strict scope equality for everything else, the host's risk policy can deny borrowed experience, and the model is told the lesson came from another scope. Deployments without the grants table, or with SELECT only on the record table, degrade to exact-scope reads rather than failing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Complete the MVP transition table (reinforce, contest, stale, supersede, revoke), refuse same-state events, and add supersession with a recorded replacement whose eligibility and cycle rules are re-decided inside the commit transaction under row locks, so two concurrent supersessions cannot store the cycle they would each individually pass. Close the null-prior bypass: a first event may only record the status the record is already in, enforced in Core and in the projection guard. Migration 0006 makes the audit trail enforced rather than conventional: statement- and row-level triggers, ENABLE ALWAYS so replication cannot skip them, covering update, delete and truncate on both event logs, monotonic revocation and expiry plus pinned identity on grants, and forward-only revisions on the record projection. Constraints are NOT VALID with a documented validate step, so an upgrade cannot abort on existing rows. History is bounded and cursored and carries each event's stored timestamp and applied revision. Leaving eligibility removes the record's embedding, which is storage hygiene rather than a reachability boundary, and never fails the transition. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Accepted evidence moves reuse confidence through the versioned heuristic (1+S)/(2+S+F). Core reads the record, computes the counters and score, and submits them with the revision it read; the adapter enforces independence with a generated key and a partial unique index, and applies the ledger row, the counters, any status change and the lifecycle event in one transaction. Independence is keyed on (experience, run, round) for machine evidence and (experience, reviewer, run) for human evidence. A duplicate key records its submission and changes nothing else -- not the counters, the status, the revision or the timestamp -- so replaying one observation can neither inflate a score nor keep a record artificially recent. The run and round are a host trust boundary, like the reviewer identity: the generated key stops a caller choosing the key string, not its inputs, and the docs now say so rather than claiming inflation is impossible. A contradiction contests the record in the same transaction. Counters and confidence move only with a lifecycle event that recorded them, enforced by the projection trigger. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
One submission links a run to the records it was exposed to, with an outcome and a reuse measure, under a caller-supplied feedback ID that makes the whole thing idempotent. Exposure alone records benefit Unknown and moves nothing. Attribution requires an authorized human assessment carrying a host-established assessment ID, or a comparative evaluator result whose evidence is cross-checked against its own verification round and the exposed record set. Either one submits supporting or contradicting evidence per record through the existing confidence path, with evidence IDs derived from the feedback and experience IDs so a retry converges instead of double-counting. An attribution that fails its evidence requirements degrades to Unknown with the exposure still recorded; only a structurally broken submission is refused outright. Exposures are sorted before ordinals are derived, so the same record set in any order is the same submission. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every read that hands a caller a record it does not own now writes an access row naming the grant that permitted it, the record and its revision, the recipient scope, the reading principal and the correlation of the invocation that caused it. That covers the single-record read and both search channels -- a candidate carries the record in full, so a search result is a delivery -- with search auditing batched into one statement per search. Auditing is off until a host wires it. Best effort returns the record and reports a failed write; Required fails the read closed, and on a search drops the whole page rather than quietly returning a different one. A read refused after the fetch, such as an evidence submission rejected because the record was only grant-readable, is not a delivery and writes nothing. Grants gain a host-configured maximum lifetime, enforced in the statement that stamps issued_at as well as in validation, with a fixed database ceiling underneath that exempts revoked rows so a legacy permanent grant can still be revoked. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
Story 3.5, the last of Epic 3 — and the one I added to the plan after triaging the deferred ledger, because grants were marketed as the audited exception to strict scope while only their administration was audited.
issued_atas well as in validation, with a fixed database ceiling underneath.Behaviour changes
The default maximum lifetime is 90 days, so a host issuing longer grants — including the
DateTimeOffset.MaxValuepreviously accepted — now gets a validation error until it sets a policy. The database ceiling exempts revoked rows, so a legacy permanent grant can still be revoked, which the first cut had accidentally made impossible.Review
Three reviewers raised 24 findings; all fixed. The largest was a scoping error in my own spec: I had excluded the search channels on the grounds that a match is not a delivery, which was wrong because the candidate carries the whole record — so a host using those ports received complete foreign records with no trail, and
Requiredcould not fail it closed. Also fixed: the lifetime bound saturated and therefore accepted the one value it exists to refuse, and a refused read was recorded as a delivery.Test plan
dotnet build --configuration Release: 0 warnings, 0 errorsdotnet test --configuration Release: 989 of 989 pass (Postgres 278, Core 505, MAF 96, Vectors 56)🤖 Generated with Claude Code