web: the roster is the only source of witness keys

.auths/roots

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# Pinned by auths init — the trusted root for this identity.
+did:keri:EB5cPHY0t-ejNC_rUzPS1dclTvd6kG-R9mQzjozCuGgd

.claude/skills/burndown/SKILL.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 name: burndown
-description: Launch the unattended claims burndown for auths-network — sequential fresh agents close RED gaps under the fleet gate until done, capped, or parked out
+description: Launch the unattended claims burndown for auths-network-web — sequential fresh agents close RED gaps under the fleet gate until done, capped, or parked out
 ---
 
 # Burndown launcher

.claude/skills/cycle/SKILL.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 name: cycle
-description: Run exactly ONE improvement cycle for auths-network — triage the highest-value RED gap, sculpt, gate, promote, snapshot, stop
+description: Run exactly ONE improvement cycle for auths-network-web — triage the highest-value RED gap, sculpt, gate, promote, snapshot, stop
 ---
 
 # Single cycle

.claude/skills/review/SKILL.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 name: adversarial-review
-description: Run the adversarial review protocol on a review-gated (security-tradeoff) gap for auths-network — try to BREAK the change, never to confirm it
+description: Run the adversarial review protocol on a review-gated (security-tradeoff) gap for auths-network-web — try to BREAK the change, never to confirm it
 ---
 
 # Adversarial review

.gitignore

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
 
 # recurve run state (parked gaps, records, receipts)
 .recurve/state/
+.recurve/

.recurve/ADJUDICATE.md

@@ -8,69 +8,16 @@
 > point where hostile spec text can be kept out of the loop's
 > instruction stream.
 
-## ADJUDICATE-1 — where the witness node + operator CLI live
+## FORK-1: "looks incapable of lying: simple" — define it concretely
+
+- Spec (PRD.md): "This is trust infrastructure, so it must also look incapable of lying: simple,"
+- Why it forks: the spec says 'simple' — what exactly, with a number or an enumerable behavior?
+- DECIDED (2026-06-14): "Simple / incapable of lying" is NOT a standalone claim or a
+  separate metric — it is **defined operationally as the conjunction of the quantified
+  design-gate claims**: FE-2 (tokens-only), FE-3 (one accent, neutral palette), FE-4
+  (<=2 typefaces, body >=16px/1.5), FE-5 (8px spacing + max-width), FE-6 (AA both
+  schemes), FE-8 (functional motion only), FE-9 (LCP/CLS budgets), FE-10 (no
+  hacker/crypto tropes), FE-11 (plain microcopy). The page is "simple/incapable of
+  lying" exactly when all of those are GREEN. The vague sentence gets no probe of its
+  own; it is the AND of the design gate, so an agent cannot rationalize a definition.
 
-PRD Open Question 1. Originally framed as "a separate witness binary vs a
-platform subcommand." **Re-decided 2026-06-13** after recognizing a
-witness node is *core trust infrastructure* (witnesses are central to the
-KERI model), not a peripheral consumer like the demos — so it belongs in the
-platform workspace, and a cargo feature (not a separate binary) is how auths
-already keeps optional heavy components out of the lean default build
-(precedent: `auths-rp`'s `git-sync` git2 feature; the fips/cnsa/bulk crypto
-provider features).
-
-**DECIDED (2026-06-13, supersedes the standalone-binary decision):**
-- **Witness node + threshold verification** → a **feature-gated Rust crate in
-  the platform workspace**, `auths/crates/auths-witness-node`, behind a
-  `witness-node` cargo feature. The lean default `auths` build never pulls it;
-  operators install a feature-enabled build (`cargo install auths --features
-  witness-node`, shipped as an `auths-witness` release binary). It composes
-  the platform's public crate APIs (`auths-witness`, `auths-keri`,
-  `auths-verifier`) — it does not re-implement protocol (WIT-B1).
-- **Operator CLI** → **unified into the main `auths` CLI** as `auths witness …`
-  subcommands (NOT a separate binary). The subcommand *surface* is
-  always compiled in (thin clap definitions, no heavy deps); the *handler* is
-  feature-split — with the feature it runs the node, without it returns a
-  helpful error pointing operators at the witness-enabled build. Lean default
-  AND unified UX; the false dichotomy ("separate binary for leanness") is
-  resolved.
-- **IaC** (OpenTofu `.tf`) → embedded with the node crate
-  (`auths-witness-node/deploy/`), shipped with the feature build.
-- **Dashboard + public directory** (Next.js/TS) → the web tier
-  (auths-site / a web repo), never the Rust workspace.
-
-**What this means for this suite:** `auths-network/.recurve/` is no longer a
-product repo — it is a **conformance/integration suite, structurally like
-`interop/`**, whose probes drive building the `auths-witness-node` crate +
-`auths witness` commands in the workspace and gate them against demos +
-interop. Single tree, no cross-repo commits. Future
-neutral-governance extraction to a separate governed repo remains possible —
-extracting a crate later is easy; start coupled.
-
-## ADJUDICATE-2 — directory admission policy v1
-
-PRD Open Question 2. Who may join the public directory at v1, checked
-how, and who signs admissions until governance exists? Sketch on the
-table: verified operator org identity + reachable endpoints + ToS
-signature, admissions signed by the auths org identity (disclosed as
-interim, replaced by governance later). Gates: WIT-D2 (`register` is
-blocked until this is decided).
-
-**DECIDED (2026-06-13):** v1 admission requires a verified operator org identity + reachable endpoints + a signed ToS acknowledgment, with admissions counter-signed by the auths org identity as the explicitly-disclosed interim authority — to be replaced by neutral governance before the directory opens permissionlessly; the interim status must be visible in the directory itself.
-
-## ADJUDICATE-3 — classification of the WIT-T block
-
-Per this suite's default-closed convention, the threshold-verification
-claims (WIT-T1..T5) start as `security-tradeoff` (review-gated — the
-unattended loop will NOT work them). Counter-argument from the house
-precedent: these claims ADD fail-closed checks rather than loosening
-any, which in the demos/interop convention is ordinary green-gate work;
-the only true loosening (accepting pre-revocation history) lives in
-lost-the-laptop LTL-1/LTL-2 and keeps its own review protocol
-regardless. Decide: keep WIT-T1..T5 review-gated (slower, maximally
-cautious) or downgrade them to their natural classes
-(missing-surface/wire-mismatch) so the loop can burn them down, with
-WIT-T5's trap as the permanent guard. Gates: whether the autonomous
-burndown can touch the suite's headline block at all.
-
-**DECIDED (2026-06-13):** Split — WIT-T1..T4 downgraded to `missing-surface` so the loop builds the threshold *mechanism* autonomously (they ADD fail-closed checks: a bug fails loud as over-strict, never silently permissive — the safe direction), while WIT-T5 stays `security-tradeoff` so a human confirms the headline outcome (the forged-ordering fixture genuinely dies) and it remains a permanent forgery trap. The one true loosening — accepting pre-revocation history — is NOT here; it lives in auths-demos LTL-1/LTL-2 and keeps its own review protocol regardless. **Sanity-check me on this one** — it is the load-bearing security call; if you'd rather a human design the whole threshold block, revert WIT-T1..T4 to `security-tradeoff`.