Status: research / devnet. Dendra is experimental software. The testnet is resettable and its token has no monetary value. Do not put real value at risk.

What the public endpoint runs. The network has been reset onto a fresh genesis more than once: every stake, balance and registration from a previous chain is gone each time, and this page names no date because a date here is a claim that ages. Its validators are all operated by the project — so fault tolerance is zero whatever their number, and stopping any one of them stops block production — and the registered miners stand below the floor the chain enforces, so nothing is served and no job is verified on that endpoint today. Whether the decentralized seed meets its contributor floor is a reading, not a property: dendrad query jobs committee-seed-health -o json returns latest_contributors next to committee_min_vrf_contributors, and below that floor the beacon falls back to its legacy source, which means the anti-grinding property is not in force. Counts printed here go stale; the queries that decide are in the README, and they are what you should trust. The rule they gate is unchanged: the jury is every registered miner except the one under audit, and a verdict requires audit_min_quorum (4) jurors to vote — five registered miners in all. A report about the verification path is therefore a report about the code, not an observation of the network; that is expected and does not need reporting, and the queries that show it are in the README. A way to make an audit conclude without a jury, to open a draw below the seed floor, or to release a held fee without a verdict, is very much in scope.

Please report security issues privately. Do NOT open a public GitHub issue for a vulnerability.

• Email: security@dendranetwork.com
• Include: a description, reproduction steps, affected component (chain module, gateway, miner, relay, judge), and impact.
• We aim to acknowledge within a few days. Coordinated disclosure is appreciated; we will credit reporters who wish to be credited.

In scope: the chain (chain/), the off-chain reference stack (services/), the deployment kits (deploy/, docker/).

Particularly valuable reports:

• Ways to mint or destroy supply (the invariant is a fixed 10,000,000 DNDR, zero mint).
• Double-settlement, escrow imbalance, or paying a job twice.
• Slashing an honest miner (false positive), or letting a prover escape a deserved slash.
• Leaking plaintext on-chain, at the relay, or in logs (only hashes/embeddings/verdicts/counters should ever appear).
• Bypassing the regex floor — not by finding content it misses (it misses a great deal by construction, and this project makes no claim that illegal content is filtered out), but by defeating the mechanism itself: making a request skip the filter stage, or disabling it remotely.
• Faucet drain / Sybil beyond the documented rate limits.

• The resettable testnet's token having no value.
• The consumer-GPU tier providing hardened deterrence, not a cryptographic guarantee (this is by design and documented).
• Denial of service against a single self-hosted node.

We do not claim a cryptographic confidentiality guarantee on consumer GPUs, nor that Dendra outperforms frontier models. Reports premised on a guarantee we never made are not vulnerabilities — but reports showing we fail a guarantee we did make are very welcome.