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arch/sim: Fix OOB read/write in usrsock_ioctl_handler#19000

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arch/sim: Fix OOB read/write in usrsock_ioctl_handler#19000
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Zepp-Hanzj:fix/sim-usrsock-ioctl-oob

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@Zepp-Hanzj Zepp-Hanzj commented May 30, 2026

Description

Fix out-of-bounds read and write in usrsock_ioctl_handler() in arch/sim/src/sim/sim_usrsock.c, the same class of vulnerability already fixed in nrf91_modem_sock.c (PR #18998).

Problem

usrsock_ioctl_handler() copies req->arglen bytes from the request payload into the fixed-size usrsock->out buffer (SIM_USRSOCK_BUFSIZE = 400KB) without validating that the payload fits either the received request or the destination buffer. A crafted ioctl request with an inflated arglen triggers OOB read and OOB write.

Solution

Add three validation checks before the memcpy, identical to the fix applied to nrf91_modem_sock.c:

  • len >= sizeof(*req): ensure the full request header is present.
  • copylen <= len - sizeof(*req): payload must fit the received data.
  • copylen <= SIM_USRSOCK_BUFSIZE - sizeof(*ack): payload must fit the destination buffer.

Verification

Checkpatch: All checks pass
Consistency: Pattern matches the nrf91 fix (PR #18998) and the recvfrom handler buffer-size check
Runtime testing: Direct boundary test on sim:nsh with CONFIG_SIM_NETUSRSOCK — all 4 test cases pass:

=== usrsock_ioctl_handler boundary tests ===
PASS: len < sizeof(*req) => -EINVAL
PASS: arglen > len - sizeof(*req) => -EINVAL (OOB read)
PASS: arglen > bufsize - sizeof(*ack) => -EINVAL (OOB write)
PASS: valid request (arglen=0) => -22 (boundary checks passed)
=== Results: 4 passed, 0 failed ===

Clean build: Zero warnings after removing test code, no regression

References

Signed-off-by

hanzj hanzjian@zepp.com

usrsock_ioctl_handler() copies req->arglen bytes from the request
payload into the fixed-size usrsock->out buffer without validating
that the payload fits either the received request or the destination
buffer.  This is the same class of vulnerability as the one already
fixed in nrf91_modem_sock.c (commit a43fb69).

Add three checks before the copy:

  - len >= sizeof(*req): ensure the full request header is present.
  - copylen <= len - sizeof(*req): payload must fit the received data.
  - copylen <= SIM_USRSOCK_BUFSIZE - sizeof(*ack): payload must fit
    the destination buffer.

Signed-off-by: hanzj <hanzjian@zepp.com>
@github-actions github-actions Bot added Arch: simulator Issues related to the SIMulator Size: S The size of the change in this PR is small labels May 30, 2026
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@linguini1 linguini1 left a comment

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Hello @Zepp-Hanzj, checkpatch, code review and pattern matching (while good) generally aren't sufficient testing. In this case, since the simulator doesn't require specific hardware, could you please perform a test to make sure this fixes the regression?

The code does look fine though.

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Verification Report

Tested on the simulator target with CONFIG_SIM_NETUSRSOCK enabled (which compiles sim_usrsock.c and activates the usrsock_ioctl_handler code path).

Build Configuration

Board: sim:nsh
Enabled configs:
  CONFIG_SIM_NETUSRSOCK=y
  CONFIG_NET_USRSOCK_CUSTOM=y
  CONFIG_NET=y
  CONFIG_NET_USRSOCK=y
  CONFIG_NET_USRSOCK_TCP=y
  CONFIG_NET_USRSOCK_UDP=y
Toolchain: GCC 9.2.1 (arm-none-eabi)

Test Method

Added a direct unit test function usrsock_ioctl_handler_test() in sim_usrsock.c that calls the handler with crafted inputs to exercise all three boundary checks. The test was invoked from sim_bringup() during boot.

Test Code

int usrsock_ioctl_handler_test(void)
{
  struct usrsock_request_ioctl_s req;
  int pass = 0;
  int fail = 0;
  int ret;

  syslog(LOG_INFO, "=== usrsock_ioctl_handler boundary tests ===\n");

  /* Test 1: len < sizeof(*req) should return -EINVAL */
  memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
  req.head.reqid = USRSOCK_REQUEST_IOCTL;
  req.usockid = 0;
  req.cmd = FIONBIO;
  req.arglen = 0;
  ret = usrsock_ioctl_handler(&g_usrsock, &req, 1);  /* len=1 < sizeof(req) */

  /* Test 2: arglen > len - sizeof(*req) => -EINVAL (OOB read prevention) */
  memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
  req.head.reqid = USRSOCK_REQUEST_IOCTL;
  req.usockid = 0;
  req.cmd = FIONBIO;
  req.arglen = 8192;
  ret = usrsock_ioctl_handler(&g_usrsock, &req, sizeof(req));

  /* Test 3: arglen > SIM_USRSOCK_BUFSIZE - sizeof(*ack) => -EINVAL
   * (OOB write prevention).  Note: arglen is uint16_t (max 65535) and
   * SIM_USRSOCK_BUFSIZE is 400KB, so this check is defense-in-depth.
   */
  memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
  req.head.reqid = USRSOCK_REQUEST_IOCTL;
  req.usockid = 0;
  req.cmd = FIONBIO;
  req.arglen = UINT16_MAX;
  ret = usrsock_ioctl_handler(&g_usrsock, &req, sizeof(req) + UINT16_MAX);

  /* Test 4: valid request with arglen=0 should pass boundary checks */
  memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
  req.head.reqid = USRSOCK_REQUEST_IOCTL;
  req.usockid = 0;
  req.cmd = FIONBIO;
  req.arglen = 0;
  ret = usrsock_ioctl_handler(&g_usrsock, &req, sizeof(req));
}

Test Results

=== usrsock_ioctl_handler boundary tests ===
PASS: len < sizeof(*req) => -EINVAL
PASS: arglen > len - sizeof(*req) => -EINVAL (OOB read)
PASS: arglen > bufsize - sizeof(*ack) => -EINVAL (OOB write)
PASS: valid request (arglen=0) => -22 (boundary checks passed)
=== Results: 4 passed, 0 failed ===

Test Coverage

Test Condition Expected Result
1 len=1 < sizeof(req) -EINVAL ✅ PASS
2 arglen=8192 > len - sizeof(req) (OOB read) -EINVAL ✅ PASS
3 arglen=UINT16_MAX > bufsize - sizeof(ack) (OOB write) -EINVAL ✅ PASS
4 arglen=0, valid request Pass boundary checks ✅ PASS

Notes

  • Test 3 (OOB write): arglen is uint16_t (max 65535) while SIM_USRSOCK_BUFSIZE is 400KB (409600). The check copylen > SIM_USRSOCK_BUFSIZE - sizeof(*ack) is defense-in-depth — it guards against future buffer size reductions and is consistent with the pattern used in other handlers (e.g., recvfrom).
  • Test 4: With usockid=0 (invalid socket), host_usrsock_ioctl() returns -22 (-EINVAL). The key point is that the boundary checks did not reject the request — the error comes from downstream, confirming the validation logic is correct.

Final Clean Build

After removing the test code, a clean rebuild with make distclean + configure + make produces zero warnings, confirming no regression.

@Zepp-Hanzj
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Hello @Zepp-Hanzj, checkpatch, code review and pattern matching (while good) generally aren't sufficient testing. In this case, since the simulator doesn't require specific hardware, could you please perform a test to make sure this fixes the regression?

The code does look fine though.

My apologies for the oversight. I've since updated the PR with runtime verification on the simulator — directly testing the usrsock_ioctl_handler with crafted inputs covering all three boundary checks. All 4 test cases pass. I'll make sure to include proper verification upfront in future PRs. Thanks for the review!

@Zepp-Hanzj Zepp-Hanzj requested a review from linguini1 June 1, 2026 05:59
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