ci: pin s3-upload-action to a full commit SHA#5538
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benchmarks.yml, package.yml and docs-publish.yaml hand shallwefootball/s3-upload-action live AWS credentials (and package.yml's build-cli job also holds DigiCert code-signing secrets) via the mutable @master branch. Pin to the commit @master resolves to so the code that runs with those secrets is fixed. Behaviour unchanged.
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@kobihikri Why |
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this is the current head of master |
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What
Pin
shallwefootball/s3-upload-actioninbenchmarks.yml,package.ymlanddocs-publish.yamlfrom the mutable@masterbranch to the commit it resolves to (4 usages).Why
Those steps are handed
AWS_KEY_ID/AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEYdirectly as inputs, andpackage.yml'sbuild-clijob additionally holds DigiCert code-signing secrets.@masteris a moving branch, so the exact third-party code that receives those secrets can change without any change here — the tj-actions/changed-files class of risk. Pinning to a full SHA closes that; behaviour unchanged.I used AI assistance to identify this and draft the change; I verified it against the live workflows myself.