diff --git a/engine/src/engine/metrics.rs b/engine/src/engine/metrics.rs
index a001f99..7b29351 100644
--- a/engine/src/engine/metrics.rs
+++ b/engine/src/engine/metrics.rs
@@ -49,6 +49,13 @@ pub(super) struct EngineMetrics {
     /// predicate is set (ADR-0009). In shadow this is the countable answer to "would this
     /// have promoted?" without any behavior change.
     pub(super) corroborations: opentelemetry::metrics::Counter<u64>,
+    /// Narrowing-delta count this pass (ADR-0041 §6): breach-relevant chains where a notable
+    /// exec is present on the entry's runtime but the chain is `!corroborated` — the cases the
+    /// retiring blanket notable-exec corroboration arm would have flipped to `corroborated`.
+    /// The Falco-retirement parity-matrix input. No labels — the count alone is the bake
+    /// signal, and any per-entry/per-node dimension would be a cardinality/PII vector (the
+    /// entry name still appears in the accompanying structured log, never in this counter).
+    pub(super) narrowing_delta: opentelemetry::metrics::Counter<u64>,
     /// Per-pass adjudications that issued a fresh model call (verdict-cache miss). A
     /// proper cumulative counter (replaces the prior `verdicts{verdict="judged_this_pass"}`
     /// gauge hack) so model-call frequency is rate-able.
@@ -198,6 +205,13 @@ impl EngineMetrics {
                 .u64_counter("protector.engine.corroborations")
                 .with_description("Corroborations fired (corroborated breach chains) per pass.")
                 .build(),
+            narrowing_delta: m
+                .u64_counter("protector.engine.narrowing_delta")
+                .with_description(
+                    "Breach chains with a notable exec present but uncorroborated (ADR-0041 \
+                     §6) — the retiring blanket notable-exec corroboration arm's parity delta.",
+                )
+                .build(),
             judged: m
                 .u64_counter("protector.engine.judged")
                 .with_description("Adjudications that issued a fresh model call (cache miss).")
diff --git a/engine/src/engine/mod.rs b/engine/src/engine/mod.rs
index 200beee..60eb159 100644
--- a/engine/src/engine/mod.rs
+++ b/engine/src/engine/mod.rs
@@ -74,6 +74,12 @@ use metrics::EngineMetrics;
 // and the dashboard's read-only view can share its record/class types.
 pub mod cut_divergence;
 
+// The narrowing-delta comparator (ADR-0041 §6): the Falco-retirement parity-matrix input —
+// counts breach-relevant chains where a notable exec is present on the entry's runtime but the
+// chain is uncorroborated (the cases the retiring blanket notable-exec corroboration arm would
+// have flipped). View only — see the module docs; mirrors `cut_divergence`'s shape.
+mod narrowing_delta;
+
 // The ADJ-MISS-DIAG re-judge diagnostic, extracted to keep this orchestrator under
 // the file-size cap (CLAUDE.md). Emits the compact, per-section-fingerprinted line the churn
 // harness ingests.
@@ -592,6 +598,18 @@ impl Engine {
         if corroborations > 0 {
             self.metrics.corroborations.add(corroborations, &[]);
         }
+        // Narrowing-delta comparator (ADR-0041 §6): the Falco-retirement parity-matrix input.
+        // VIEW ONLY — reads `graph`/`chains`, feeds nothing back into adjudication, the ledger,
+        // or the arming state; see the module docs.
+        let narrowing_delta = narrowing_delta::compute(&graph, &chains);
+        if !narrowing_delta.is_empty() {
+            self.metrics
+                .narrowing_delta
+                .add(narrowing_delta.len() as u64, &[]);
+        }
+        for record in &narrowing_delta {
+            record.emit();
+        }
         // Publish this pass's behavioral-bake snapshot into the output state. Done
         // here, before the slow adjudication loop, for the same reason the findings are:
         // the bake snapshot must reflect the current pass even while the model is judging.
diff --git a/engine/src/engine/narrowing_delta.rs b/engine/src/engine/narrowing_delta.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2906218
--- /dev/null
+++ b/engine/src/engine/narrowing_delta.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+//! The narrowing-delta comparator (ADR-0041 §6): a read-only bake instrument that counts the
+//! cases the retiring blanket notable-exec corroboration arm would have flipped to
+//! `corroborated` — a breach-relevant chain whose entry carries a **notable exec** (an
+//! interactive shell or package-manager `ProcessExec`,
+//! [`crate::engine::observe::exec_class::notable_exec`]) on its on-pod runtime, but whose
+//! chain is `!corroborated` today. This is the Falco-retirement parity-matrix input: the
+//! recall the `Behavior::Alert` arm currently backstops (see
+//! `docs/adr/0041-narrow-blanket-notable-exec-corroboration.md` §6).
+//!
+//! **View only** (ADR-0016 — presentation is a view, never a gate): [`compute`] takes its
+//! inputs by shared reference and returns owned data; there is no path from this module back
+//! into the ledger, the actuator, or the arming state. Mirrors
+//! [`crate::engine::cut_divergence`]'s read-only-bake shape (ADR-0037), scoped to a single
+//! predicate rather than a cut-set comparison.
+//!
+//! Before the narrowing this counter measures lands (a separate change), a bare notable exec
+//! still corroborates via the blanket arm, so `compute` reads empty in practice — expected,
+//! not a bug: the counter is a bake instrument for the AFTER state, and its unit tests
+//! construct both states directly rather than depending on the narrowing to land first.
+
+use crate::engine::graph::{Node, NodeKey, SecurityGraph};
+use crate::engine::observe::exec_class;
+use crate::engine::reason::proof::ProvenChain;
+
+/// One breach-relevant chain where the old blanket notable-exec corroboration arm would have
+/// flipped `corroborated`, but the chain is `!corroborated` today.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct NarrowingDeltaRecord {
+    /// The internet-facing entry carrying the notable exec.
+    pub entry: String,
+    /// The objective this chain targets.
+    pub objective: String,
+    /// The ATT&CK technique this chain's objective achieves — a fixed internal string
+    /// (never untrusted input), safe to log.
+    pub technique_id: &'static str,
+}
+
+impl NarrowingDeltaRecord {
+    /// Log this record as a structured line — the parity-matrix / bake-review artifact
+    /// (ADR-0041 §6). A view-only side effect: logging never mutates anything else.
+    pub fn emit(&self) {
+        tracing::info!(
+            entry = %self.entry,
+            objective = %self.objective,
+            technique = self.technique_id,
+            "narrowing delta: notable exec present, chain uncorroborated"
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+/// Whether `entry`'s on-pod runtime carries a notable exec — an interactive shell or
+/// package-manager `ProcessExec` ([`exec_class::notable_exec`]). Non-workload nodes, and an
+/// entry key the graph no longer carries, are never notable. Deliberately scoped to
+/// `notable_exec` rather than the broader
+/// [`crate::engine::observe::alarm_class::is_alarming_now`] family: an `Alert` or an alarming
+/// file write still corroborates through their OWN (unnarrowed) arms, so only the notable-exec
+/// shape is the narrowing's delta.
+fn entry_has_notable_exec(graph: &SecurityGraph, entry: &NodeKey) -> bool {
+    graph.index_of(entry).is_some_and(|idx| {
+        matches!(
+            graph.inner().node_weight(idx),
+            Some(Node::Workload(w))
+                if w.runtime.iter().any(|s| exec_class::notable_exec(&s.behavior).is_some())
+        )
+    })
+}
+
+/// Compute this pass's narrowing-delta records: every breach-relevant chain whose entry has a
+/// notable exec in its runtime AND whose chain is `!corroborated`. Pure: reads
+/// `graph`/`chains`, returns owned records; mutates neither.
+pub fn compute(graph: &SecurityGraph, chains: &[ProvenChain]) -> Vec<NarrowingDeltaRecord> {
+    chains
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|c| c.is_breach_relevant() && !c.corroborated)
+        .filter(|c| entry_has_notable_exec(graph, &c.entry))
+        .map(|c| NarrowingDeltaRecord {
+            entry: c.entry.0.clone(),
+            objective: c.objective.0.clone(),
+            technique_id: c.attack.technique_id,
+        })
+        .collect()
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+#[path = "narrowing_delta_tests.rs"]
+mod tests;
diff --git a/engine/src/engine/narrowing_delta_tests.rs b/engine/src/engine/narrowing_delta_tests.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..71cee51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/engine/src/engine/narrowing_delta_tests.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+//! Tests for the ADR-0041 §6 narrowing-delta comparator, kept in their own `*_tests.rs` file
+//! (repo CLAUDE.md: tests count toward the 1,000-line cap). Both fixtures build the
+//! corroborated/uncorroborated `ProvenChain` states DIRECTLY (rather than routing through
+//! `reason::proof::corroborate::corroborated_for`), per the ticket's note: the current blanket
+//! notable-exec arm corroborates every objective on ANY entry with a shell/pkg-mgr exec, so a
+//! real uncorroborated-with-notable-exec breach-relevant chain can't be produced from the
+//! live pipeline until the narrowing (a separate change) lands. `compute` itself only reads
+//! `entry`/`objective`/`attack`/`exposed_entry`/`corroborated`, so hand-building the chain
+//! exercises exactly what it reads without depending on that narrowing.
+
+use super::*;
+use crate::engine::graph::attack::CREDENTIAL_ACCESS;
+use crate::engine::graph::{
+    Behavior, Exposure, Node, NodeKey, Provenance, RuntimeSignal, Workload,
+};
+
+/// A `web` entry workload whose runtime carries a shell exec — optionally alongside an
+/// in-window internet egress, mirroring the reverse-shell shape's evidence without needing
+/// the shape's own window-matching logic (irrelevant to this comparator, which only reads
+/// `ProvenChain::corroborated`).
+fn web_entry_graph(with_egress: bool) -> SecurityGraph {
+    let mut graph = SecurityGraph::new();
+    let mut runtime = vec![RuntimeSignal {
+        behavior: Behavior::ProcessExec {
+            path: "/bin/bash".into(),
+            exe_anon_inode: false,
+        },
+        provenance: Provenance::new("agent", std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH),
+    }];
+    if with_egress {
+        runtime.push(RuntimeSignal {
+            behavior: Behavior::NetworkConnection {
+                peer: "1.2.3.4:4444".into(),
+                internet: true,
+            },
+            provenance: Provenance::new("agent", std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH),
+        });
+    }
+    graph.upsert_node(Node::Workload(Workload {
+        namespace: "app".into(),
+        name: "web".into(),
+        kind: "Pod".into(),
+        labels: Default::default(),
+        meshed: false,
+        exposure: Exposure::Internet,
+        runtime,
+        persistent: false,
+        misconfigs: Vec::new(),
+        rbac_findings: Vec::new(),
+    }));
+    graph
+}
+
+/// A breach-relevant chain over the `web` entry, `corroborated` set directly by the caller —
+/// the state under test, independent of how corroboration is actually derived.
+fn web_chain(corroborated: bool) -> ProvenChain {
+    ProvenChain {
+        entry: NodeKey::workload("app", "Pod", "web"),
+        objective: NodeKey::workload("app", "Secret", "session-key"),
+        attack: CREDENTIAL_ACCESS,
+        foothold: None,
+        corroborated,
+        adjudicated: true,
+        promoted: false,
+        exposed_entry: true,
+        verdict: None,
+        links: Vec::new(),
+        paths: Vec::new(),
+        paths_truncated: false,
+        single_edge_cuts: Vec::new(),
+        quarantine_targets: Vec::new(),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Shell exec present, chain uncorroborated (no in-window egress — the plain bare-shell case,
+/// ADR-0011's on-call-engineer false positive under the narrowed shapes): the counter fires —
+/// this IS one of the cases the old blanket arm would have corroborated.
+#[test]
+fn shell_exec_uncorroborated_chain_fires() {
+    let graph = web_entry_graph(false);
+    let chains = vec![web_chain(false)];
+
+    let records = compute(&graph, &chains);
+
+    assert_eq!(records.len(), 1);
+    assert_eq!(records[0].entry, "workload/app/Pod/web");
+    assert_eq!(records[0].objective, "workload/app/Secret/session-key");
+    assert_eq!(records[0].technique_id, CREDENTIAL_ACCESS.technique_id);
+}
+
+/// Shell exec present, chain corroborated (e.g. the in-window egress shape fired): NOT a
+/// narrowing delta — the chain would be corroborated either way, so the old blanket arm's
+/// recall isn't backstopping anything here. No fire.
+#[test]
+fn shell_exec_corroborated_chain_does_not_fire() {
+    let graph = web_entry_graph(true);
+    let chains = vec![web_chain(true)];
+
+    let records = compute(&graph, &chains);
+
+    assert!(records.is_empty());
+}
+
+/// A notable exec absent from the entry's runtime never fires, corroborated or not — the
+/// comparator is scoped to the notable-exec shape, not every uncorroborated chain.
+#[test]
+fn no_notable_exec_never_fires() {
+    let graph = SecurityGraph::new();
+    let chains = vec![web_chain(false)];
+
+    let records = compute(&graph, &chains);
+
+    assert!(records.is_empty());
+}
+
+/// A notable exec on an entry whose chain is NOT breach-relevant (an internal-only entry)
+/// never fires — the parity matrix only concerns internet-facing paths (matches the scope of
+/// the `corroborations` metric it sits beside).
+#[test]
+fn non_breach_relevant_entry_never_fires() {
+    let graph = web_entry_graph(false);
+    let mut chain = web_chain(false);
+    chain.exposed_entry = false;
+
+    let records = compute(&graph, &[chain]);
+
+    assert!(records.is_empty());
+}