Official Python SDK for AuthForge — credit-based license key authentication with Ed25519-verified responses.
Uses cryptography for Ed25519 verification. Works on Python 3.9+.
Install from PyPI as authforge-sdk. In code, import the authforge module:
pip install authforge-sdkAlternative: copy authforge.py into your project if you need a single-file vendored layout (you must still satisfy the cryptography dependency yourself).
After pip install authforge-sdk (or vendoring authforge.py), use:
from authforge import AuthForgeClient
client = AuthForgeClient(
app_id="YOUR_APP_ID", # from your AuthForge dashboard
app_secret="YOUR_APP_SECRET", # from your AuthForge dashboard
public_key="YOUR_PUBLIC_KEY", # from your AuthForge dashboard
heartbeat_mode="SERVER", # "SERVER" or "LOCAL"
)
license_key = input("Enter license key: ")
if client.login(license_key):
print("Authenticated!")
# Your app logic here — heartbeats run automatically in the background
else:
print("Invalid license key.")
exit(1)| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
app_id |
str | required | Your application ID from the AuthForge dashboard |
app_secret |
str | required | Your application secret from the AuthForge dashboard |
public_key |
str | required | App Ed25519 public key (base64) from dashboard |
heartbeat_mode |
str | required | "SERVER" or "LOCAL" (see below) |
heartbeat_interval |
int | 900 |
Seconds between heartbeat checks (minimum 10; default 15 min) |
api_base_url |
str | https://auth.authforge.cc |
API endpoint |
on_failure |
callable | None |
Callback `(reason: str, exc: Exception |
request_timeout |
int | 15 |
HTTP request timeout in seconds |
ttl_seconds |
int | None |
None (server default: 86400) |
Requested session token lifetime. Server clamps to [3600, 604800]; preserved across heartbeat refreshes. |
hwid_override |
str | None |
None |
Optional custom hardware/subject identifier. When set to a non-empty value, the SDK uses it instead of machine fingerprinting. |
client = AuthForgeClient(
app_id="YOUR_APP_ID",
app_secret="YOUR_APP_SECRET",
public_key="YOUR_PUBLIC_KEY",
heartbeat_mode="SERVER",
hwid_override=f"tg:{telegram_user_id}", # or f"discord:{discord_user_id}"
)- 1
login()orvalidate_license()call = 1 credit (one/auth/validatedebit each). - 10 heartbeats on the same license = 1 credit (billed every 10th successful heartbeat).
A desktop app running 6h/day at a 15-minute interval burns ~3–4 credits/day. The server enforces /auth/heartbeat at 6 requests/minute per license key, so keep intervals at 10 seconds or higher and pick the interval based on how fast you need revocations to propagate (they always land on the next heartbeat).
| Method | Returns | Description |
|---|---|---|
login(license_key) |
bool |
Validates key and stores signed session (sessionToken, expiresIn, appVariables, licenseVariables) |
validate_license(license_key) |
ValidateLicenseResult |
Same /auth/validate + signatures as login; does not store session or start heartbeats; returns a dict with valid / code and never calls on_failure or os._exit |
self_ban(...) |
dict |
Requests /auth/selfban to blacklist HWID/IP and optionally revoke (session-authenticated only) |
logout() |
None |
Stops heartbeat and clears all session/auth state |
is_authenticated() |
bool |
True when an active authenticated session exists |
get_session_data() |
dict | None |
Full decoded payload map |
get_app_variables() |
dict | None |
App-scoped variables map |
get_license_variables() |
dict | None |
License-scoped variables map |
SERVER — The SDK calls /auth/heartbeat every heartbeat_interval seconds with a fresh nonce, verifies signature + nonce, and triggers failure on invalid session state.
LOCAL — No network calls. The SDK re-verifies stored signature state and checks expiry timestamp locally. If expired, it triggers failure with session_expired.
If authentication fails (login rejected, heartbeat fails, signature mismatch, etc.), the SDK calls your on_failure callback if one is provided. If no callback is set, the SDK calls os._exit(1) to terminate the process. This is intentional — it prevents your app from running without a valid license.
validate_license() does not trigger on_failure or os._exit — check result["valid"] and result["code"].
Recognized server errors:
invalid_app, invalid_key, expired, revoked, hwid_mismatch, no_credits, blocked, rate_limited, replay_detected, app_disabled, session_expired, revoke_requires_session, bad_request, malformed_request, system_error
Request retries are automatic inside the internal HTTP layer:
rate_limited: retry after 2s, then 5s (max 3 attempts total)- network failure: retry once after 2s
- every retry regenerates a fresh nonce
def handle_auth_failure(reason, exception):
print(f"Auth failed: {reason}")
if exception:
print(f"Details: {exception}")
# Clean up and exit gracefully
sys.exit(1)
client = AuthForgeClient(
app_id="YOUR_APP_ID",
app_secret="YOUR_APP_SECRET",
public_key="YOUR_PUBLIC_KEY",
heartbeat_mode="SERVER",
on_failure=handle_auth_failure,
)Use self_ban() when anti-tamper checks trigger:
# Post-session (authenticated): defaults to revoke + HWID/IP blacklist.
client.self_ban()
# Pre-session: pass license_key, SDK automatically disables revoke_license.
client.self_ban(license_key="AF-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX")
# Custom flags:
client.self_ban(
blacklist_hwid=True,
blacklist_ip=True,
revoke_license=False,
)self_ban() automatically chooses mode:
- Uses post-session mode when a session token is available (
session_tokenarg or current SDK session). - Falls back to pre-session mode using
license_key+ nonce + app secret. - In pre-session mode, revoke is forced off client-side to avoid unsafe key revocations.
-
Login — Uses
hwid_overrideif provided; otherwise collects a hardware fingerprint (MAC, CPU, disk serial). It then generates a random nonce and sends everything to the AuthForge API. The server validates the license key, binds the HWID, deducts a credit, and returns a signed payload. The SDK verifies the Ed25519 signature and nonce to prevent replay attacks. -
Heartbeat — A background daemon thread checks in at the configured interval. In SERVER mode, it sends a fresh nonce and verifies the response. In LOCAL mode, it re-verifies the stored signature and checks expiry without network calls.
-
Crypto — Both
/validateand/heartbeatresponses are signed by AuthForge with your app's Ed25519 private key. The SDK verifies every signedpayloadusing your configuredpublic_keyand rejects tampered responses.
The SDK generates a deterministic hardware fingerprint by hashing:
- MAC address
- CPU identifier
- Disk serial number
Each component falls back gracefully if it can't be read (e.g. permissions issues). The HWID is sent with every auth request so the server can enforce per-device license limits.
For non-device identities (for example Telegram users), pass hwid_override such as tg:<user_id>.
The shared test_vectors.json file validates cross-language Ed25519 verification behavior.
- Python 3.9+
- Dependency:
cryptography
MIT