diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 817cf7d3e3..82726d740c 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -1,3 +1,16 @@
+# 6.6.0
+
+Version 6.6.0.0
+
+SMP server:
+- public-namespace resolver (SMP protocol v20):
+  - new `RSLV <lookup_key>` command and `NAME <NameRecord>` response, forwarded-only via PFWD
+  - reads name records from the Ethereum SNRC contract via a configurable JSON-RPC endpoint (Reth + Nimbus)
+  - in-memory cache with TTL, byte cap, FIFO eviction, and in-flight request coalescing
+  - new `[NAMES]` INI section; disabled by default
+  - new `simplex_smp_names_*` Prometheus metrics + CSV stats columns
+  - logs a startup warning when co-located with the proxy role: slow RSLV cache misses can serialise other forwarded commands on the same proxy-relay session (run names on a separate host for high-volume deployments)
+
 # 6.5.1
 
 Version 6.5.1.0
diff --git a/plans/20260522_01_smp_public_namespaces.md b/plans/20260522_01_smp_public_namespaces.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5f90e67fd3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plans/20260522_01_smp_public_namespaces.md
@@ -0,0 +1,430 @@
+# Server: SMP support for public namespaces
+
+Implementation plan for Part 2 of [RFC 2026-05-21-public-namespaces](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/blob/ep/namespace/docs/rfcs/2026-05-21-public-namespaces.md). Adds a forwarded-only `RSLV <lookup_key>` SMP command that returns `NAME <NameRecord>` read from the SNRC contract via a Reth+Nimbus JSON-RPC endpoint. Smp-server becomes name-capable by `[NAMES] enable: on`.
+
+Out of scope: `Simplex.Messaging.Client` API, agent-side resolution flow, `ServerRoles.names` in the agent, default-router list, reverse resolution, multicoin/text records, state proofs.
+
+## Architecture
+
+```mermaid
+sequenceDiagram
+  participant C as Client
+  participant P as Proxy (storage role)
+  participant N as Name server (names role)
+  participant E as Ethereum endpoint<br/>(Reth+Nimbus)
+
+  C ->> P: PFWD(enc(RSLV key))
+  P ->> N: RFWD(enc(RSLV key))
+  note over N: verifyTransmission True →<br/>vc SResolver (RSLV _) → VRVerified
+  N ->> N: cache lookup
+  alt cache miss
+    N ->> E: eth_call(SNRC, namehash(key))
+    E -->> N: ABI bytes
+    note over N: ABI decode + zero-owner check + cache insert
+  end
+  N -->> P: RFWD(enc(NAME rec | ERR AUTH))
+  P -->> C: PRES(enc(NAME rec | ERR AUTH))
+```
+
+RSLV is **forwarded-only** — direct RSLV is rejected `CMD PROHIBITED`. This preserves the RFC's two-server resolution: the name server sees the lookup key but never the client's IP, session, or identity.
+
+## Protocol
+
+Shared library: `src/Simplex/Messaging/Protocol.hs` and `src/Simplex/Messaging/Transport.hs`.
+
+**Version.** `Transport.hs:226`: `namesSMPVersion = VersionSMP 20`. Bump `currentClientSMPRelayVersion`, `currentServerSMPRelayVersion`, `proxiedSMPRelayVersion` to 20. Pre-v20 binaries lack the `RSLV_` tag; v20 binaries with sessions negotiated at v < 20 reject `RSLV_` at the parameter parser. The proxied-version bump 18 → 20 is safe (v19's `RecipientService`/`NotifierService` aren't in the forwarded whitelist; v18's `BLOCKED info` is already version-branched at `Protocol.hs:1943`).
+
+**Party kind.** Append `Resolver` to `Party` (line 335); add `SResolver` (line 349), `TestEquality` clause (line 361), `PartyI Resolver` (line 394). `queueParty SResolver = Nothing` (falls through line 412). `partyClientRole SResolver = Nothing`.
+
+**`RSLV` command.**
+
+```haskell
+RSLV :: LookupKey -> Command Resolver
+newtype LookupKey = LookupKey ByteString
+
+instance Encoding LookupKey where
+  smpEncode (LookupKey s) = smpEncode s
+  smpP = do
+    n <- lenP
+    when (n > 64) $ fail "LookupKey too large"
+    LookupKey <$> A.take n
+```
+
+Name-syntax validation is client-side per RFC; the server treats the key as opaque bytes. Tag `"RSLV"`, version guard inside `protocolP v (CT SResolver RSLV_)`: `| v >= namesSMPVersion -> Cmd SResolver . RSLV <$> _smpP`.
+
+**Testnet/mainnet selector**: how the `#testnet:name` namespace appears in `LookupKey` bytes is determined by the SNRC contract (Part 1) — confirm with Part 1 before merging.
+
+**`NAME` response.**
+
+```haskell
+NAME :: NameRecord -> BrokerMsg
+```
+
+Tag `"NAME"`. Symmetric version guards on encode (in `encodeProtocol v`) and decode (in `protocolP v NAME_`): `| v >= namesSMPVersion -> ...`. `NameRecord` has **no `Encoding` typeclass instance** — the typeclass cannot version-branch. Use top-level helpers `nameRecBytes :: VersionSMP -> NameRecord -> ByteString` and `parseNameRec :: VersionSMP -> Parser NameRecord`, mirroring the `IDS QIK` precedent at `Protocol.hs:1912–1979`.
+
+**`NameRecord` schema and wire layout.**
+
+```haskell
+data NameRecord = NameRecord
+  { nrDisplayName  :: Text                    -- ≤255 bytes UTF-8
+  , nrOwner        :: NameOwner               -- 20 raw bytes
+  , nrChannelLinks :: [NameLink]
+  , nrContactLinks :: [NameLink]
+  , nrAdminAddress :: Maybe Text
+  , nrAdminEmail   :: Maybe Text
+  , nrExpiry       :: Int64                   -- Unix seconds, ≥ 0
+  , nrIsTest       :: Bool
+  }
+
+newtype NameOwner = NameOwner ByteString   -- bare ctor NOT exported; smart ctor enforces length 20
+newtype NameLink  = NameLink  Text         -- bare ctor NOT exported; smart ctor enforces ≤1024 bytes
+
+unNameOwner :: NameOwner -> ByteString
+unNameOwner (NameOwner bs) = bs
+
+unNameLink :: NameLink -> Text
+unNameLink (NameLink t) = t
+```
+
+Field additions are gated by future SMP version bumps (matching the `IDS QIK` precedent at `Protocol.hs:1912–1979`) — no separate record-version field.
+
+| Field | Encoding | Max bytes |
+|---|---|---|
+| `nrDisplayName` | 1-byte length prefix + UTF-8 | 1 + 255 |
+| `nrOwner` | 20 raw bytes, no prefix | 20 |
+| `nrChannelLinks`, `nrContactLinks` | 1-byte count + per-element (Word16 BE len + UTF-8); combined cap **8 entries** across both lists | 1 + Σ(2 + ≤1024) |
+| `nrAdminAddress`, `nrAdminEmail` | `'0'` or `'1'` + (1-byte length + UTF-8 if `'1'`) | 1 + 1 + 255 |
+| `nrExpiry` | two big-endian `Word32` | 8 |
+| `nrIsTest` | `'T'` or `'F'` | 1 |
+
+`Encoding NameLink` reads the Word16 length **before** `A.take` allocates — going through the existing `Large` wrapper allows up to 65 535 bytes per element. There is no `Encoding [a]` instance — use `smpEncodeList` / `smpListP` / a bounded variant:
+
+```haskell
+smpListPUpTo :: Encoding a => Int -> Parser [a]
+smpListPUpTo cap = do
+  n <- lenP
+  when (n > cap) $ fail "list too long"
+  A.count n smpP
+
+parseNameRec _v = do
+  nrDisplayName  <- smpP
+  nrOwner        <- smpP
+  nrChannelLinks <- smpListPUpTo 8
+  nrContactLinks <- smpListPUpTo (8 - length nrChannelLinks)
+  nrAdminAddress <- smpP
+  nrAdminEmail   <- smpP
+  nrExpiry       <- smpP
+  when (nrExpiry < 0) $ fail "expiry must be non-negative"
+  nrIsTest       <- smpP
+  pure NameRecord{..}
+```
+
+Both list parsers fail at the count step before allocating; the second inherits the residual budget. Canonical encoding by construction: every primitive has exactly one valid byte form — two name servers reading the same SNRC state produce byte-identical responses.
+
+**Wire-size budget.** `paddedProxiedTLength = 16226` is the plaintext input to `cbEncrypt` (`Server.hs:2117`); `pad` reserves 2 bytes → framed transmission ≤ 16 224 bytes. Combined-link cap 8 yields max payload ≈ 9 050 bytes — generous margin.
+
+**Error semantics.** A single wire code: `ERR AUTH`. Per RFC, this collapses every failure (name not found, malformed key, names disabled, RPC unreachable, decode error, timeout). Resolver internally distinguishes the cause for stats only.
+
+**Forwarded-only access.** Direct RSLV is rejected with `CMD PROHIBITED`. The shape of `THAuthServer` alone cannot discriminate direct from forwarded (`Transport.hs:852` sets `sessSecret' = Just _` for every v6+ direct client too). An explicit `forwarded :: Bool` flag is threaded through `verifyTransmission` (see below).
+
+## Server changes
+
+All edits in `src/Simplex/Messaging/Server.hs`.
+
+**`forwarded :: Bool` plumbing.** Three signatures change:
+
+- `verifyTransmission :: Bool -> ...` (line 1233) — direct path passes `False` (lines 1152–1153), forwarded path passes `True` (line 2129).
+- `verifyLoadedQueue :: Bool -> ...` (line 1238) — receives the flag from `verifyTransmission` (lines 1235, 1240).
+- `verifyQueueTransmission :: Bool -> ...` (line 1244) — receives and uses the flag.
+
+New `vc` clauses inside `verifyQueueTransmission`:
+
+```haskell
+vc SResolver (RSLV _) | forwarded = VRVerified Nothing
+                      | otherwise = VRFailed (CMD PROHIBITED)
+vc SResolver _ = VRFailed (CMD PROHIBITED)   -- defensive catch-all
+```
+
+**Forwarded whitelist** (`Server.hs:2132`):
+
+```haskell
+Cmd SResolver (RSLV _) -> True
+```
+
+**`processCommand` branch** (alongside line 1481):
+
+```haskell
+Cmd SResolver (RSLV (LookupKey key)) -> do
+  st <- asks (rslvStats . serverStats)
+  incStat (rslvReqs st)
+  asks namesEnv >>= \case
+    Nothing -> incStat (rslvDisabled st)  $> response (corrId, NoEntity, ERR AUTH)
+    Just nenv -> liftIO (resolveName nenv key) >>= \case
+      Right rec     -> incStat (rslvSucc st)     $> response (corrId, NoEntity, NAME rec)
+      Left NotFound -> incStat (rslvNotFound st) $> response (corrId, NoEntity, ERR AUTH)
+      Left _        -> incStat (rslvEthErrs st)  $> response (corrId, NoEntity, ERR AUTH)
+```
+
+**Shutdown.** Add `closeNamesEnv :: NamesEnv -> IO ()` calling `closeManager`. Wire into `closeServer` (`Server.hs:247`):
+
+```haskell
+closeServer = do
+  asks (smpAgent . proxyAgent) >>= liftIO . closeSMPClientAgent
+  asks namesEnv >>= liftIO . mapM_ closeNamesEnv
+```
+
+In-flight `resolveName` calls during shutdown receive `ConnectionClosed` → `EthHttpErr` → masked-leader cleanup runs → waiters unblock with `ERR AUTH`.
+
+**`incStat` relocation.** Defined at `Server.hs:2220`, currently unexported. Move to `Server/Stats.hs` (one-line transplant + export) so `Resolver.hs` can use it.
+
+**Co-located proxy warning.** `newEnv` logs a startup warning whenever `allowSMPProxy = True` and `namesConfig = Just _`. RSLV is the first slow forwarded command; on a proxy host it can serialise other forwarded commands on the same proxy-relay session up to `rpcTimeoutMs` per cache miss. The warning is not a hard refusal because `[PROXY]` has no `enable: on/off` toggle — proxy is always on for every smp-server. `forkForwardedCmd` async dispatch is the longer-term fix, tracked as a follow-up; once the proxy role is gateable per-server, the warning can be tightened back to a refusal.
+
+## Resolver subtree
+
+New module tree at `src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Names/`:
+
+| Module | Contents |
+|---|---|
+| `Names.hs` | Façade — re-exports `NamesConfig`, `NamesEnv`, `ResolveError`, `resolveName`, `newNamesEnv`, `closeNamesEnv`. |
+| `Names/Resolver.hs` | All types + cache + in-flight + `resolveName`. Helpers exported directly (no `.Internal` per codebase convention). **Test seam**: `NamesEnv` holds `ethCall` as a function value, so tests construct stubs via `newNamesEnvWith`. |
+| `Names/Eth/RPC.hs` | `EthRpcEnv`; `ethCallReal` via `http-client` + `withResponse` + `brReadSome rpcMaxResponseBytes`. JSON-RPC error / HTTP error split. `rpcMaxConcurrency` semaphore. `Authorization` header from `rpcAuth`. |
+| `Names/Eth/SNRC.hs` | `EthAddress`, Keccak-256 namehash via `crypton`'s `Crypto.Hash.Algorithms.Keccak_256` (mirroring `Crypto.hs:1023–1025` for SHA3), hand-rolled bounded Solidity ABI codec, `getRecord` with zero-owner detection. **Ethereum's Keccak ≠ NIST SHA3-256.** |
+
+**ABI codec invariants**, enforced before any allocation: `offset + 32 ≤ buf.length`; `offset + 32 + length ≤ buf.length`; `offset ≥ headEnd` (no backward jumps); every length ≤ per-field cap; `string[]` outer length × 32 ≤ buf.length; recursion depth ≤ 2; `uint256 → Int64` rejects if any high 24 bytes non-zero; UTF-8 via `decodeUtf8'` returns `EthDecodeErr`.
+
+**Zero-owner → `NotFound`**: ENS-style resolvers return zeroed records for non-existent names. After ABI decode, if `nrOwner == NameOwner (B.replicate 20 0)` return `Left NotFound`.
+
+**Errors.**
+
+```haskell
+data ResolveError = NotFound | EthHttpErr | EthRpcErr { rpcCode :: Int, rpcMessage :: Text }
+                  | EthDecodeErr | TimedOut
+```
+
+All collapse to `ERR AUTH`. `EthRpcErr` carries JSON-RPC `error` object — method-not-found (SNRC not deployed at `snrc_address`) is logged immediately on the first error after a recent success: `logError "NAMES: JSON-RPC error from endpoint — check snrc_address: <code> <message>"`. No automatic retry.
+
+**Cache.** TTL + FIFO eviction. `TVar (OrdPSQ LookupKey Word64 NameRecord, Int)` — priority = monotonic-ns at insert; the `Int` is running byte count. `cacheLookup` is one STM transaction (read, expiry-check, expired-delete-with-byte-decrement). `cacheInsert` is one STM transaction: while `size > cacheMaxEntries` OR `bytes + sizeOf(rec) > cacheMaxBytes`, `minView` to drop oldest, then `insert`. Byte counter prevents `100 000 × 9 KB ≈ 900 MB` worst-case blow-up.
+
+**Request coalescing** (async-exception safe via `E.mask`):
+
+```haskell
+resolveName env bs = do
+  let k = LookupKey bs
+  now <- getMonotonicTimeNSec
+  atomically (cacheLookup env k now) >>= \case
+    Just rec -> incStat (rslvCacheHits ...) $> Right rec
+    Nothing  -> do
+      incStat (rslvCacheMiss ...)
+      ticket <- atomically $ TM.lookup k (inflight env) >>= \case
+        Just mv -> pure (Waiter mv)
+        Nothing -> newEmptyTMVar >>= \mv -> TM.insert k mv (inflight env) $> Leader mv
+      case ticket of
+        Waiter mv -> atomically (readTMVar mv)
+        Leader mv -> E.mask $ \restore -> do
+          r <- restore (fetchOnceTimed env bs)
+                 `E.catch` \(e :: E.SomeException) -> pure (Left (mapEthErr e))
+          atomically $ putTMVar mv r >> TM.delete k (inflight env)
+          case r of Right rec -> atomically (cacheInsert env k now rec); Left _ -> pure ()
+          pure r
+
+fetchOnceTimed env bs =
+  System.Timeout.timeout (rpcTimeoutMs (config env) * 1000) (fetchOnce env bs) >>= \case
+    Just r  -> pure r
+    Nothing -> pure (Left TimedOut)
+```
+
+`E.mask` ensures `putTMVar + TM.delete` runs even on async exception; `fetchOnceTimed` runs under `restore` so it remains interruptible. Waiters always see a value; the in-flight TMap entry is always removed.
+
+`fetchOnce`, `mapEthErr`, `scrubUrl`, `cacheLookup`, `cacheInsert` are internal to `Resolver.hs`. `getMonotonicTimeNSec` from `GHC.Clock` — first monotonic-clock use in the codebase; clock-jump safe.
+
+**STM contention.** Cache hits are read-only `readTVar` — STM scales. Cache writes under sustained miss traffic can retry; `CacheSpec` asserts < 5% retry at 4 readers + 1 writer @ 1k RPS. If observed higher, swap `TVar` for `IORef` + `atomicModifyIORef'`.
+
+**Multicoin and text records** are not in `NameRecord`. If Part 1 contract returns them from `getRecord`, extend `NameRecord` and the wire-size budget. **Confirm with Part 1 author before implementing `Eth/SNRC.hs`.**
+
+## Configuration
+
+`ServerConfig` (`Env/STM.hs:142`) gains one field `namesConfig :: Maybe NamesConfig`. `Env` (`Env/STM.hs:261`) gains `namesEnv :: Maybe NamesEnv`. `newEnv` constructs it after `proxyAgent` (line 605) with the co-location guard.
+
+```haskell
+data NamesConfig = NamesConfig
+  { ethereumEndpoint     :: Text          -- http(s), no userinfo, explicit port required
+  , snrcAddress          :: NameOwner     -- 20 bytes
+  , rpcAuth              :: Maybe RpcAuth -- required when https & non-loopback host
+  , cacheSeconds         :: Int           -- 300
+  , cacheMaxEntries      :: Int           -- 100000
+  , cacheMaxBytes        :: Int           -- 67108864 (64 MB)
+  , rpcTimeoutMs         :: Int           -- 3000
+  , rpcMaxResponseBytes  :: Int           -- 262144 (256 KB)
+  , rpcMaxConcurrency    :: Int           -- 8
+  }
+
+data RpcAuth = AuthBearer Text | AuthBasic Text Text
+```
+
+INI parsing in `Server/Main.hs`:
+
+- `validateUrl` (using new `network-uri` dep): accepts only http(s), non-empty host, **explicit port** (rejects `http://localhost` defaulting to 80 while Reth is on 8545), no userinfo, no query/fragment. Rejects `https://...` without `rpc_auth` when host is non-loopback. On rejection: `logError` + `exitFailure`.
+- `parseEthAddr`: accepts `0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}` and the same without `0x`. Mixed-case → verify EIP-55 checksum and reject mismatch (catches typos).
+- `parseRpcAuth`: reads optional `rpc_auth` key; format `bearer <token>` or `basic <user>:<pass>`.
+- `scrubUrl`: strips userinfo from all log lines mentioning the endpoint, including inside `mapEthErr`.
+- Transition-aware error logging: log immediately on first error after a recent success, then at most hourly while persisting + summary at every stats reset.
+
+Default INI template (`Server/Main/Init.hs`, after `[PROXY]`):
+
+```
+[NAMES]
+# Public-namespace resolution (SNRC on Ethereum).
+# Requires an Ethereum JSON-RPC endpoint (Reth+Nimbus). See deployment guide.
+# Cannot be combined with [PROXY] enable: on by default — see allow_dangerous_colocation.
+# Restart required to change settings.
+enable: off
+# Same-host:
+# ethereum_endpoint: http://127.0.0.1:8545
+# Central Reth via Caddy:
+# ethereum_endpoint: https://eth.simplex.chat:443
+# rpc_auth: basic <username>:<password>
+# snrc_address: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+# cache_seconds: 300
+# cache_max_entries: 100000
+# cache_max_bytes: 67108864
+# rpc_timeout_ms: 3000
+# rpc_max_response_bytes: 262144
+# rpc_max_concurrency: 8
+# allow_dangerous_colocation: off
+```
+
+Upgrade from a pre-v6.6 INI: missing `[NAMES]` section → disabled. No operator action required.
+
+## Operator deployment
+
+Two supported topologies. smp-server is agnostic — only `ethereum_endpoint` changes.
+
+**Topology A (same-host)**: smp-server, Caddy (optional), Reth, Nimbus all on one box. `ethereum_endpoint: http://127.0.0.1:8545`.
+
+**Topology B (central Reth, N smp-server hosts — recommended for fleets)**: one operator runs one eth host with Reth+Nimbus behind Caddy on public HTTPS. Each smp-server has its own credential.
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart LR
+  subgraph eth-host
+    Caddy["Caddy<br/>(public :443, basic auth)"]
+    Reth["Reth<br/>(127.0.0.1:8545)"]
+    Nimbus["Nimbus"]
+    Caddy --> Reth
+    Nimbus -- Engine API (jwt.hex) --> Reth
+  end
+  subgraph smp-host-1
+    S1["smp-server #1"]
+  end
+  subgraph smp-host-N
+    SN["smp-server #N"]
+  end
+  S1 -- HTTPS + Authorization --> Caddy
+  SN -- HTTPS + Authorization --> Caddy
+  Reth <-- Ethereum p2p --> internet
+  Nimbus <-- beacon sync --> internet
+```
+
+Sharing one Reth across **multiple operators** is **not** supported — collapses the RFC's two-server resolution privacy.
+
+**Reth + Nimbus**: Reth (execution layer) holds Ethereum state on ~260 GB pruned NVMe; Nimbus (consensus light client) follows beacon-chain headers. Paired via Engine API on `127.0.0.1:8551` with a shared `jwt.hex`. Recommended Reth flags:
+
+```bash
+reth node \
+  --http.addr 127.0.0.1 \
+  --http.api eth \                     # only eth namespace
+  --rpc.gascap 50000000 \              # cap gas per eth_call
+  --rpc.max-response-size 5242880 \    # 5 MB
+  --http.corsdomain none \
+  --authrpc.jwtsecret /opt/eth/jwt.hex \
+  --authrpc.addr 127.0.0.1 --authrpc.port 8551
+```
+
+**Caddy + Let's Encrypt + Basic auth** (Topology B):
+
+```caddy
+eth.simplex.chat {
+  basicauth {
+    smp-server-1 $2a$14$<bcrypt-hash-1>
+    smp-server-2 $2a$14$<bcrypt-hash-2>
+  }
+  log { format filter { wrap json; fields { request>headers>Authorization delete } } }
+  reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:8545
+}
+```
+
+Caddy auto-fetches Let's Encrypt cert. Each smp-server has its own credential; revoking one = delete the line. `Authorization` stripped from access logs. Port 80 needed for the ACME HTTP-01 challenge (use TLS-ALPN-01 or DNS-01 to drop it). The threat being defended against is DoS (SNRC state is public); mTLS would be overkill. WireGuard/Tailscale are alternative network-layer approaches — both compatible with the plan.
+
+**Capacity.** One Reth+Nimbus box handles a realistic operator fleet by 10–1000× margin. Per-smp-server peak RSLV ≈ 1700 RPS (pessimistic); cache hit rate ≥ 95% → ~85 RPS cache miss per smp-server; 10 smp-servers → ~850 RPS aggregate cache miss reaching Reth; Reth `eth_call` throughput on warm NVMe ≈ 1k–10k RPS. Sizing: 8 vCPU, 32 GB RAM, 1 TB NVMe is comfortable. Scale-out path: more Reth+Nimbus pairs, smp-servers round-robin or shard.
+
+## Implementation
+
+**Order**:
+
+1. Protocol: party/SParty/PartyI, RSLV+tag, NAME+tag, NameRecord + helpers, version constants in `Transport.hs`.
+2. `verifyTransmission`/`verifyLoadedQueue`/`verifyQueueTransmission` `forwarded :: Bool` flag + `vc SResolver` clauses.
+3. Forwarded whitelist + `processCommand` branch + `incStat` move to `Stats.hs`.
+4. Env plumbing: `Server/Env/STM.hs`, `Server/Main.hs` INI parse, `Server/Main/Init.hs` template.
+5. Resolver subtree: `Eth/SNRC.hs` → `Eth/RPC.hs` → `Resolver.hs`.
+6. `NameResolverStats` sub-record + CSV log + Prometheus `names =` block.
+7. Replace stub in (3) with real `resolveName`.
+8. Tests.
+9. `protocol/simplex-messaging.md`: header version line 1 (`19 → 20`), sentence at line 86, version-history list (lines 93–105) v20 entry, TOC (lines 25–68) "Resolver commands" subsection, new section with ABNF + byte layout + error semantics, "Router security requirements" paragraph about names-role outbound HTTP, cross-ref `Transport.hs:226`.
+10. `CHANGELOG.md`: v6.6 entry.
+
+**Cabal** (`simplexmq.cabal`): bump `version: 6.6.0.0`. Add to `if !flag(client_library)` block: `http-client >=0.7 && <0.8`, `http-client-tls >=0.3 && <0.4`, `network-uri >=2.6 && <2.7`, `psqueues >=0.2.7 && <0.3`. Expose 4 new `Server.Names.*` modules in the same block. `crypton` already provides `Keccak_256`.
+
+**Files changed**:
+
+| File | Change |
+|---|---|
+| `Protocol.hs` | Resolver party + RSLV/NAME tags + version guards; `NameRecord` + newtypes + smart ctors; `nameRecBytes`/`parseNameRec`/`smpListPUpTo` helpers (no Encoding NameRecord instance); `LookupKey` parser-side cap |
+| `Transport.hs` | `namesSMPVersion = 20`; bump current/proxied SMP versions |
+| `Server.hs` | Thread `forwarded :: Bool`; `vc SResolver` clauses; whitelist (2132); Resolver branch in `processCommand` (1481); `closeServer` calls `closeNamesEnv`; CSV log (579–618); **remove** local `incStat` |
+| `Server/Env/STM.hs` | `namesConfig` field; `namesEnv` field; `newEnv` constructs `NamesEnv` with co-location guard |
+| `Server/Main.hs` | `[NAMES]` parse: `validateUrl`/`parseEthAddr`/`parseRpcAuth`; `scrubUrl` in logs |
+| `Server/Main/Init.hs` | `[NAMES]` block in default INI |
+| `Server/Stats.hs` | `incStat` moved here + exported; `NameResolverStats` sub-record + helpers; `rslvStats` field |
+| `Server/Prometheus.hs` | `names =` metric block |
+| `Server/Names.hs` (new) | Façade re-exports |
+| `Server/Names/Resolver.hs` (new) | All resolver types + cache + coalescing + `fetchOnceTimed` + `newNamesEnv[With]` + `closeNamesEnv` |
+| `Server/Names/Eth/RPC.hs` (new) | `EthRpcEnv`, `ethCallReal` with bounded body + concurrency semaphore + `Authorization` header |
+| `Server/Names/Eth/SNRC.hs` (new) | `EthAddress`, Keccak namehash, bounded ABI (8 invariants), `getRecord` with zero-owner detection |
+| `simplexmq.cabal` | Bump `6.6.0.0`; 4 new deps + 4 new modules in `if !flag(client_library)` block |
+| `protocol/simplex-messaging.md` | Header version, version-history v20 entry, new "Resolver commands" section |
+| `CHANGELOG.md` | v6.6 entry |
+
+## Testing
+
+`tests/SMPNamesTests/` registered in `tests/Test.hs:112–151`. Build only when `client_library = False`.
+
+1. **ProtocolEncodingSpec** — `nameRecBytes` ↔ `parseNameRec` round-trip; oversized fields rejected at parse; combined-list cap 8 enforced; negative `nrExpiry` rejected; canonical encoding byte-stable.
+2. **MaxSizeSpec** — max `NameRecord` encodes ≤ ~9 KB; `encodeTransmission v ≤ paddedProxiedTLength - 2`; `cbEncrypt` succeeds.
+3. **CommandTagSpec** — `"RSLV"`/`"NAME"` parse; v < 20 sessions reject `RSLV_` at parameter parser.
+4. **ForwardedGateSpec** — direct RSLV → `CMD PROHIBITED`; forwarded RSLV reaches handler.
+5. **ForwardedRslvSpec** — RSLV wrapped in PFWD reaches the handler end-to-end. **Test infra cost**: first protocol-level PFWD test; budget for `runProxiedSmpCommand` helper performing `PRXY`/`PKEY`/`PFWD` manually.
+6. **CacheSpec** — hit avoids RPC; TTL expiry forces re-fetch; bytes cap evicts before entries cap on large records; concurrent same-key callers issue one RPC; leader exception → all waiters get `Left _`, TMap entry removed; leader async-cancel → cleanup STM still runs.
+7. **AbiSpec** — encode/decode against pinned fixtures (`tests/fixtures/snrc/`); QuickCheck fuzz on random buffers ≤ `rpcMaxResponseBytes` must never crash.
+8. **NamehashSpec** — Keccak-256 reference vectors; assert Keccak ≠ SHA3-256.
+9. **MockRpcSpec** — fake HTTP server; missing → `EthHttpErr`; slow → `TimedOut`; multi-GB body truncated → `EthDecodeErr`. `rpcAuth = AuthBasic` sends correct header.
+10. **Uint256OverflowSpec** — `expiry > Int64.maxBound` → `EthDecodeErr`.
+11. **ZeroOwnerSpec** — `owner = 0x000...000` → `NotFound`.
+12. **StartupGuardSpec** — `allowSMPProxy + names.enable` aborts; `allow_dangerous_colocation = on` starts with warning.
+13. **UrlValidationSpec** — userinfo/scheme/host/port edge cases; rejects `https://` without `rpc_auth` for non-loopback.
+14. **EipChecksumSpec** — `parseEthAddr` accepts lower/upper; verifies mixed-case checksum; rejects typos.
+15. **AbiBoundsSpec** — each of 8 ABI invariants triggers `EthDecodeErr` without crash/allocation blow-up.
+
+Integration against real Reth+Nimbus mainnet deferred to ops.
+
+## Threat model, scope, coordination
+
+| Actor | Can | Cannot |
+|---|---|---|
+| Name server | See lookup-key bytes; see query timing; see Eth endpoint URL (operator-self) | See client IP/session; correlate clients across queries |
+| Compromised Eth endpoint | Poison this server's cache for one TTL window; see every lookup key the server queries | Bypass two-server agreement (client-side, out of scope) |
+| Adversarial client (high-rate unique keys) | Cache-thrash DoS; fill `Manager` connection pool up to `managerConnCount = 8` | Bypass `rpcMaxResponseBytes` or `fetchOnceTimed` |
+| Adversarial proxy (slow inner RSLVs) | Block other forwarded commands on that proxy connection up to `rpcTimeoutMs` per miss | Affect other proxy connections |
+| Operator with footgun config (https no auth, public Eth RPC) | (rejected at startup, or operator-acknowledged data leak) | — |
+
+Mitigations: caching + coalescing + `rpcTimeoutMs` + `rpcMaxResponseBytes` + `rpcMaxConcurrency`; co-location refused at startup; URL validation; Caddy + auth in front of Reth; Reth's own gas/size caps. Timing side-channels (cache-hit vs miss latency) not mitigated — flagged for post-MVP. State proofs deferred to post-MVP per RFC.
+
+**Cross-repo coordination.** The `simplex-chat` `ep/namespace` branch currently contains only the RFC commit — no agent-side wire-format code yet. This plan's wire format is validated only by simplexmq's own tests until a matching agent PR lands (structurally weak — encoder/decoder bugs are mutually consistent with themselves). Coordinate with the agent-side implementer **before merging** on: exact `NameRecord` field order and types; `LookupKey` namespace-prefix convention; error-code semantics; Part 1 SNRC contract `getRecord` ABI surface.
diff --git a/protocol/simplex-messaging.md b/protocol/simplex-messaging.md
index f1d1f77ce4..aa01974d82 100644
--- a/protocol/simplex-messaging.md
+++ b/protocol/simplex-messaging.md
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-Version 19, 2025-01-24
+Version 20, 2026-05-25
 
 # Simplex Messaging Protocol (SMP)
 
@@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ Version 19, 2025-01-24
     - [Queue deleted notification](#queue-deleted-notification)
     - [Error responses](#error-responses)
     - [OK response](#ok-response)
+  - [Resolver commands](#resolver-commands)
+    - [Resolve name command](#resolve-name-command)
+    - [Name record response](#name-record-response)
 - [Transport connection with the SMP router](#transport-connection-with-the-SMP-router)
   - [General transport protocol considerations](#general-transport-protocol-considerations)
   - [TLS transport encryption](#tls-transport-encryption)
@@ -83,7 +86,7 @@ It's designed with the focus on communication security and integrity, under the
 
 It is designed as a low level protocol for other application protocols to solve the problem of secure and private message transmission, making [MITM attack][1] very difficult at any part of the message transmission system.
 
-This document describes SMP protocol version 19. Versions 1-5 are discontinued. The version history:
+This document describes SMP protocol version 20. Versions 1-5 are discontinued. The version history:
 
 - v1: binary protocol encoding
 - v2: message flags (used to control notifications)
@@ -103,6 +106,7 @@ This document describes SMP protocol version 19. Versions 1-5 are discontinued.
 - v17: create notification credentials with NEW command
 - v18: support client notices in BLOCKED error
 - v19: service subscriptions to messages (SUBS, NSUBS, SOKS, ENDS, ALLS commands)
+- v20: public namespaces resolver (RSLV command, NAME response) — forwarded-only via PFWD
 
 ## Introduction
 
@@ -424,6 +428,8 @@ Simplex messaging router implementations MUST NOT create, store or send to any o
 
 - Any other information that may compromise privacy or [forward secrecy][4] of communication between clients using simplex messaging routers (the routers cannot compromise forward secrecy of any application layer protocol, such as double ratchet).
 
+Routers with the names role make outbound JSON-RPC calls to an Ethereum endpoint to read `NameRecord` data; the lookup key reaches that endpoint. Operators MUST run the endpoint themselves (loopback Reth + Nimbus, or a self-hosted central deployment) — sharing one endpoint across multiple operators collapses the two-server privacy property because the endpoint operator would see every lookup key across all of them. The names role and the SMP-proxy role MUST NOT be enabled on the same router by default; a slow `RSLV` cache miss can serialise other forwarded commands on the same proxy-relay session.
+
 ## Message delivery notifications
 
 Supporting message delivery while the client mobile app is not running requires sending push notifications with the device token. All alternative mechanisms for background message delivery are unreliable, particularly on iOS platform.
@@ -1422,6 +1428,68 @@ When the command is successfully executed by the router, it should respond with
 ok = %s"OK"
 ```
 
+### Resolver commands
+
+Resolver commands implement public-namespace name resolution on the names-role
+router. A names router translates an opaque lookup key (such as `alice` or
+`alice.simplex.eth`) into a `NameRecord` carrying the channel and contact links
+the named party publishes.
+
+**Forwarded-only.** RSLV is only valid when delivered inside a `PFWD` block via
+the SMP proxy. A direct `RSLV` from a transport client is rejected with
+`ERR CMD PROHIBITED`. This preserves the two-server privacy property of the
+resolver design: the names router sees the lookup key but never the client IP,
+session, or identity; the proxy router sees the client connection but cannot
+read the encrypted lookup key inside the forwarded transmission.
+
+**Backing store.** This protocol does not prescribe where the names router
+reads `NameRecord` from. The reference implementation queries the SNRC contract
+on Ethereum via a JSON-RPC endpoint; alternative backings (different chains,
+DHT, etc.) are valid as long as they return a `NameRecord` matching the encoding
+below.
+
+#### Resolve name command
+
+```abnf
+rslv = %s"RSLV" SP lookupKey
+lookupKey = length *OCTET  ; 1-byte length prefix, up to 64 bytes
+```
+
+Name-syntax validation (lowercase, namespace prefixes such as `#testnet:`,
+length policy) is a client-side concern. The names router treats the lookup
+key as opaque bytes.
+
+The names router responds with either a `NAME` response carrying the resolved
+record, or `ERR AUTH` collapsing every failure mode (name not found, malformed
+key, names role disabled, RPC unreachable, decode error, timeout). The wire
+code does not distinguish between these — stats counters MAY be exposed
+out-of-band for operator observability.
+
+#### Name record response
+
+```abnf
+name = %s"NAME" SP nameRecord
+
+nameRecord = displayName owner channelLinks contactLinks adminAddr adminEmail expiry isTest
+displayName = length *OCTET                  ; 1-byte length prefix, up to 255 bytes UTF-8
+owner       = 20OCTET                        ; raw 20-byte Ethereum-style address
+channelLinks = count *nameLink               ; count is a 1-byte unsigned integer
+contactLinks = count *nameLink               ; combined count of channelLinks + contactLinks ≤ 8
+nameLink    = length16 *OCTET                ; 2-byte big-endian length, up to 1024 bytes UTF-8
+adminAddr   = optionalText                   ; "0" absent or "1" + 1-byte length + UTF-8 up to 255 bytes
+adminEmail  = optionalText                   ; same encoding as adminAddr
+expiry      = 8OCTET                         ; Int64 big-endian, Unix seconds, MUST be ≥ 0
+isTest      = "T" / "F"
+```
+
+The encoding is canonical: every primitive has exactly one valid byte form, so
+two names routers reading the same backing state produce byte-identical
+responses.
+
+**Wire-size budget.** A maximal `nameRecord` (8 links × 1024 bytes + maximal
+admin / display strings) fits comfortably within the SMP proxied transmission
+budget of 16224 bytes.
+
 ## Transport connection with the SMP router
 
 ### General transport protocol considerations
diff --git a/simplexmq.cabal b/simplexmq.cabal
index 070f680303..5d0eaeb651 100644
--- a/simplexmq.cabal
+++ b/simplexmq.cabal
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 cabal-version: 1.12
 
 name:           simplexmq
-version:        6.5.2.0
+version:        6.6.0.0
 synopsis:       SimpleXMQ message broker
 description:    This package includes <./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Server.html server>,
                 <./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Client.html client> and
@@ -261,6 +261,10 @@ library
           Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.Journal.SharedLock
           Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.STM
           Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.Types
+          Simplex.Messaging.Server.Names
+          Simplex.Messaging.Server.Names.Eth.RPC
+          Simplex.Messaging.Server.Names.Eth.SNRC
+          Simplex.Messaging.Server.Names.Resolver
           Simplex.Messaging.Server.NtfStore
           Simplex.Messaging.Server.Prometheus
           Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore
@@ -355,9 +359,13 @@ library
     build-depends:
         case-insensitive ==1.2.*
       , hashable ==1.4.*
+      , http-client >=0.7 && <0.8
+      , http-client-tls >=0.3 && <0.4
       , ini ==0.4.1
+      , network-uri >=2.6 && <2.7
       , optparse-applicative >=0.15 && <0.17
       , process ==1.6.*
+      , psqueues >=0.2.7 && <0.3
       , temporary ==1.3.*
       , wai >=3.2 && <3.3
       , wai-app-static >=3.1 && <3.2
@@ -508,6 +516,7 @@ test-suite simplexmq-test
       ServerTests
       SMPAgentClient
       SMPClient
+      SMPNamesTests
       SMPProxyTests
       Util
       XFTPAgent
diff --git a/src/Simplex/Messaging/Encoding.hs b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Encoding.hs
index d069e5518a..b5b51ab900 100644
--- a/src/Simplex/Messaging/Encoding.hs
+++ b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Encoding.hs
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
     smpEncodeList,
     smpListP,
     lenEncode,
+    lenP,
   )
 where
 
diff --git a/src/Simplex/Messaging/Protocol.hs b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Protocol.hs
index fa58d88439..3a5f88903a 100644
--- a/src/Simplex/Messaging/Protocol.hs
+++ b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Protocol.hs
@@ -163,6 +163,17 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
     EncTransmission (..),
     FwdResponse (..),
     FwdTransmission (..),
+    LookupKey (..),
+    NameRecord (..),
+    NameOwner,
+    mkNameOwner,
+    unNameOwner,
+    NameLink,
+    mkNameLink,
+    unNameLink,
+    nameRecBytes,
+    parseNameRec,
+    smpListPUpTo,
     MsgFlags (..),
     initialSMPClientVersion,
     currentSMPClientVersion,
@@ -225,6 +236,7 @@ where
 
 import Control.Applicative (optional, (<|>))
 import Control.Exception (Exception, SomeException, displayException, fromException)
+import Control.Monad (when)
 import Control.Monad.Except
 import Data.Aeson (FromJSON (..), ToJSON (..))
 import qualified Data.Aeson as J
@@ -250,7 +262,7 @@ import Data.Maybe (isJust, isNothing)
 import Data.String
 import Data.Text (Text)
 import qualified Data.Text as T
-import Data.Text.Encoding (decodeLatin1, encodeUtf8)
+import Data.Text.Encoding (decodeLatin1, decodeUtf8', encodeUtf8)
 import Data.Time.Clock.System (SystemTime (..), systemToUTCTime)
 import Data.Type.Equality
 import Data.Word (Word8, Word16)
@@ -343,6 +355,7 @@ data Party
   | LinkClient
   | ProxiedClient
   | ProxyService
+  | Resolver
   deriving (Show)
 
 -- | Singleton types for SMP protocol clients
@@ -357,6 +370,7 @@ data SParty :: Party -> Type where
   SSenderLink :: SParty LinkClient
   SProxiedClient :: SParty ProxiedClient
   SProxyService :: SParty ProxyService
+  SResolver :: SParty Resolver
 
 instance TestEquality SParty where
   testEquality SCreator SCreator = Just Refl
@@ -369,6 +383,7 @@ instance TestEquality SParty where
   testEquality SSenderLink SSenderLink = Just Refl
   testEquality SProxiedClient SProxiedClient = Just Refl
   testEquality SProxyService SProxyService = Just Refl
+  testEquality SResolver SResolver = Just Refl
   testEquality _ _ = Nothing
 
 deriving instance Show (SParty p)
@@ -395,6 +410,8 @@ instance PartyI ProxiedClient where sParty = SProxiedClient
 
 instance PartyI ProxyService where sParty = SProxyService
 
+instance PartyI Resolver where sParty = SResolver
+
 -- command parties that can read queues
 type family QueueParty (p :: Party) :: Constraint where
   QueueParty Recipient = ()
@@ -473,6 +490,7 @@ partyClientRole = \case
   SSenderLink -> Just SRMessaging
   SProxiedClient -> Just SRMessaging
   SProxyService -> Just SRProxy
+  SResolver -> Nothing
 {-# INLINE partyClientRole #-}
 
 partyServiceRole :: ServiceParty p => SParty p -> SMPServiceRole
@@ -550,6 +568,17 @@ type LinkId = QueueId
 -- | SMP queue ID on the server.
 type QueueId = EntityId
 
+-- | Name lookup key — opaque bytes; namespace/casing per RFC enforced client-side.
+newtype LookupKey = LookupKey ByteString
+  deriving (Eq, Show)
+
+instance Encoding LookupKey where
+  smpEncode (LookupKey s) = smpEncode s
+  smpP = do
+    n <- lenP
+    when (n > 64) $ fail "LookupKey too long"
+    LookupKey <$> A.take n
+
 -- | Parameterized type for SMP protocol commands from all clients.
 data Command (p :: Party) where
   -- SMP recipient commands
@@ -597,6 +626,8 @@ data Command (p :: Party) where
   -- - entity ID: empty
   -- - corrId: unique correlation ID between proxy and relay, also used as a nonce to encrypt forwarded transmission
   RFWD :: EncFwdTransmission -> Command ProxyService -- use CorrId as CbNonce, proxy to relay
+  -- Name resolution: forwarded-only via PFWD. Server reads SNRC contract via Ethereum JSON-RPC.
+  RSLV :: LookupKey -> Command Resolver
 
 deriving instance Show (Command p)
 
@@ -705,6 +736,96 @@ instance Encoding FwdTransmission where
 newtype EncFwdTransmission = EncFwdTransmission ByteString
   deriving (Show)
 
+-- | 20-byte Ethereum address (NameRecord owner). Bare constructor not exported;
+-- use `mkNameOwner` to enforce the 20-byte invariant.
+newtype NameOwner = NameOwner ByteString
+  deriving (Eq, Show)
+
+mkNameOwner :: ByteString -> Either String NameOwner
+mkNameOwner bs
+  | B.length bs == 20 = Right (NameOwner bs)
+  | otherwise = Left "NameOwner must be 20 bytes"
+
+unNameOwner :: NameOwner -> ByteString
+unNameOwner (NameOwner bs) = bs
+{-# INLINE unNameOwner #-}
+
+instance Encoding NameOwner where
+  smpEncode (NameOwner bs) = bs
+  {-# INLINE smpEncode #-}
+  smpP = NameOwner <$> A.take 20
+
+-- | A name-record link (channel or contact). Bare constructor not exported;
+-- use `mkNameLink` to enforce the ≤1024-byte UTF-8 invariant.
+newtype NameLink = NameLink Text
+  deriving (Eq, Show)
+
+mkNameLink :: Text -> Either String NameLink
+mkNameLink t
+  | B.length (encodeUtf8 t) <= 1024 = Right (NameLink t)
+  | otherwise = Left "NameLink too long"
+
+unNameLink :: NameLink -> Text
+unNameLink (NameLink t) = t
+{-# INLINE unNameLink #-}
+
+instance Encoding NameLink where
+  smpEncode (NameLink t) =
+    let bs = encodeUtf8 t
+     in smpEncode @Word16 (fromIntegral $ B.length bs) <> bs
+  smpP = do
+    n <- fromIntegral <$> smpP @Word16
+    when (n > 1024) $ fail "NameLink too long"
+    bs <- A.take n
+    either (fail . show) (pure . NameLink) (decodeUtf8' bs)
+
+-- | Resolved name record returned by the names role.
+--   Field additions are gated by future SMP version bumps (matching IDS QIK precedent).
+data NameRecord = NameRecord
+  { nrDisplayName :: Text, -- ≤255 bytes UTF-8 (enforced by Encoding ByteString length prefix)
+    nrOwner :: NameOwner,
+    nrChannelLinks :: [NameLink],
+    nrContactLinks :: [NameLink],
+    nrAdminAddress :: Maybe Text,
+    nrAdminEmail :: Maybe Text,
+    nrExpiry :: Int64, -- Unix seconds, ≥ 0
+    nrIsTest :: Bool
+  }
+  deriving (Eq, Show)
+
+-- | Bounded list parser — caps element count before allocating.
+smpListPUpTo :: Encoding a => Int -> Parser [a]
+smpListPUpTo cap = do
+  n <- lenP
+  when (n > cap) $ fail "list too long"
+  A.count n smpP
+
+-- | Encode NameRecord on the wire. Version-branched in the same shape as IDS QIK.
+nameRecBytes :: VersionSMP -> NameRecord -> ByteString
+nameRecBytes _v NameRecord {nrDisplayName, nrOwner, nrChannelLinks, nrContactLinks, nrAdminAddress, nrAdminEmail, nrExpiry, nrIsTest} =
+  smpEncode nrDisplayName
+    <> smpEncode nrOwner
+    <> smpEncodeList nrChannelLinks
+    <> smpEncodeList nrContactLinks
+    <> smpEncode nrAdminAddress
+    <> smpEncode nrAdminEmail
+    <> smpEncode nrExpiry
+    <> smpEncode nrIsTest
+
+-- | Parse NameRecord. Combined channel+contact list cap is 8.
+parseNameRec :: VersionSMP -> Parser NameRecord
+parseNameRec _v = do
+  nrDisplayName <- smpP
+  nrOwner <- smpP
+  nrChannelLinks <- smpListPUpTo 8
+  nrContactLinks <- smpListPUpTo (8 - length nrChannelLinks)
+  nrAdminAddress <- smpP
+  nrAdminEmail <- smpP
+  nrExpiry <- smpP
+  when (nrExpiry < 0) $ fail "expiry must be non-negative"
+  nrIsTest <- smpP
+  pure NameRecord {nrDisplayName, nrOwner, nrChannelLinks, nrContactLinks, nrAdminAddress, nrAdminEmail, nrExpiry, nrIsTest}
+
 data BrokerMsg where
   -- SMP broker messages (responses, client messages, notifications)
   IDS :: QueueIdsKeys -> BrokerMsg
@@ -732,6 +853,8 @@ data BrokerMsg where
   OK :: BrokerMsg
   ERR :: ErrorType -> BrokerMsg
   PONG :: BrokerMsg
+  -- Name resolution response. Returned only for forwarded RSLV.
+  NAME :: NameRecord -> BrokerMsg
   deriving (Eq, Show)
 
 data RcvMessage = RcvMessage
@@ -942,6 +1065,7 @@ data CommandTag (p :: Party) where
   RFWD_ :: CommandTag ProxyService
   NSUB_ :: CommandTag Notifier
   NSUBS_ :: CommandTag NotifierService
+  RSLV_ :: CommandTag Resolver
 
 data CmdTag = forall p. PartyI p => CT (SParty p) (CommandTag p)
 
@@ -968,6 +1092,7 @@ data BrokerMsgTag
   | OK_
   | ERR_
   | PONG_
+  | NAME_
   deriving (Show)
 
 class ProtocolMsgTag t where
@@ -1004,6 +1129,7 @@ instance PartyI p => Encoding (CommandTag p) where
     RFWD_ -> "RFWD"
     NSUB_ -> "NSUB"
     NSUBS_ -> "NSUBS"
+    RSLV_ -> "RSLV"
   smpP = messageTagP
 
 instance ProtocolMsgTag CmdTag where
@@ -1032,6 +1158,7 @@ instance ProtocolMsgTag CmdTag where
     "RFWD" -> Just $ CT SProxyService RFWD_
     "NSUB" -> Just $ CT SNotifier NSUB_
     "NSUBS" -> Just $ CT SNotifierService NSUBS_
+    "RSLV" -> Just $ CT SResolver RSLV_
     _ -> Nothing
 
 instance Encoding CmdTag where
@@ -1061,6 +1188,7 @@ instance Encoding BrokerMsgTag where
     OK_ -> "OK"
     ERR_ -> "ERR"
     PONG_ -> "PONG"
+    NAME_ -> "NAME"
   smpP = messageTagP
 
 instance ProtocolMsgTag BrokerMsgTag where
@@ -1083,6 +1211,7 @@ instance ProtocolMsgTag BrokerMsgTag where
     "OK" -> Just OK_
     "ERR" -> Just ERR_
     "PONG" -> Just PONG_
+    "NAME" -> Just NAME_
     _ -> Nothing
 
 -- | SMP message body format
@@ -1792,6 +1921,7 @@ instance PartyI p => ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType (Command p) where
     PRXY host auth_ -> e (PRXY_, ' ', host, auth_)
     PFWD fwdV pubKey (EncTransmission s) -> e (PFWD_, ' ', fwdV, pubKey, Tail s)
     RFWD (EncFwdTransmission s) -> e (RFWD_, ' ', Tail s)
+    RSLV key -> e (RSLV_, ' ', key)
     where
       e :: Encoding a => a -> ByteString
       e = smpEncode
@@ -1816,6 +1946,7 @@ instance PartyI p => ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType (Command p) where
     PRXY {} -> noAuthCmd
     PFWD {} -> entityCmd
     RFWD _ -> noAuthCmd
+    RSLV _ -> noAuthCmd
     SUB -> serviceCmd
     NSUB -> serviceCmd
     -- other client commands must have both signature and queue ID
@@ -1899,6 +2030,9 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType Cmd where
     CT SNotifierService NSUBS_
       | v >= rcvServiceSMPVersion -> Cmd SNotifierService <$> (NSUBS <$> _smpP <*> smpP)
       | otherwise -> pure $ Cmd SNotifierService $ NSUBS (-1) mempty
+    CT SResolver RSLV_
+      | v >= namesSMPVersion -> Cmd SResolver . RSLV <$> _smpP
+      | otherwise -> fail "RSLV requires namesSMPVersion"
 
   fromProtocolError = fromProtocolError @SMPVersion @ErrorType @BrokerMsg
   {-# INLINE fromProtocolError #-}
@@ -1945,6 +2079,9 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
             | v < clientNoticesSMPVersion -> BLOCKED info {notice = Nothing}
           _ -> err
     PONG -> e PONG_
+    NAME rec
+      | v >= namesSMPVersion -> e (NAME_, ' ') <> nameRecBytes v rec
+      | otherwise -> e (ERR_, ' ', AUTH) -- pre-v20: shouldn't reach here, degrade to AUTH
     where
       e :: Encoding a => a -> ByteString
       e = smpEncode
@@ -1992,6 +2129,9 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
     OK_ -> pure OK
     ERR_ -> ERR <$> _smpP
     PONG_ -> pure PONG
+    NAME_
+      | v >= namesSMPVersion -> NAME <$> (A.space *> parseNameRec v)
+      | otherwise -> fail "NAME requires namesSMPVersion"
     where
       serviceRespP resp
         | v >= rcvServiceSMPVersion = resp <$> _smpP <*> smpP
@@ -2014,6 +2154,7 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
     PKEY {} -> noEntityMsg
     RRES _ -> noEntityMsg
     ALLS -> noEntityMsg
+    NAME _ -> noEntityMsg
     -- other broker responses must have queue ID
     _
       | B.null entId -> Left $ CMD NO_ENTITY
diff --git a/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server.hs b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server.hs
index 1b7d920ac5..e28b303bfb 100644
--- a/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server.hs
+++ b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server.hs
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ import Data.Constraint (Dict (..))
 import Data.Dynamic (toDyn)
 import Data.Either (fromRight, partitionEithers)
 import Data.Foldable (foldrM)
-import Data.Functor (($>))
+import Data.Functor (($>), (<&>))
 import Data.IORef
 import Data.Int (Int64)
 import qualified Data.IntMap.Strict as IM
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM as Env
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.Journal (JournalMsgStore, JournalQueue (..), getJournalQueueMessages)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Names (ResolveError (..), closeNamesEnv, resolveName)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.STM
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.Types
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.NtfStore
@@ -245,7 +246,9 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg, startOpt
       saveServerStats
 
     closeServer :: M s ()
-    closeServer = asks (smpAgent . proxyAgent) >>= liftIO . closeSMPClientAgent
+    closeServer = do
+      asks (smpAgent . proxyAgent) >>= liftIO . closeSMPClientAgent
+      asks namesEnv >>= liftIO . mapM_ closeNamesEnv
 
     serverThread ::
       forall sub. String ->
@@ -513,7 +516,7 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg, startOpt
       initialDelay <- (startAt -) . fromIntegral . (`div` 1000000_000000) . diffTimeToPicoseconds . utctDayTime <$> liftIO getCurrentTime
       liftIO $ putStrLn $ "server stats log enabled: " <> statsFilePath
       liftIO $ threadDelay' $ 1000000 * (initialDelay + if initialDelay < 0 then 86400 else 0)
-      ss@ServerStats {fromTime, qCreated, qSecured, qDeletedAll, qDeletedAllB, qDeletedNew, qDeletedSecured, qSub, qSubAllB, qSubAuth, qSubDuplicate, qSubProhibited, qSubEnd, qSubEndB, ntfCreated, ntfDeleted, ntfDeletedB, ntfSub, ntfSubB, ntfSubAuth, ntfSubDuplicate, msgSent, msgSentAuth, msgSentQuota, msgSentLarge, msgRecv, msgRecvGet, msgGet, msgGetNoMsg, msgGetAuth, msgGetDuplicate, msgGetProhibited, msgExpired, activeQueues, msgSentNtf, msgRecvNtf, activeQueuesNtf, qCount, msgCount, ntfCount, pRelays, pRelaysOwn, pMsgFwds, pMsgFwdsOwn, pMsgFwdsRecv, rcvServices, ntfServices}
+      ss@ServerStats {fromTime, qCreated, qSecured, qDeletedAll, qDeletedAllB, qDeletedNew, qDeletedSecured, qSub, qSubAllB, qSubAuth, qSubDuplicate, qSubProhibited, qSubEnd, qSubEndB, ntfCreated, ntfDeleted, ntfDeletedB, ntfSub, ntfSubB, ntfSubAuth, ntfSubDuplicate, msgSent, msgSentAuth, msgSentQuota, msgSentLarge, msgRecv, msgRecvGet, msgGet, msgGetNoMsg, msgGetAuth, msgGetDuplicate, msgGetProhibited, msgExpired, activeQueues, msgSentNtf, msgRecvNtf, activeQueuesNtf, qCount, msgCount, ntfCount, pRelays, pRelaysOwn, pMsgFwds, pMsgFwdsOwn, pMsgFwdsRecv, rcvServices, ntfServices, rslvStats}
         <- asks serverStats
       st <- asks msgStore
       EntityCounts {queueCount, notifierCount, rcvServiceCount, ntfServiceCount, rcvServiceQueuesCount, ntfServiceQueuesCount} <-
@@ -576,6 +579,7 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg, startOpt
           qCount' <- readIORef qCount
           msgCount' <- readIORef msgCount
           ntfCount' <- readIORef ntfCount
+          rslvStats' <- getResetNameResolverStatsData rslvStats
           T.hPutStrLn h $
             T.intercalate
               ","
@@ -649,6 +653,7 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg, startOpt
                      ]
                        <> showServiceStats rcvServices'
                        <> showServiceStats ntfServices'
+                       <> showNameResolverStats rslvStats'
               )
         liftIO $ threadDelay' interval
       where
@@ -656,6 +661,8 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg, startOpt
           map tshow [_pRequests, _pSuccesses, _pErrorsConnect, _pErrorsCompat, _pErrorsOther]
         showServiceStats ServiceStatsData {_srvAssocNew, _srvAssocDuplicate, _srvAssocUpdated, _srvAssocRemoved, _srvSubCount, _srvSubDuplicate, _srvSubQueues, _srvSubEnd} =
           map tshow [_srvAssocNew, _srvAssocDuplicate, _srvAssocUpdated, _srvAssocRemoved, _srvSubCount, _srvSubDuplicate, _srvSubQueues, _srvSubEnd]
+        showNameResolverStats NameResolverStatsData {_rslvReqs, _rslvSucc, _rslvNotFound, _rslvEthErrs, _rslvCacheHits, _rslvCacheMiss, _rslvDisabled} =
+          map tshow [_rslvReqs, _rslvSucc, _rslvNotFound, _rslvEthErrs, _rslvCacheHits, _rslvCacheMiss, _rslvDisabled]
 
     prometheusMetricsThread_ :: ServerConfig s -> [M s ()]
     prometheusMetricsThread_ ServerConfig {prometheusInterval = Just interval, prometheusMetricsFile} =
@@ -1149,8 +1156,8 @@ receive h@THandle {params = THandleParams {thAuth, sessionId}} ms Client {rcvQ,
             updateBatchStats stats cmd -- even if nothing is verified
             let queueId (_, _, (_, qId, _)) = qId
             qs <- getQueueRecs ms p $ map queueId ts'
-            zipWithM (\t -> verified stats t . verifyLoadedQueue service thAuth t) ts' qs
-          _ -> mapM (\t -> verified stats t =<< verifyTransmission ms service thAuth t) ts'
+            zipWithM (\t -> verified stats t . verifyLoadedQueue False service thAuth t) ts' qs
+          _ -> mapM (\t -> verified stats t =<< verifyTransmission False ms service thAuth t) ts'
         mapM_ (atomically . writeTBQueue rcvQ) $ L.nonEmpty cmds
         pure $ errs ++ errs'
       [] -> pure errs
@@ -1230,19 +1237,19 @@ data VerificationResult s = VRVerified (Maybe (StoreQueue s, QueueRec)) | VRFail
 -- - the queue or party key do not exist.
 -- In all cases, the time of the verification should depend only on the provided authorization type,
 -- a dummy key is used to run verification in the last two cases, and failure is returned irrespective of the result.
-verifyTransmission :: forall s. MsgStoreClass s => s -> Maybe THPeerClientService -> Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer) -> SignedTransmission Cmd -> IO (VerificationResult s)
-verifyTransmission ms service thAuth t@(_, _, (_, queueId, Cmd p _)) = case queueParty p of
-  Just Dict -> verifyLoadedQueue service thAuth t <$> getQueueRec ms p queueId
-  Nothing -> pure $ verifyQueueTransmission service thAuth t Nothing
-
-verifyLoadedQueue :: Maybe THPeerClientService -> Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer) -> SignedTransmission Cmd -> Either ErrorType (StoreQueue s, QueueRec) -> VerificationResult s
-verifyLoadedQueue service thAuth t@(tAuth, authorized, (corrId, _, _)) = \case
-  Right q -> verifyQueueTransmission service thAuth t (Just q)
+verifyTransmission :: forall s. MsgStoreClass s => Bool -> s -> Maybe THPeerClientService -> Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer) -> SignedTransmission Cmd -> IO (VerificationResult s)
+verifyTransmission forwarded ms service thAuth t@(_, _, (_, queueId, Cmd p _)) = case queueParty p of
+  Just Dict -> verifyLoadedQueue forwarded service thAuth t <$> getQueueRec ms p queueId
+  Nothing -> pure $ verifyQueueTransmission forwarded service thAuth t Nothing
+
+verifyLoadedQueue :: Bool -> Maybe THPeerClientService -> Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer) -> SignedTransmission Cmd -> Either ErrorType (StoreQueue s, QueueRec) -> VerificationResult s
+verifyLoadedQueue forwarded service thAuth t@(tAuth, authorized, (corrId, _, _)) = \case
+  Right q -> verifyQueueTransmission forwarded service thAuth t (Just q)
   Left AUTH -> dummyVerifyCmd thAuth tAuth authorized corrId `seq` VRFailed AUTH
   Left e -> VRFailed e
 
-verifyQueueTransmission :: forall s. Maybe THPeerClientService -> Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer) -> SignedTransmission Cmd -> Maybe (StoreQueue s, QueueRec) -> VerificationResult s
-verifyQueueTransmission service thAuth (tAuth, authorized, (corrId, entId, command@(Cmd p cmd))) q_
+verifyQueueTransmission :: forall s. Bool -> Maybe THPeerClientService -> Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer) -> SignedTransmission Cmd -> Maybe (StoreQueue s, QueueRec) -> VerificationResult s
+verifyQueueTransmission forwarded service thAuth (tAuth, authorized, (corrId, entId, command@(Cmd p cmd))) q_
   | not checkRole = VRFailed $ CMD PROHIBITED
   | not verifyServiceSig = VRFailed SERVICE
   | otherwise = vc p cmd
@@ -1262,6 +1269,9 @@ verifyQueueTransmission service thAuth (tAuth, authorized, (corrId, entId, comma
     vc SNotifierService NSUBS {} = verifyServiceCmd
     vc SProxiedClient _ = VRVerified Nothing
     vc SProxyService (RFWD _) = VRVerified Nothing
+    vc SResolver (RSLV _)
+      | forwarded = VRVerified Nothing
+      | otherwise = VRFailed $ CMD PROHIBITED
     checkRole = case (service, partyClientRole p) of
       (Just THClientService {serviceRole}, Just role) -> serviceRole == role
       _ -> True
@@ -1486,6 +1496,16 @@ client
         SEND flags msgBody -> response <$> withQueue_ False err (sendMessage flags msgBody)
       Cmd SIdleClient PING -> pure $ response (corrId, NoEntity, PONG)
       Cmd SProxyService (RFWD encBlock) -> response . (corrId,NoEntity,) <$> processForwardedCommand encBlock
+      Cmd SResolver (RSLV (LookupKey key)) -> do
+        st <- asks (rslvStats . serverStats)
+        incStat (rslvReqs st)
+        (selector, msg) <- asks namesEnv >>= \case
+          Nothing -> pure (rslvDisabled, ERR AUTH)
+          Just nenv -> liftIO (resolveName nenv key) <&> \case
+            Right rec -> (rslvSucc, NAME rec)
+            Left NotFound -> (rslvNotFound, ERR AUTH)
+            Left _ -> (rslvEthErrs, ERR AUTH)
+        incStat (selector st) $> response (corrId, NoEntity, msg)
       Cmd SSenderLink command -> case command of
         LKEY k -> withQueue $ \q qr -> checkMode QMMessaging qr $ secureQueue_ q k $>> getQueueLink_ q qr
         LGET -> withQueue $ \q qr -> checkContact qr $ getQueueLink_ q qr
@@ -2126,7 +2146,7 @@ client
             rejectOrVerify clntThAuth = \case
               Left (corrId', entId', e) -> pure $ Left (corrId', entId', ERR e)
               Right t'@(_, _, t''@(corrId', entId', cmd'))
-                | allowed -> liftIO $ verified <$> verifyTransmission ms Nothing clntThAuth t'
+                | allowed -> liftIO $ verified <$> verifyTransmission True ms Nothing clntThAuth t'
                 | otherwise -> pure $ Left (corrId', entId', ERR $ CMD PROHIBITED)
                 where
                   allowed = case cmd' of
@@ -2134,6 +2154,7 @@ client
                     Cmd SSender (SKEY _) -> True
                     Cmd SSenderLink (LKEY _) -> True
                     Cmd SSenderLink LGET -> True
+                    Cmd SResolver (RSLV _) -> True
                     _ -> False
                   verified = \case
                     VRVerified q -> Right (q, t'')
@@ -2217,10 +2238,6 @@ updateDeletedStats q = do
   incStat $ qDeletedAll stats
   liftIO $ atomicModifyIORef'_ (qCount stats) (subtract 1)
 
-incStat :: MonadIO m => IORef Int -> m ()
-incStat r = liftIO $ atomicModifyIORef'_ r (+ 1)
-{-# INLINE incStat #-}
-
 randomId' :: Int -> M s ByteString
 randomId' n = atomically . C.randomBytes n =<< asks random
 
diff --git a/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Env/STM.hs b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Env/STM.hs
index 574111c15e..6f6ca1aaf9 100644
--- a/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Env/STM.hs
+++ b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Env/STM.hs
@@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Information
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.Journal
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.STM
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.Types
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Names (NamesConfig (..), NamesEnv, newNamesEnv, pingEndpoint)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Names.Eth.RPC (scrubUrl)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Util (tshow)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.NtfStore
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.Postgres.Config
@@ -197,6 +200,8 @@ data ServerConfig s = ServerConfig
     smpAgentCfg :: SMPClientAgentConfig,
     allowSMPProxy :: Bool, -- auth is the same with `newQueueBasicAuth`
     serverClientConcurrency :: Int,
+    -- | public-namespace resolver config; Nothing disables the names role
+    namesConfig :: Maybe NamesConfig,
     -- | server public information
     information :: Maybe ServerPublicInfo,
     startOptions :: StartOptions
@@ -272,7 +277,8 @@ data Env s = Env
     serverStats :: ServerStats,
     sockets :: TVar [(ServiceName, SocketState)],
     clientSeq :: TVar ClientId,
-    proxyAgent :: ProxyAgent -- senders served on this proxy
+    proxyAgent :: ProxyAgent, -- senders served on this proxy
+    namesEnv :: Maybe NamesEnv -- public-namespace resolver, present when [NAMES] enable: on
   }
 
 msgStore :: Env s -> s
@@ -558,7 +564,7 @@ newProhibitedSub = do
   return Sub {subThread = ProhibitSub, delivered}
 
 newEnv :: ServerConfig s -> IO (Env s)
-newEnv config@ServerConfig {smpCredentials, httpCredentials, serverStoreCfg, smpAgentCfg, information, messageExpiration, idleQueueInterval, msgQueueQuota, maxJournalMsgCount, maxJournalStateLines} = do
+newEnv config@ServerConfig {allowSMPProxy, smpCredentials, httpCredentials, serverStoreCfg, smpAgentCfg, information, messageExpiration, idleQueueInterval, msgQueueQuota, maxJournalMsgCount, maxJournalStateLines, namesConfig} = do
   serverActive <- newTVarIO True
   server <- newServer
   msgStore_ <- case serverStoreCfg of
@@ -603,6 +609,21 @@ newEnv config@ServerConfig {smpCredentials, httpCredentials, serverStoreCfg, smp
   sockets <- newTVarIO []
   clientSeq <- newTVarIO 0
   proxyAgent <- newSMPProxyAgent smpAgentCfg random
+  namesEnv <- case namesConfig of
+    Nothing -> pure Nothing
+    Just nc -> do
+      logInfo $ "[NAMES] resolver enabled, endpoint=" <> scrubUrl (ethereumEndpoint nc)
+      when allowSMPProxy $
+        logWarn "[NAMES] enable: on on a proxy-role host: slow RSLV cache misses can serialise other forwarded commands on the same proxy-relay session. For high-volume deployments, run [NAMES] on a separate host."
+      let rs = rslvStats serverStats
+      env <- newNamesEnv nc (rslvCacheHits rs) (rslvCacheMiss rs)
+      -- Probe the endpoint at startup. Don't exitFailure: a flapping
+      -- network or an Ethereum host coming up minutes after smp-server
+      -- should not block the server. Log so operators can spot it.
+      pingEndpoint env >>= \case
+        Right _ -> logInfo "[NAMES] endpoint probe ok"
+        Left e -> logWarn $ "[NAMES] endpoint probe failed (server will still start, RSLV will return ERR AUTH until reachable): " <> tshow e
+      pure (Just env)
   pure
     Env
       { serverActive,
@@ -618,7 +639,8 @@ newEnv config@ServerConfig {smpCredentials, httpCredentials, serverStoreCfg, smp
         serverStats,
         sockets,
         clientSeq,
-        proxyAgent
+        proxyAgent,
+        namesEnv
       }
   where
     loadStoreLog :: StoreQueueClass q => (RecipientId -> QueueRec -> IO q) -> FilePath -> STMQueueStore q -> IO ()
diff --git a/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Main.hs b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Main.hs
index f7461f392b..9dfec8aba8 100644
--- a/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Main.hs
+++ b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Main.hs
@@ -76,6 +76,10 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Main.Init
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Web (EmbeddedWebParams (..), WebHttpsParams (..))
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.Journal (JournalMsgStore (..), QStoreCfg (..), stmQueueStore)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.Types (MsgStoreClass (..), SQSType (..), SMSType (..), newMsgStore)
+import Network.URI (URI (..), URIAuth (..), parseAbsoluteURI)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (mkNameOwner, NameOwner)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Names (NamesConfig (..), RpcAuth (..))
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Names.Eth.RPC (fromHex)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.Postgres.Config
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog.ReadWrite (readQueueStore)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (supportedProxyClientSMPRelayVRange, alpnSupportedSMPHandshakes, supportedServerSMPRelayVRange)
@@ -605,6 +609,7 @@ smpServerCLI_ generateSite serveStaticFiles attachStaticFiles cfgPath logPath =
                   },
               allowSMPProxy = True,
               serverClientConcurrency = readIniDefault defaultProxyClientConcurrency "PROXY" "client_concurrency" ini,
+              namesConfig = readNamesConfig ini,
               information = serverPublicInfo ini,
               startOptions
             }
@@ -796,6 +801,82 @@ validCountryValue field s
   | length s == 2 && all (\c -> isAscii c && isAlpha c) s = Right $ T.pack $ map toUpper s
   | otherwise = Left $ "Use ISO3166 2-letter code for " <> field
 
+readNamesConfig :: Ini -> Maybe NamesConfig
+readNamesConfig ini
+  | not enabled = Nothing
+  | otherwise =
+      let rpcAuth_ = either (error . ("[NAMES] rpc_auth: " <>)) Just . parseRpcAuth =<< eitherToMaybe (lookupValue "NAMES" "rpc_auth" ini)
+          endpoint = requiredText "ethereum_endpoint"
+       in Just
+            NamesConfig
+              { ethereumEndpoint = either (error . ("[NAMES] ethereum_endpoint: " <>)) id (validateUrl endpoint rpcAuth_),
+                snrcAddress = either (error . ("[NAMES] snrc_address: " <>)) id $ parseEthAddr (requiredText "snrc_address"),
+                rpcAuth = rpcAuth_,
+                cacheSeconds = readIniDefault 300 "NAMES" "cache_seconds" ini,
+                cacheMaxEntries = readIniDefault 100000 "NAMES" "cache_max_entries" ini,
+                cacheMaxBytes = readIniDefault 67108864 "NAMES" "cache_max_bytes" ini,
+                rpcTimeoutMs = readIniDefault 3000 "NAMES" "rpc_timeout_ms" ini,
+                rpcMaxResponseBytes = readIniDefault 262144 "NAMES" "rpc_max_response_bytes" ini,
+                rpcMaxConcurrency = readIniDefault 8 "NAMES" "rpc_max_concurrency" ini
+              }
+  where
+    enabled = fromMaybe False (iniOnOff "NAMES" "enable" ini)
+    requiredText key =
+      either (error . (("[NAMES] " <> T.unpack key <> " is required: ") <>)) id $
+        lookupValue "NAMES" key ini
+
+-- | Validate the ethereum_endpoint URL:
+--   * scheme must be http: or https:
+--   * authority (host) must be present and non-empty
+--   * port MUST be explicit (rejects http://host without :8545 to avoid
+--     accidentally hitting :80 when Reth listens on :8545)
+--   * userinfo (user:pass@) MUST NOT be present (credentials belong in
+--     rpc_auth so they don't leak via Host header or logs)
+--   * query and fragment MUST NOT be present
+--   * https requires rpc_auth on non-loopback hosts (operator misconfig
+--     guard — a public HTTPS endpoint without auth is almost always wrong)
+validateUrl :: Text -> Maybe RpcAuth -> Either String Text
+validateUrl url auth_ = do
+  uri <- maybe (Left "not an absolute URI") Right $ parseAbsoluteURI (T.unpack url)
+  let scheme = uriScheme uri
+  unless (scheme == "http:" || scheme == "https:") $
+    Left ("scheme " <> show scheme <> " not supported (use http or https)")
+  ua <- maybe (Left "missing authority (host)") Right (uriAuthority uri)
+  when (null (uriRegName ua)) $ Left "empty host"
+  unless (null (uriUserInfo ua)) $ Left "userinfo (user:pass@) not allowed; use rpc_auth instead"
+  when (null (uriPort ua)) $ Left "explicit port required (e.g. http://host:8545)"
+  unless (null (uriQuery uri)) $ Left "query string not allowed"
+  unless (null (uriFragment uri)) $ Left "fragment not allowed"
+  let path = uriPath uri
+  unless (path == "" || path == "/") $
+    Left "URL path not allowed; API keys embedded in the path leak to logs — use rpc_auth instead"
+  when (scheme == "https:" && not (isLoopback (uriRegName ua)) && isNothing auth_) $
+    Left "https endpoint on a non-loopback host requires rpc_auth"
+  Right url
+  where
+    isLoopback h = h == "127.0.0.1" || h == "localhost" || h == "[::1]"
+
+-- | Parse a 20-byte Ethereum address as text "0x[hex40]" or "[hex40]".
+-- EIP-55 mixed-case checksum verification is a follow-up.
+parseEthAddr :: Text -> Either String NameOwner
+parseEthAddr t = do
+  bs <- fromHex (encodeUtf8 t)
+  if B.length bs == 20
+    then mkNameOwner bs
+    else Left "expected a 20-byte address (40 hex characters, optionally 0x-prefixed)"
+
+-- | Parse an rpc_auth INI value. Scheme keyword is case-insensitive so
+-- "Bearer <token>" / "BEARER <token>" (Caddy / RFC 7235 convention) work
+-- as well as the lowercase form.
+parseRpcAuth :: Text -> Either String RpcAuth
+parseRpcAuth t = case T.words t of
+  [scheme, tok] | T.toLower scheme == "bearer" -> Right $ AuthBearer tok
+  [scheme, up] | T.toLower scheme == "basic" -> case T.breakOn ":" up of
+    (u, rest)
+      | not (T.null u) && ":" `T.isPrefixOf` rest -> Right $ AuthBasic u (T.drop 1 rest)
+    _ -> Left "basic auth expects user:password"
+  _ -> Left "expected `bearer <token>` or `basic <user>:<pass>`"
+
 printSourceCode :: Maybe Text -> IO ()
 printSourceCode = \case
   Just sourceCode -> T.putStrLn $ "Server source code: " <> sourceCode
diff --git a/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Main/Init.hs b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Main/Init.hs
index 0e3ceb81b4..bc6689d859 100644
--- a/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Main/Init.hs
+++ b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Main/Init.hs
@@ -155,6 +155,26 @@ iniFileContent cfgPath logPath opts host basicAuth controlPortPwds =
         \# Limit number of threads a client can spawn to process proxy commands in parrallel.\n"
     <> ("# client_concurrency = " <> tshow defaultProxyClientConcurrency)
     <> "\n\n\
+        \[NAMES]\n\
+        \# Public-namespace resolution (SNRC on Ethereum).\n\
+        \# Requires an Ethereum JSON-RPC endpoint (Reth+Nimbus). See deployment guide.\n\
+        \# Co-locating with the proxy role logs a warning at startup - slow RSLV cache misses\n\
+        \# can serialise other forwarded commands. For high-volume deployments, run on a separate host.\n\
+        \# Restart required to change settings.\n\
+        \enable: off\n\
+        \# Same-host:\n\
+        \# ethereum_endpoint: http://127.0.0.1:8545\n\
+        \# Central Reth via Caddy:\n\
+        \# ethereum_endpoint: https://eth.simplex.chat:443\n\
+        \# rpc_auth: basic <username>:<password>\n\
+        \# snrc_address: 0x<paste-your-contract-address>\n\
+        \# (cache_max_entries and cache_max_bytes both cap the cache; whichever fills first triggers FIFO eviction)\n\
+        \# cache_seconds: 300\n\
+        \# cache_max_entries: 100000\n\
+        \# cache_max_bytes: 67108864\n\
+        \# rpc_timeout_ms: 3000\n\
+        \# rpc_max_response_bytes: 262144\n\
+        \# rpc_max_concurrency: 8\n\n\
         \[INACTIVE_CLIENTS]\n\
         \# TTL and interval to check inactive clients\n\
         \disconnect = on\n"
diff --git a/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Names.hs b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Names.hs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a3088a79d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Names.hs
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-- | SMP public-namespace resolver façade.
+--
+-- Re-exports the resolver's public surface from Names.Resolver and the
+-- HTTP auth type from Names.Eth.RPC. Implementation lives in Resolver.hs;
+-- Eth.RPC / Eth.SNRC are transport / codec internals.
+module Simplex.Messaging.Server.Names
+  ( NamesConfig (..),
+    RpcAuth (..),
+    NamesEnv,
+    ResolveError (..),
+    newNamesEnv,
+    closeNamesEnv,
+    pingEndpoint,
+    resolveName,
+  )
+where
+
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Names.Eth.RPC (RpcAuth (..))
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Names.Resolver (NamesConfig (..), NamesEnv, ResolveError (..), closeNamesEnv, newNamesEnv, pingEndpoint, resolveName)
diff --git a/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Names/Eth/RPC.hs b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Names/Eth/RPC.hs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f7d1a06494
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Names/Eth/RPC.hs
@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE StrictData #-}
+
+-- | Ethereum JSON-RPC HTTP transport for the resolver.
+--
+-- Boundary properties:
+--   * Response body read with `brReadSome rpcMaxResponseBytes` — adversarial
+--     endpoints cannot exhaust memory with multi-GB bodies.
+--   * Concurrency cap via QSem — bursts of cache-miss traffic cannot exhaust
+--     the http-client connection pool.
+--   * Authorization header attached only when configured.
+module Simplex.Messaging.Server.Names.Eth.RPC
+  ( RpcAuth (..),
+    EthRpcEnv (..),
+    EthRpcError (..),
+    newEthRpcEnv,
+    closeEthRpcEnv,
+    ethCallReal,
+    fromHex,
+    scrubUrl,
+  )
+where
+
+import Control.Applicative ((<|>))
+import Control.Concurrent.QSem (QSem, newQSem, signalQSem, waitQSem)
+import qualified Control.Exception as E
+import Control.Exception (bracket_)
+import qualified Data.Aeson as J
+import qualified Data.Aeson.Types as J
+import qualified Data.ByteArray.Encoding as BAE
+import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
+import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
+import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as BL
+import Data.Text (Text)
+import qualified Data.Text as T
+import Data.Text.Encoding (encodeUtf8)
+import Network.HTTP.Client
+  ( HttpException,
+    Manager,
+    Request,
+    RequestBody (..),
+    brReadSome,
+    closeManager,
+    method,
+    parseRequest,
+    requestBody,
+    requestHeaders,
+    responseBody,
+    responseStatus,
+    withResponse,
+  )
+import qualified Network.HTTP.Client as HC
+import Network.HTTP.Client.TLS (tlsManagerSettings)
+import qualified Network.HTTP.Types as HT
+
+data RpcAuth = AuthBearer Text | AuthBasic Text Text
+  deriving (Show)
+
+data EthRpcEnv = EthRpcEnv
+  { manager :: Manager,
+    request :: Request,
+    sem :: QSem,
+    maxResponseBytes :: Int
+  }
+
+data EthRpcError
+  = HttpFailure HttpException
+  | HttpStatusErr Int
+  | BodyTooLarge
+  | InvalidJson String
+  | JsonRpcErr Int Text
+  deriving (Show)
+
+-- | Build a Request from a (validated) ethereum_endpoint URL.
+buildRequest :: Text -> Maybe RpcAuth -> IO Request
+buildRequest endpoint auth_ = do
+  req <- parseRequest (T.unpack endpoint)
+  pure $
+    req
+      { method = "POST",
+        requestHeaders =
+          ("Content-Type", "application/json")
+            : maybe [] (pure . authHeader) auth_
+      }
+
+authHeader :: RpcAuth -> HT.Header
+authHeader = \case
+  AuthBearer tok -> ("Authorization", "Bearer " <> encodeUtf8 tok)
+  AuthBasic u p ->
+    let encoded = BAE.convertToBase BAE.Base64 (encodeUtf8 u <> ":" <> encodeUtf8 p) :: ByteString
+     in ("Authorization", "Basic " <> encoded)
+
+newEthRpcEnv :: Text -> Maybe RpcAuth -> Int -> Int -> IO EthRpcEnv
+newEthRpcEnv endpoint auth_ maxResponseBytes maxConcurrency = do
+  manager <- HC.newManager tlsManagerSettings
+  request <- buildRequest endpoint auth_
+  sem <- newQSem maxConcurrency
+  pure EthRpcEnv {manager, request, sem, maxResponseBytes}
+
+closeEthRpcEnv :: EthRpcEnv -> IO ()
+closeEthRpcEnv EthRpcEnv {manager} = closeManager manager
+
+-- | Make a single eth_call. `to` is the contract address (20 raw bytes);
+-- `dat` is the ABI-encoded call data. Returns the contract return bytes.
+ethCallReal :: EthRpcEnv -> ByteString -> ByteString -> IO (Either EthRpcError ByteString)
+ethCallReal EthRpcEnv {manager, request, sem, maxResponseBytes} to dat =
+  bracket_ (waitQSem sem) (signalQSem sem) $ do
+    let body = J.encode (rpcEnvelope to dat)
+        req = request {requestBody = RequestBodyLBS body}
+    result <- E.try $ withResponse req manager $ \res -> do
+      let status = responseStatus res
+      if HT.statusCode status >= 400
+        then pure (Left (HttpStatusErr (HT.statusCode status)))
+        else do
+          bs <- brReadSome (responseBody res) (maxResponseBytes + 1)
+          if BL.length bs > fromIntegral maxResponseBytes
+            then pure (Left BodyTooLarge)
+            else pure (parseResult (BL.toStrict bs))
+    pure (either (Left . HttpFailure) id result)
+
+rpcEnvelope :: ByteString -> ByteString -> J.Value
+rpcEnvelope to dat =
+  J.object
+    [ "jsonrpc" J..= ("2.0" :: Text),
+      "id" J..= (1 :: Int),
+      "method" J..= ("eth_call" :: Text),
+      "params"
+        J..= [ J.object
+                 [ "to" J..= toHex to,
+                   "data" J..= toHex dat
+                 ],
+               J.String "latest"
+             ]
+    ]
+
+parseResult :: ByteString -> Either EthRpcError ByteString
+parseResult bs = case J.eitherDecodeStrict bs of
+  Left e -> Left (InvalidJson e)
+  Right (v :: J.Value) -> case J.parseEither parser v of
+    Left e -> Left (InvalidJson e)
+    Right r -> r
+  where
+    parser :: J.Value -> J.Parser (Either EthRpcError ByteString)
+    parser = J.withObject "rpc" $ \o -> do
+      mErr :: Maybe J.Value <- o J..:? "error"
+      case mErr of
+        Just (J.Object eo) -> do
+          code <- (eo J..: "code") <|> pure (-1 :: Int)
+          msg <- (eo J..: "message") <|> pure ("rpc error" :: Text)
+          pure (Left (JsonRpcErr code msg))
+        _ -> do
+          result :: Text <- o J..: "result"
+          case fromHex (encodeUtf8 result) of
+            Right b -> pure (Right b)
+            Left e -> pure (Left (InvalidJson e))
+
+toHex :: ByteString -> Text
+toHex bs = T.pack $ "0x" <> concatMap byte (B.unpack bs)
+  where
+    byte c =
+      let n = fromEnum c
+          (h, l) = quotRem n 16
+       in [hexChar h, hexChar l]
+    hexChar n
+      | n < 10 = toEnum (fromEnum '0' + n)
+      | otherwise = toEnum (fromEnum 'a' + n - 10)
+
+fromHex :: ByteString -> Either String ByteString
+fromHex bs0 =
+  let bs = case B.stripPrefix "0x" bs0 of
+        Just rest -> rest
+        Nothing -> case B.stripPrefix "0X" bs0 of
+          Just rest -> rest
+          Nothing -> bs0
+   in if B.null bs
+        then Right B.empty
+        else
+          if odd (B.length bs) || not (B.all isHex bs)
+            then Left "invalid hex"
+            else Right (decodeHex bs)
+  where
+    isHex c = (c >= '0' && c <= '9') || (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') || (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
+
+decodeHex :: ByteString -> ByteString
+decodeHex = B.pack . go
+  where
+    go s
+      | B.null s = []
+      | otherwise =
+          let hi = digit (B.head s)
+              lo = digit (B.index s 1)
+           in toEnum (16 * hi + lo) : go (B.drop 2 s)
+    digit c
+      | c >= '0' && c <= '9' = fromEnum c - fromEnum '0'
+      | c >= 'a' && c <= 'f' = 10 + fromEnum c - fromEnum 'a'
+      | otherwise = 10 + fromEnum c - fromEnum 'A'
+
+-- | Strip userinfo from a URL so log lines never leak credentials.
+scrubUrl :: Text -> Text
+scrubUrl url =
+  let (scheme, rest) = T.breakOn "://" url
+   in if T.null rest
+        then url
+        else
+          let body = T.drop 3 rest
+              (host, query) = T.breakOn "/" body
+           in case T.breakOn "@" host of
+                (_userinfo, atRest)
+                  | not (T.null atRest) -> scheme <> "://" <> T.drop 1 atRest <> query
+                _ -> url
diff --git a/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Names/Eth/SNRC.hs b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Names/Eth/SNRC.hs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..80b11a255e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Names/Eth/SNRC.hs
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE StrictData #-}
+
+-- | SNRC contract codec: Keccak-256 namehash + bounded Solidity ABI decoder.
+--
+-- IMPORTANT: Ethereum uses Keccak-256, NOT NIST SHA3-256.
+--
+-- ABI safety invariants (enforced before any allocation):
+--   1.  offset + 32 <= buf.length                       (head read in-bounds)
+--   2.  offset + 32 + length <= buf.length              (body in-bounds)
+--   3.  offset >= headEnd                               (no backward jumps)
+--   4.  every length <= per-field cap                   (bounded allocations)
+--   5.  string[] outer count * 32 + offset <= buf.length (array head fits)
+--   6.  recursion depth <= 2                            (no deep nesting)
+--   7.  uint256 -> Int64 fails if any high 24 bytes non-zero (range check)
+--   8.  UTF-8 via decodeUtf8' returns AbiBadUtf8        (no partial bytes)
+module Simplex.Messaging.Server.Names.Eth.SNRC
+  ( -- * Namehash
+    keccak256,
+    namehash,
+
+    -- * SNRC eth_call payload
+    snrcSelector,
+    encodeGetRecord,
+
+    -- * ABI decoding
+    AbiError (..),
+    decodeGetRecord,
+    decodeWord256Int64,
+    decodeAddress,
+    decodeString,
+    decodeUtf8Text,
+    decodeStringArray,
+  )
+where
+
+import Crypto.Hash (Digest, Keccak_256, hash)
+import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA
+import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
+import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
+import Data.Int (Int64)
+import Data.Text (Text)
+import Data.Text.Encoding (decodeUtf8')
+import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (NameOwner, NameRecord, mkNameOwner, unNameOwner)
+
+-- | ABI-decode failure modes (caller collapses to ResolveError EthDecodeErr).
+data AbiError
+  = AbiTruncated
+  | AbiOversized
+  | AbiBackwardOffset
+  | AbiNonZeroHighBytes
+  | AbiBadUtf8
+  | AbiDepthExceeded
+  | AbiInvariantViolated String
+  deriving (Eq, Show)
+
+-- | Keccak-256 (Ethereum variant), NOT SHA3-256.
+keccak256 :: ByteString -> ByteString
+keccak256 = BA.convert . (hash :: ByteString -> Digest Keccak_256)
+{-# INLINE keccak256 #-}
+
+-- | ENS / SNRC namehash: recursive keccak256 over reversed labels.
+-- Empty name -> 32 zero bytes; "a.b.c" -> keccak(keccak(keccak(0 ++ keccak "c") ++ keccak "b") ++ keccak "a").
+namehash :: ByteString -> ByteString
+namehash name
+  | B.null name = zeroNode
+  | otherwise = foldr step zeroNode (B.split '.' name)
+  where
+    zeroNode = B.replicate 32 '\NUL'
+    step label acc = keccak256 (acc <> keccak256 label)
+
+-- | First 4 bytes of keccak("getRecord(bytes32)"). Confirm signature
+-- against the Part 1 SNRC contract before merging.
+snrcSelector :: ByteString
+snrcSelector = B.take 4 (keccak256 "getRecord(bytes32)")
+
+-- | Build the eth_call `data` parameter for getRecord(lookupKey).
+encodeGetRecord :: ByteString -> ByteString
+encodeGetRecord node32
+  | B.length node32 == 32 = snrcSelector <> node32
+  | otherwise = snrcSelector <> padLeft32 node32
+
+padLeft32 :: ByteString -> ByteString
+padLeft32 bs
+  | n >= 32 = B.take 32 bs
+  | otherwise = B.replicate (32 - n) '\NUL' <> bs
+  where
+    n = B.length bs
+
+-- | Read a uint256 at byte offset, fail if it doesn't fit in *signed* Int64.
+-- Rejects both (a) any non-zero byte in the high 24 bytes and (b) the high
+-- bit of the low 8 bytes being set — the latter is essential because Int64
+-- would otherwise sign-flip a uint64 value into a negative integer, silently
+-- corrupting downstream length math.
+decodeWord256Int64 :: Int -> ByteString -> Either AbiError Int64
+decodeWord256Int64 off buf
+  | off + 32 > B.length buf = Left AbiTruncated
+  | B.any (/= '\NUL') (B.take 24 (B.drop off buf)) = Left AbiNonZeroHighBytes
+  | B.index buf (off + 24) >= '\x80' = Left AbiNonZeroHighBytes
+  | otherwise = Right $ B.foldl shiftIn 0 (B.take 8 (B.drop (off + 24) buf))
+  where
+    shiftIn :: Int64 -> Char -> Int64
+    shiftIn !acc c = (acc * 256) + fromIntegral (fromEnum c :: Int)
+{-# INLINE decodeWord256Int64 #-}
+
+-- | Read an Ethereum address at byte offset (uint256 with high 12 bytes zero).
+decodeAddress :: Int -> ByteString -> Either AbiError NameOwner
+decodeAddress off buf
+  | off + 32 > B.length buf = Left AbiTruncated
+  | B.any (/= toEnum 0) (B.take 12 (B.drop off buf)) = Left (AbiInvariantViolated "address has non-zero high 12 bytes")
+  | otherwise = case mkNameOwner (B.take 20 (B.drop (off + 12) buf)) of
+      Right addr -> Right addr
+      Left e -> Left (AbiInvariantViolated e)
+
+-- | Decode a Solidity `string` whose data starts at byte offset `off`.
+-- Returns raw bytes; UTF-8 validity is the caller's choice (use
+-- `decodeUtf8Text` if a Text is required).
+decodeString :: Int -> Int -> Int -> ByteString -> Either AbiError ByteString
+decodeString headEnd off cap buf
+  | off < headEnd = Left AbiBackwardOffset
+  | off + 32 > B.length buf = Left AbiTruncated
+  | otherwise = do
+      n <- decodeWord256Int64 off buf
+      let len = fromIntegral n :: Int
+      if len > cap
+        then Left AbiOversized
+        else
+          if off + 32 + len > B.length buf
+            then Left AbiTruncated
+            else Right $ B.take len (B.drop (off + 32) buf)
+
+-- | Decode a Solidity `string` as Text, failing with AbiBadUtf8 on
+-- invalid UTF-8. This is what NameRecord decoder composition will use.
+decodeUtf8Text :: Int -> Int -> Int -> ByteString -> Either AbiError Text
+decodeUtf8Text headEnd off cap buf = do
+  raw <- decodeString headEnd off cap buf
+  either (const (Left AbiBadUtf8)) Right (decodeUtf8' raw)
+
+-- | Decode a Solidity `string[]` at byte offset `off`. Each element capped
+-- at `byteCap` bytes, total element count capped at `cntCap`. Depth must be
+-- < 2 (recurses one level into decodeString).
+decodeStringArray :: Int -> Int -> Int -> Int -> Int -> ByteString -> Either AbiError [ByteString]
+decodeStringArray depth headEnd off cntCap byteCap buf
+  | depth >= 2 = Left AbiDepthExceeded
+  | off < headEnd = Left AbiBackwardOffset
+  | off + 32 > B.length buf = Left AbiTruncated
+  | otherwise = do
+      n <- decodeWord256Int64 off buf
+      let cnt = fromIntegral n :: Int
+      if cnt > cntCap
+        then Left AbiOversized
+        else
+          let arrHead = off + 32
+              arrHeadEnd = arrHead + cnt * 32
+           in if arrHeadEnd > B.length buf
+                then Left AbiTruncated
+                else collectN 0 cnt arrHead arrHeadEnd []
+  where
+    collectN i n base hd acc
+      | i >= n = Right (reverse acc)
+      | otherwise = do
+          relOff <- decodeWord256Int64 (base + i * 32) buf
+          let absOff = base + fromIntegral relOff
+          s <- decodeString hd absOff byteCap buf
+          collectN (i + 1) n base hd (s : acc)
+
+-- | Decode the ABI-encoded return value of getRecord(bytes32) into a NameRecord.
+-- Zero-owner (0x000...000) is reported as Right Nothing so the caller maps it
+-- to NotFound (ENS-style sentinel).
+--
+-- PLACEHOLDER: returns Right Nothing for any non-zero owner until the Part 1
+-- SNRC contract ABI is finalised. All ABI primitives above are production-ready;
+-- only the field-layout-aware composition is pending.
+decodeGetRecord :: ByteString -> Either AbiError (Maybe NameRecord)
+decodeGetRecord buf
+  | B.length buf < 32 * 8 = Left AbiTruncated
+  | otherwise = case decodeAddress 32 buf of
+      Left e -> Left e
+      Right owner
+        | isZeroOwner owner -> Right Nothing
+        | otherwise -> Right Nothing -- placeholder until SNRC ABI is finalised
+
+isZeroOwner :: NameOwner -> Bool
+isZeroOwner = (== B.replicate 20 '\NUL') . unNameOwner
diff --git a/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Names/Resolver.hs b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Names/Resolver.hs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1ed654659a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Names/Resolver.hs
@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
+{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE StrictData #-}
+
+-- | Public-namespace resolver: TTL+FIFO cache, in-flight coalescing,
+-- timeout-bounded RPC, and zero-owner → NotFound mapping.
+module Simplex.Messaging.Server.Names.Resolver
+  ( NamesConfig (..),
+    RpcAuth (..),
+    NamesEnv (..),
+    EthCall,
+    ResolveError (..),
+    newNamesEnv,
+    newNamesEnvWith,
+    closeNamesEnv,
+    pingEndpoint,
+    resolveName,
+  )
+where
+
+import Control.Concurrent.STM
+import qualified Control.Exception as E
+import Control.Logger.Simple (logError)
+import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
+import qualified Data.HashPSQ as PSQ
+import Data.IORef (IORef)
+import Data.Text (Text)
+import qualified Data.Text as T
+import Data.Word (Word64)
+import Data.Time.Clock.POSIX (getPOSIXTime)
+import GHC.Clock (getMonotonicTimeNSec)
+import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
+import qualified Data.Text.Encoding as T
+import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (NameLink, NameOwner, NameRecord (..), unNameLink, unNameOwner)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Names.Eth.RPC (EthRpcEnv, EthRpcError (..), RpcAuth (..), closeEthRpcEnv, ethCallReal, newEthRpcEnv)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Names.Eth.SNRC (decodeGetRecord, encodeGetRecord, namehash)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Util (atomicModifyIORef'_)
+import System.Timeout (timeout)
+
+-- | Public-namespace resolver configuration.
+data NamesConfig = NamesConfig
+  { ethereumEndpoint :: Text,
+    snrcAddress :: NameOwner,
+    rpcAuth :: Maybe RpcAuth,
+    cacheSeconds :: Int,
+    cacheMaxEntries :: Int,
+    cacheMaxBytes :: Int,
+    rpcTimeoutMs :: Int,
+    rpcMaxResponseBytes :: Int,
+    rpcMaxConcurrency :: Int
+  }
+  deriving (Show)
+
+data ResolveError
+  = NotFound
+  | EthHttpErr
+  | EthRpcErr {rpcCode :: Int, rpcMessage :: Text}
+  | EthDecodeErr
+  | TimedOut
+  deriving (Eq, Show)
+
+-- | Test seam: a function from (to, data) -> raw return bytes or error.
+-- Production wires this to ethCallReal; tests substitute a stub.
+type EthCall = ByteString -> ByteString -> IO (Either EthRpcError ByteString)
+
+-- | Cache value bundles a result (NameRecord or NotFound sentinel) with
+-- its insertion-time byte cost and per-entry TTL (NotFound expires faster
+-- than positive results so newly-registered names become visible quickly
+-- while still preventing DoS via unique-name spam).
+data CacheEntry = CacheEntry
+  { ceResult :: Maybe NameRecord, -- Nothing = NotFound; Just = Found
+    ceBytes :: Int,
+    ceTtlNs :: Word64
+  }
+
+-- | Cache state: (PSQ keyed by LookupKey, priority = insert time in ns, total bytes).
+-- PSQ minView returns lowest-priority element → FIFO eviction by insertion order.
+type CacheState = (PSQ.HashPSQ ByteString Word64 CacheEntry, Int)
+
+data NamesEnv = NamesEnv
+  { config :: NamesConfig,
+    ethCall :: EthCall,
+    cache :: TVar CacheState,
+    inflight :: TVar (PSQ.HashPSQ ByteString Word64 (TMVar (Either ResolveError NameRecord))),
+    rpcEnv :: Maybe EthRpcEnv, -- Nothing for test stubs
+    cacheHitsRef :: IORef Int, -- shared with ServerStats.rslvStats.rslvCacheHits
+    cacheMissRef :: IORef Int -- shared with ServerStats.rslvStats.rslvCacheMiss
+  }
+
+-- | Allocate resolver with real HTTP transport.
+-- `cacheHitsRef` and `cacheMissRef` are shared with ServerStats.rslvStats so
+-- the periodic CSV / Prometheus exporter sees per-request cache outcomes.
+newNamesEnv :: NamesConfig -> IORef Int -> IORef Int -> IO NamesEnv
+newNamesEnv cfg cacheHitsRef cacheMissRef = do
+  rpc <- newEthRpcEnv (ethereumEndpoint cfg) (rpcAuth cfg) (rpcMaxResponseBytes cfg) (rpcMaxConcurrency cfg)
+  let call to dat = ethCallReal rpc to dat
+  newNamesEnvWith cfg call (Just rpc) cacheHitsRef cacheMissRef
+
+-- | Allocate resolver with an injected ethCall (test seam).
+newNamesEnvWith :: NamesConfig -> EthCall -> Maybe EthRpcEnv -> IORef Int -> IORef Int -> IO NamesEnv
+newNamesEnvWith config ethCall rpcEnv cacheHitsRef cacheMissRef = do
+  cache <- newTVarIO (PSQ.empty, 0)
+  inflight <- newTVarIO PSQ.empty
+  pure NamesEnv {config, ethCall, cache, inflight, rpcEnv, cacheHitsRef, cacheMissRef}
+
+closeNamesEnv :: NamesEnv -> IO ()
+closeNamesEnv NamesEnv {rpcEnv} = maybe (pure ()) closeEthRpcEnv rpcEnv
+
+-- | Reach the configured endpoint with a harmless probe call to confirm
+-- network reachability and basic config sanity. Returns Left only on
+-- transport-level failures (DNS, TLS, refused) — a JSON-RPC error (e.g.
+-- a misconfigured snrc_address) is treated as "endpoint reachable",
+-- because the operator-friendly signal we want is "is the eth host alive,
+-- not is your contract address right." That distinction surfaces later
+-- via the rslvEthErrs counter.
+pingEndpoint :: NamesEnv -> IO (Either EthRpcError ())
+pingEndpoint NamesEnv {ethCall, config} = do
+  let to = unNameOwner (snrcAddress config)
+      -- Use the ENS-style root node (32 zero bytes) — always a valid
+      -- bytes32 input that costs the contract nothing to look up.
+      callData = encodeGetRecord (namehash "")
+  ethCall to callData >>= \case
+    Left e@(HttpFailure _) -> pure (Left e)
+    Left e@(HttpStatusErr _) -> pure (Left e)
+    _ -> pure (Right ())
+
+-- | Resolve a lookup key. Coalesces concurrent identical requests, caches
+-- results for cacheSeconds, and bounds RPCs by rpcTimeoutMs.
+resolveName :: NamesEnv -> ByteString -> IO (Either ResolveError NameRecord)
+resolveName env key = do
+  now <- getMonotonicTimeNSec
+  cacheLookup env key now >>= \case
+    Just result -> do
+      atomicModifyIORef'_ (cacheHitsRef env) (+ 1)
+      pure $ maybe (Left NotFound) Right result
+    Nothing -> do
+      atomicModifyIORef'_ (cacheMissRef env) (+ 1)
+      coalesce env key now
+
+-- | Look up the key in cache. Returns:
+--   Nothing                 — cache miss (or expired entry, which is evicted)
+--   Just Nothing            — cache hit for NotFound
+--   Just (Just rec)         — cache hit for a NameRecord
+cacheLookup :: NamesEnv -> ByteString -> Word64 -> IO (Maybe (Maybe NameRecord))
+cacheLookup NamesEnv {cache} key now = atomically $ do
+  (psq, totalBytes) <- readTVar cache
+  case PSQ.lookup key psq of
+    Just (insertedAt, ce)
+      | now < insertedAt + ceTtlNs ce -> pure (Just (ceResult ce))
+      | otherwise -> do
+          -- Expired: evict and signal miss.
+          writeTVar cache (PSQ.delete key psq, totalBytes - ceBytes ce)
+          pure Nothing
+    Nothing -> pure Nothing
+
+ttlFoundNs :: NamesConfig -> Word64
+ttlFoundNs cfg = fromIntegral (cacheSeconds cfg) * 1000000000
+
+-- | NotFound cache TTL — short enough that a newly-registered name becomes
+-- visible within seconds, long enough to absorb a unique-name DoS burst.
+-- Bounded by cacheSeconds in case the operator deliberately ran a tiny TTL.
+ttlNotFoundNs :: NamesConfig -> Word64
+ttlNotFoundNs cfg = min (ttlFoundNs cfg) (30 * 1000000000)
+
+-- | Leader/waiter coalescing. Leader runs the RPC under E.mask; waiters
+-- block on the leader's TMVar. Cleanup runs even on async exception.
+coalesce :: NamesEnv -> ByteString -> Word64 -> IO (Either ResolveError NameRecord)
+coalesce env@NamesEnv {inflight} key now = do
+  ticket <- atomically $ do
+    flight <- readTVar inflight
+    case PSQ.lookup key flight of
+      Just (_, mv) -> pure (Right mv)
+      Nothing -> do
+        mv <- newEmptyTMVar
+        writeTVar inflight (PSQ.insert key now mv flight)
+        pure (Left mv)
+  case ticket of
+    Right mv -> atomically (readTMVar mv) -- waiter
+    Left mv -> E.mask $ \restore -> do
+      -- Run the fetch with sync-only catching: async exceptions (cancel,
+      -- killThread) must propagate after we've completed the STM cleanup
+      -- so waiters never block on an orphan TMVar.
+      r <-
+        E.try (restore (fetchOnceTimed env key)) >>= \case
+          Right ok -> pure ok
+          Left e
+            | Just (_ :: E.SomeAsyncException) <- E.fromException e -> do
+                -- Tell waiters the lookup failed, then rethrow.
+                atomically $ do
+                  putTMVar mv (Left EthHttpErr)
+                  modifyTVar' inflight (PSQ.delete key)
+                E.throwIO e
+            | otherwise -> do
+                logError $ "[NAMES] resolver fetch raised " <> T.pack (E.displayException e)
+                pure (Left EthHttpErr)
+      atomically $ do
+        putTMVar mv r
+        modifyTVar' inflight (PSQ.delete key)
+      case r of
+        Right rec -> cacheInsert env key now (Just rec) (ttlFoundNs (config env))
+        Left NotFound -> cacheInsert env key now Nothing (ttlNotFoundNs (config env))
+        Left _ -> pure () -- transient errors (HTTP, decode, timeout) are not cached
+      pure r
+
+fetchOnceTimed :: NamesEnv -> ByteString -> IO (Either ResolveError NameRecord)
+fetchOnceTimed env key =
+  timeout (rpcTimeoutMs (config env) * 1000) (fetchOnce env key) >>= \case
+    Just r -> pure r
+    Nothing -> pure (Left TimedOut)
+
+fetchOnce :: NamesEnv -> ByteString -> IO (Either ResolveError NameRecord)
+fetchOnce NamesEnv {ethCall, config} key =
+  ethCall (unNameOwner (snrcAddress config)) (encodeGetRecord (namehash key)) >>= \case
+    Left e -> pure (Left (mapEthRpcError e))
+    Right ret -> case decodeGetRecord ret of
+      Right Nothing -> pure (Left NotFound)
+      Right (Just rec) -> checkExpiry rec
+      Left _ -> pure (Left EthDecodeErr)
+  where
+    -- Defense in depth: the SNRC contract should already return the
+    -- zero-owner sentinel for expired records, but a buggy / pre-upgrade
+    -- contract might not. nrExpiry == 0 means "never expires" (reserved
+    -- names); any positive expiry in the past is treated as NotFound.
+    checkExpiry rec = do
+      nowSec <- floor <$> getPOSIXTime
+      pure $ if nrExpiry rec /= 0 && nrExpiry rec < nowSec
+        then Left NotFound
+        else Right rec
+
+-- | Collapse the JSON-RPC transport-layer error space into the resolver's
+-- public error space. Reused by fetchOnce and pingEndpoint.
+mapEthRpcError :: EthRpcError -> ResolveError
+mapEthRpcError = \case
+  HttpFailure _ -> EthHttpErr
+  HttpStatusErr _ -> EthHttpErr
+  BodyTooLarge -> EthDecodeErr
+  InvalidJson _ -> EthDecodeErr
+  JsonRpcErr c m -> EthRpcErr {rpcCode = c, rpcMessage = m}
+
+cacheInsert :: NamesEnv -> ByteString -> Word64 -> Maybe NameRecord -> Word64 -> IO ()
+cacheInsert NamesEnv {config, cache} key now result ttl = atomically $ do
+  (psq, totalBytes) <- readTVar cache
+  let entryBytes = maybe notFoundOverhead estimateBytes result
+      (psq', totalBytes') = evictWhile psq totalBytes
+      evictWhile p tb
+        | PSQ.size p > cacheMaxEntries config || tb + entryBytes > cacheMaxBytes config =
+            case PSQ.minView p of
+              Just (_, _, ce, rest) -> evictWhile rest (tb - ceBytes ce)
+              Nothing -> (p, tb)
+        | otherwise = (p, tb)
+      ce = CacheEntry {ceResult = result, ceBytes = entryBytes, ceTtlNs = ttl}
+  writeTVar cache (PSQ.insert key now ce psq', totalBytes' + entryBytes)
+  where
+    notFoundOverhead = 128 -- PSQ node + key copy + small constant for the Nothing sentinel
+
+-- | Approximate byte cost of a cached NameRecord. Counts the user-controlled
+-- variable-length content plus a fixed per-entry overhead for the wrapper
+-- (TVar/PSQ node + ByteString headers + IORef). Tighter than a constant upper
+-- bound so cacheMaxBytes is a meaningful cap.
+estimateBytes :: NameRecord -> Int
+estimateBytes NameRecord {nrDisplayName, nrChannelLinks, nrContactLinks, nrAdminAddress, nrAdminEmail} =
+  perEntryOverhead
+    + utf8Len nrDisplayName
+    + 20 -- nrOwner
+    + sum (map nameLinkBytes nrChannelLinks)
+    + sum (map nameLinkBytes nrContactLinks)
+    + maybe 0 utf8Len nrAdminAddress
+    + maybe 0 utf8Len nrAdminEmail
+  where
+    perEntryOverhead = 256 -- PSQ node + key copy + ByteString headers
+    utf8Len = B.length . T.encodeUtf8
+    nameLinkBytes :: NameLink -> Int
+    nameLinkBytes = utf8Len . unNameLink
diff --git a/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Prometheus.hs b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Prometheus.hs
index 32e8bd9a10..f8a5f84bf3 100644
--- a/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Prometheus.hs
+++ b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Prometheus.hs
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ data RTSubscriberMetrics = RTSubscriberMetrics
 {-# FOURMOLU_DISABLE\n#-}
 prometheusMetrics :: ServerMetrics -> RealTimeMetrics -> UTCTime -> Text
 prometheusMetrics sm rtm ts =
-  time <> queues <> subscriptions <> messages <> ntfMessages <> ntfs <> relays <> services <> info
+  time <> queues <> subscriptions <> messages <> ntfMessages <> ntfs <> relays <> services <> names <> info
   where
     ServerMetrics {statsData, activeQueueCounts = ps, activeNtfCounts = psNtf, entityCounts, rtsOptions} = sm
     RealTimeMetrics
@@ -128,7 +128,8 @@ prometheusMetrics sm rtm ts =
         _rcvServicesSubDuplicate,
         _qCount,
         _msgCount,
-        _ntfCount
+        _ntfCount,
+        _rslvStats
       } = statsData
     time =
       "# Recorded at: " <> T.pack (iso8601Show ts) <> "\n\
@@ -459,6 +460,39 @@ prometheusMetrics sm rtm ts =
       \# TYPE simplex_smp_" <> pfx <> "_services_sub_fewer_total gauge\n\
       \simplex_smp_" <> pfx <> "_services_sub_fewer_total " <> mshow (_srvSubFewerTotal ss) <> "\n# " <> pfx <> ".srvSubFewerTotal\n\
       \\n"
+    names =
+      let NameResolverStatsData {_rslvReqs, _rslvSucc, _rslvNotFound, _rslvEthErrs, _rslvCacheHits, _rslvCacheMiss, _rslvDisabled} = _rslvStats
+       in "# Names\n\
+          \# -----\n\
+          \\n\
+          \# HELP simplex_smp_names_reqs Total RSLV requests forwarded to this server.\n\
+          \# TYPE simplex_smp_names_reqs counter\n\
+          \simplex_smp_names_reqs " <> mshow _rslvReqs <> "\n# rslvReqs\n\
+          \\n\
+          \# HELP simplex_smp_names_success NameRecord successfully resolved and returned.\n\
+          \# TYPE simplex_smp_names_success counter\n\
+          \simplex_smp_names_success " <> mshow _rslvSucc <> "\n# rslvSucc\n\
+          \\n\
+          \# HELP simplex_smp_names_not_found Lookup key has no corresponding NameRecord on chain (zero-owner sentinel).\n\
+          \# TYPE simplex_smp_names_not_found counter\n\
+          \simplex_smp_names_not_found " <> mshow _rslvNotFound <> "\n# rslvNotFound\n\
+          \\n\
+          \# HELP simplex_smp_names_eth_errs Ethereum endpoint or ABI errors.\n\
+          \# TYPE simplex_smp_names_eth_errs counter\n\
+          \simplex_smp_names_eth_errs " <> mshow _rslvEthErrs <> "\n# rslvEthErrs\n\
+          \\n\
+          \# HELP simplex_smp_names_cache_hits Resolution served from cache.\n\
+          \# TYPE simplex_smp_names_cache_hits counter\n\
+          \simplex_smp_names_cache_hits " <> mshow _rslvCacheHits <> "\n# rslvCacheHits\n\
+          \\n\
+          \# HELP simplex_smp_names_cache_miss Resolution required an eth_call.\n\
+          \# TYPE simplex_smp_names_cache_miss counter\n\
+          \simplex_smp_names_cache_miss " <> mshow _rslvCacheMiss <> "\n# rslvCacheMiss\n\
+          \\n\
+          \# HELP simplex_smp_names_disabled RSLV requests rejected because the names role is disabled.\n\
+          \# TYPE simplex_smp_names_disabled counter\n\
+          \simplex_smp_names_disabled " <> mshow _rslvDisabled <> "\n# rslvDisabled\n\
+          \\n"
     info =
       "# Info\n\
       \# ----\n\
diff --git a/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Stats.hs b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Stats.hs
index e8291759e6..de9c23f19b 100644
--- a/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Stats.hs
+++ b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Stats.hs
@@ -39,9 +39,18 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Server.Stats
     setServiceStats,
     emptyTimeBuckets,
     updateTimeBuckets,
+    incStat,
+    NameResolverStats (..),
+    NameResolverStatsData (..),
+    newNameResolverStats,
+    newNameResolverStatsData,
+    getNameResolverStatsData,
+    getResetNameResolverStatsData,
+    setNameResolverStats,
   ) where
 
 import Control.Applicative (optional, (<|>))
+import Control.Monad.IO.Class (MonadIO, liftIO)
 import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
 import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
 import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
@@ -123,7 +132,8 @@ data ServerStats = ServerStats
     rcvServicesSubDuplicate :: IORef Int,
     qCount :: IORef Int,
     msgCount :: IORef Int,
-    ntfCount :: IORef Int
+    ntfCount :: IORef Int,
+    rslvStats :: NameResolverStats
   }
 
 data ServerStatsData = ServerStatsData
@@ -184,7 +194,8 @@ data ServerStatsData = ServerStatsData
     _rcvServicesSubDuplicate :: Int,
     _qCount :: Int,
     _msgCount :: Int,
-    _ntfCount :: Int
+    _ntfCount :: Int,
+    _rslvStats :: NameResolverStatsData
   }
   deriving (Show)
 
@@ -248,6 +259,7 @@ newServerStats ts = do
   qCount <- newIORef 0
   msgCount <- newIORef 0
   ntfCount <- newIORef 0
+  rslvStats <- newNameResolverStats
   pure
     ServerStats
       { fromTime,
@@ -307,7 +319,8 @@ newServerStats ts = do
         rcvServicesSubDuplicate,
         qCount,
         msgCount,
-        ntfCount
+        ntfCount,
+        rslvStats
       }
 
 getServerStatsData :: ServerStats -> IO ServerStatsData
@@ -370,6 +383,7 @@ getServerStatsData s = do
   _qCount <- readIORef $ qCount s
   _msgCount <- readIORef $ msgCount s
   _ntfCount <- readIORef $ ntfCount s
+  _rslvStats <- getNameResolverStatsData $ rslvStats s
   pure
     ServerStatsData
       { _fromTime,
@@ -429,7 +443,8 @@ getServerStatsData s = do
         _rcvServicesSubDuplicate,
         _qCount,
         _msgCount,
-        _ntfCount
+        _ntfCount,
+        _rslvStats
       }
 
 -- this function is not thread safe, it is used on server start only
@@ -493,6 +508,7 @@ setServerStats s d = do
   writeIORef (qCount s) $! _qCount d
   writeIORef (msgCount s) $! _msgCount d
   writeIORef (ntfCount s) $! _ntfCount d
+  setNameResolverStats (rslvStats s) $! _rslvStats d
 
 instance StrEncoding ServerStatsData where
   strEncode d =
@@ -557,7 +573,9 @@ instance StrEncoding ServerStatsData where
         "rcvServices:",
         strEncode (_rcvServices d),
         "ntfServices:",
-        strEncode (_ntfServices d)
+        strEncode (_ntfServices d),
+        "rslvStats:",
+        strEncode (_rslvStats d)
       ]
   strP = do
     _fromTime <- "fromTime=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine
@@ -628,6 +646,10 @@ instance StrEncoding ServerStatsData where
     _pMsgFwdsRecv <- opt "pMsgFwdsRecv="
     _rcvServices <- serviceStatsP "rcvServices:"
     _ntfServices <- serviceStatsP "ntfServices:"
+    _rslvStats <-
+      optional ("rslvStats:" <* A.endOfLine) >>= \case
+        Just _ -> strP <* optional A.endOfLine
+        _ -> pure newNameResolverStatsData
     pure
       ServerStatsData
         { _fromTime,
@@ -687,7 +709,8 @@ instance StrEncoding ServerStatsData where
           _rcvServicesSubDuplicate = 0,
           _qCount,
           _msgCount = 0,
-          _ntfCount = 0
+          _ntfCount = 0,
+          _rslvStats
         }
     where
       opt s = A.string s *> strP <* A.endOfLine <|> pure 0
@@ -786,6 +809,10 @@ updatePeriodStats ps (EntityId pId) = do
     ph = hash pId
     updatePeriod ref = unlessM (IS.member ph <$> readIORef ref) $ atomicModifyIORef'_ ref $ IS.insert ph
 
+incStat :: MonadIO m => IORef Int -> m ()
+incStat r = liftIO $ atomicModifyIORef'_ r (+ 1)
+{-# INLINE incStat #-}
+
 data ProxyStats = ProxyStats
   { pRequests :: IORef Int,
     pSuccesses :: IORef Int, -- includes destination server error responses that will be forwarded to the client
@@ -862,6 +889,109 @@ instance StrEncoding ProxyStatsData where
     _pErrorsOther <- "errorsOther=" *> strP
     pure ProxyStatsData {_pRequests, _pSuccesses, _pErrorsConnect, _pErrorsCompat, _pErrorsOther}
 
+data NameResolverStats = NameResolverStats
+  { rslvReqs :: IORef Int,
+    rslvSucc :: IORef Int,
+    rslvNotFound :: IORef Int,
+    rslvEthErrs :: IORef Int,
+    rslvCacheHits :: IORef Int,
+    rslvCacheMiss :: IORef Int,
+    rslvDisabled :: IORef Int
+  }
+
+newNameResolverStats :: IO NameResolverStats
+newNameResolverStats = do
+  rslvReqs <- newIORef 0
+  rslvSucc <- newIORef 0
+  rslvNotFound <- newIORef 0
+  rslvEthErrs <- newIORef 0
+  rslvCacheHits <- newIORef 0
+  rslvCacheMiss <- newIORef 0
+  rslvDisabled <- newIORef 0
+  pure NameResolverStats {rslvReqs, rslvSucc, rslvNotFound, rslvEthErrs, rslvCacheHits, rslvCacheMiss, rslvDisabled}
+
+data NameResolverStatsData = NameResolverStatsData
+  { _rslvReqs :: Int,
+    _rslvSucc :: Int,
+    _rslvNotFound :: Int,
+    _rslvEthErrs :: Int,
+    _rslvCacheHits :: Int,
+    _rslvCacheMiss :: Int,
+    _rslvDisabled :: Int
+  }
+  deriving (Show)
+
+newNameResolverStatsData :: NameResolverStatsData
+newNameResolverStatsData =
+  NameResolverStatsData
+    { _rslvReqs = 0,
+      _rslvSucc = 0,
+      _rslvNotFound = 0,
+      _rslvEthErrs = 0,
+      _rslvCacheHits = 0,
+      _rslvCacheMiss = 0,
+      _rslvDisabled = 0
+    }
+
+getNameResolverStatsData :: NameResolverStats -> IO NameResolverStatsData
+getNameResolverStatsData s = do
+  _rslvReqs <- readIORef $ rslvReqs s
+  _rslvSucc <- readIORef $ rslvSucc s
+  _rslvNotFound <- readIORef $ rslvNotFound s
+  _rslvEthErrs <- readIORef $ rslvEthErrs s
+  _rslvCacheHits <- readIORef $ rslvCacheHits s
+  _rslvCacheMiss <- readIORef $ rslvCacheMiss s
+  _rslvDisabled <- readIORef $ rslvDisabled s
+  pure NameResolverStatsData {_rslvReqs, _rslvSucc, _rslvNotFound, _rslvEthErrs, _rslvCacheHits, _rslvCacheMiss, _rslvDisabled}
+
+getResetNameResolverStatsData :: NameResolverStats -> IO NameResolverStatsData
+getResetNameResolverStatsData s = do
+  _rslvReqs <- atomicSwapIORef (rslvReqs s) 0
+  _rslvSucc <- atomicSwapIORef (rslvSucc s) 0
+  _rslvNotFound <- atomicSwapIORef (rslvNotFound s) 0
+  _rslvEthErrs <- atomicSwapIORef (rslvEthErrs s) 0
+  _rslvCacheHits <- atomicSwapIORef (rslvCacheHits s) 0
+  _rslvCacheMiss <- atomicSwapIORef (rslvCacheMiss s) 0
+  _rslvDisabled <- atomicSwapIORef (rslvDisabled s) 0
+  pure NameResolverStatsData {_rslvReqs, _rslvSucc, _rslvNotFound, _rslvEthErrs, _rslvCacheHits, _rslvCacheMiss, _rslvDisabled}
+
+-- not thread safe; used on server start only
+setNameResolverStats :: NameResolverStats -> NameResolverStatsData -> IO ()
+setNameResolverStats s d = do
+  writeIORef (rslvReqs s) $! _rslvReqs d
+  writeIORef (rslvSucc s) $! _rslvSucc d
+  writeIORef (rslvNotFound s) $! _rslvNotFound d
+  writeIORef (rslvEthErrs s) $! _rslvEthErrs d
+  writeIORef (rslvCacheHits s) $! _rslvCacheHits d
+  writeIORef (rslvCacheMiss s) $! _rslvCacheMiss d
+  writeIORef (rslvDisabled s) $! _rslvDisabled d
+
+instance StrEncoding NameResolverStatsData where
+  strEncode NameResolverStatsData {_rslvReqs, _rslvSucc, _rslvNotFound, _rslvEthErrs, _rslvCacheHits, _rslvCacheMiss, _rslvDisabled} =
+    "reqs="
+      <> strEncode _rslvReqs
+      <> "\nsucc="
+      <> strEncode _rslvSucc
+      <> "\nnotFound="
+      <> strEncode _rslvNotFound
+      <> "\nethErrs="
+      <> strEncode _rslvEthErrs
+      <> "\ncacheHits="
+      <> strEncode _rslvCacheHits
+      <> "\ncacheMiss="
+      <> strEncode _rslvCacheMiss
+      <> "\ndisabled="
+      <> strEncode _rslvDisabled
+  strP = do
+    _rslvReqs <- "reqs=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine
+    _rslvSucc <- "succ=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine
+    _rslvNotFound <- "notFound=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine
+    _rslvEthErrs <- "ethErrs=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine
+    _rslvCacheHits <- "cacheHits=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine
+    _rslvCacheMiss <- "cacheMiss=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine
+    _rslvDisabled <- "disabled=" *> strP
+    pure NameResolverStatsData {_rslvReqs, _rslvSucc, _rslvNotFound, _rslvEthErrs, _rslvCacheHits, _rslvCacheMiss, _rslvDisabled}
+
 data ServiceStats = ServiceStats
   { srvAssocNew :: IORef Int,
     srvAssocDuplicate :: IORef Int,
diff --git a/src/Simplex/Messaging/Transport.hs b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Transport.hs
index f1eb1a8bd0..c2600b0f8a 100644
--- a/src/Simplex/Messaging/Transport.hs
+++ b/src/Simplex/Messaging/Transport.hs
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Transport
     newNtfCredsSMPVersion,
     clientNoticesSMPVersion,
     rcvServiceSMPVersion,
+    namesSMPVersion,
     simplexMQVersion,
     smpBlockSize,
     TransportConfig (..),
@@ -223,6 +224,9 @@ clientNoticesSMPVersion = VersionSMP 18
 rcvServiceSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
 rcvServiceSMPVersion = VersionSMP 19
 
+namesSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
+namesSMPVersion = VersionSMP 20
+
 minClientSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
 minClientSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 6
 
@@ -230,13 +234,13 @@ minServerSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
 minServerSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 6
 
 currentClientSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
-currentClientSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 19
+currentClientSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 20
 
 legacyServerSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
 legacyServerSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 6
 
 currentServerSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
-currentServerSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 19
+currentServerSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 20
 
 -- Max SMP protocol version to be used in e2e encrypted
 -- connection between client and server, as defined by SMP proxy.
@@ -244,7 +248,7 @@ currentServerSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 19
 -- to prevent client version fingerprinting by the
 -- destination relays when clients upgrade at different times.
 proxiedSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
-proxiedSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 18
+proxiedSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 20
 
 -- minimal supported protocol version is 6
 -- TODO remove code that supports sending commands without batching
diff --git a/tests/SMPClient.hs b/tests/SMPClient.hs
index d043fd3c86..2ee9b509f0 100644
--- a/tests/SMPClient.hs
+++ b/tests/SMPClient.hs
@@ -278,6 +278,7 @@ cfgMS msType = withStoreCfg (testServerStoreConfig msType) $ \serverStoreCfg ->
       smpAgentCfg = defaultSMPClientAgentConfig {persistErrorInterval = 1}, -- seconds
       allowSMPProxy = False,
       serverClientConcurrency = 2,
+      namesConfig = Nothing,
       information = Nothing,
       startOptions = defaultStartOptions
     }
diff --git a/tests/SMPNamesTests.hs b/tests/SMPNamesTests.hs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f597c4ae07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/SMPNamesTests.hs
@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
+
+module SMPNamesTests (smpNamesTests) where
+
+import Control.Concurrent (threadDelay)
+import Control.Concurrent.Async (async, replicateConcurrently, wait)
+import Control.Concurrent.STM (atomically, newEmptyTMVarIO, putTMVar, readTMVar)
+import qualified Crypto.Hash as Crypton
+import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
+import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
+import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA
+import Data.Either (isLeft, isRight)
+import Data.IORef (atomicModifyIORef', newIORef, readIORef)
+import qualified Data.Text as T
+import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding (smpEncode, smpP)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (parseAll)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
+  ( LookupKey (..),
+    NameRecord (..),
+    mkNameLink,
+    mkNameOwner,
+    nameRecBytes,
+    parseNameRec,
+    unNameLink,
+    unNameOwner,
+  )
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Names.Eth.SNRC
+  ( AbiError (..),
+    decodeAddress,
+    decodeGetRecord,
+    decodeString,
+    decodeStringArray,
+    decodeWord256Int64,
+    encodeGetRecord,
+    keccak256,
+    namehash,
+    snrcSelector,
+  )
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Names.Resolver
+  ( NamesConfig (..),
+    ResolveError (..),
+    newNamesEnvWith,
+    resolveName,
+  )
+import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (VersionSMP)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Version.Internal (Version (..))
+import Test.Hspec
+
+-- Reference vectors:
+-- keccak256("")  = c5d2460186f7233c927e7db2dcc703c0e500b653ca8227b7bfad8045d85a470
+-- keccak256("abc") = 4e03657aea45a94fc7d47ba826c8d667c0d1e6e33a64a036ec44f58fa12d6c45
+-- sha3_256("abc") = 3a985da74fe225b2045c172d6bd390bd855f086e3e9d525b46bfe24511431532
+-- namehash("eth")  = 93cdeb708b7545dc668eb9280176169d1c33cfd8ed6f04690a0bcc88a93fc4ae
+
+keccak256Empty :: ByteString
+keccak256Empty = "\xc5\xd2\x46\x01\x86\xf7\x23\x3c\x92\x7e\x7d\xb2\xdc\xc7\x03\xc0\xe5\x00\xb6\x53\xca\x82\x27\x3b\x7b\xfa\xd8\x04\x5d\x85\xa4\x70"
+
+keccak256Abc :: ByteString
+keccak256Abc = "\x4e\x03\x65\x7a\xea\x45\xa9\x4f\xc7\xd4\x7b\xa8\x26\xc8\xd6\x67\xc0\xd1\xe6\xe3\x3a\x64\xa0\x36\xec\x44\xf5\x8f\xa1\x2d\x6c\x45"
+
+sha3_256Abc :: ByteString
+sha3_256Abc = "\x3a\x98\x5d\xa7\x4f\xe2\x25\xb2\x04\x5c\x17\x2d\x6b\xd3\x90\xbd\x85\x5f\x08\x6e\x3e\x9d\x52\x5b\x46\xbf\xe2\x45\x11\x43\x15\x32"
+
+namehashEth :: ByteString
+namehashEth = "\x93\xcd\xeb\x70\x8b\x75\x45\xdc\x66\x8e\xb9\x28\x01\x76\x16\x9d\x1c\x33\xcf\xd8\xed\x6f\x04\x69\x0a\x0b\xcc\x88\xa9\x3f\xc4\xae"
+
+v20 :: VersionSMP
+v20 = Version 20
+
+twentyOnes :: ByteString
+twentyOnes = B.replicate 20 '\x01'
+
+sampleRecord :: NameRecord
+sampleRecord = case (mkNameOwner twentyOnes, mkNameLink "simplex:/contact/abc#xyz") of
+  (Right o, Right l) ->
+    NameRecord
+      { nrDisplayName = "Alice",
+        nrOwner = o,
+        nrChannelLinks = [],
+        nrContactLinks = [l],
+        nrAdminAddress = Just "simplex:/admin/...",
+        nrAdminEmail = Just "admin@example.org",
+        nrExpiry = 1735689600,
+        nrIsTest = False
+      }
+  _ -> error "sampleRecord smart ctors failed"
+
+smpNamesTests :: Spec
+smpNamesTests = do
+  describe "NameRecord encoding (Protocol)" nameRecordEncodingSpec
+  describe "LookupKey + smart constructors" lookupKeyAndCtorsSpec
+  describe "Keccak-256 and namehash" namehashSpec
+  describe "ABI primitive bounds" abiBoundsSpec
+  describe "decodeGetRecord (zero-owner sentinel)" zeroOwnerSpec
+  describe "Resolver cache + coalescing" resolverCacheSpec
+
+nameRecordEncodingSpec :: Spec
+nameRecordEncodingSpec = do
+  it "round-trips nameRecBytes / parseNameRec" $ do
+    let bytes = nameRecBytes v20 sampleRecord
+    parseAll (parseNameRec v20) bytes `shouldBe` Right sampleRecord
+
+  it "rejects negative expiry" $ do
+    let badBytes = nameRecBytes v20 sampleRecord {nrExpiry = -1}
+    parseAll (parseNameRec v20) badBytes `shouldSatisfy` isLeft
+
+  it "enforces combined channel+contact list cap of 8" $ do
+    let mkLink i = either error id (mkNameLink ("simplex:/contact/" <> T.pack (show (i :: Int))))
+        nineLinks = map mkLink [0 .. 8]
+        overflow = sampleRecord {nrChannelLinks = nineLinks, nrContactLinks = []}
+        bytes = nameRecBytes v20 overflow
+    parseAll (parseNameRec v20) bytes `shouldSatisfy` isLeft
+
+  it "encodes within the proxied transmission budget" $ do
+    let huge = either error id (mkNameLink (T.replicate 1024 "x"))
+        wide =
+          sampleRecord
+            { nrChannelLinks = replicate 4 huge,
+              nrContactLinks = replicate 4 huge,
+              nrDisplayName = T.replicate 255 "n",
+              nrAdminAddress = Just (T.replicate 255 "a"),
+              nrAdminEmail = Just (T.replicate 255 "e")
+            }
+    B.length (nameRecBytes v20 wide) < 16224 `shouldBe` True
+
+lookupKeyAndCtorsSpec :: Spec
+lookupKeyAndCtorsSpec = do
+  it "LookupKey parser caps at 64 bytes" $ do
+    let okBytes = smpEncode (LookupKey (B.replicate 64 'a'))
+        bigBytes = smpEncode (LookupKey (B.replicate 65 'a'))
+    parseAll (smpP @LookupKey) okBytes `shouldSatisfy` isRight
+    parseAll (smpP @LookupKey) bigBytes `shouldSatisfy` isLeft
+
+  it "mkNameOwner accepts exactly 20 bytes" $ do
+    mkNameOwner twentyOnes `shouldSatisfy` isRight
+    mkNameOwner (B.replicate 19 '\x01') `shouldSatisfy` isLeft
+    mkNameOwner (B.replicate 21 '\x01') `shouldSatisfy` isLeft
+
+  it "mkNameLink rejects >1024 UTF-8 bytes" $ do
+    mkNameLink (T.replicate 1024 "x") `shouldSatisfy` isRight
+    mkNameLink (T.replicate 1025 "x") `shouldSatisfy` isLeft
+    -- multibyte UTF-8 counted in bytes, not chars: 600 × 3 = 1800 bytes
+    mkNameLink (T.replicate 600 "\x4e2d") `shouldSatisfy` isLeft
+
+  it "unNameLink / unNameOwner round-trip the smart ctors" $ do
+    case (mkNameOwner twentyOnes, mkNameLink "abc") of
+      (Right o, Right l) -> do
+        unNameOwner o `shouldBe` twentyOnes
+        unNameLink l `shouldBe` "abc"
+      _ -> expectationFailure "smart ctors failed"
+
+namehashSpec :: Spec
+namehashSpec = do
+  it "keccak256 of empty string matches reference vector" $
+    keccak256 "" `shouldBe` keccak256Empty
+
+  it "keccak256 of \"abc\" matches reference vector" $
+    keccak256 "abc" `shouldBe` keccak256Abc
+
+  it "Keccak-256 is NOT SHA3-256 (different output for same input)" $ do
+    let sha3 = BA.convert (Crypton.hash @ByteString @Crypton.SHA3_256 "abc") :: ByteString
+    sha3 `shouldBe` sha3_256Abc
+    keccak256 "abc" `shouldNotBe` sha3
+
+  it "namehash of empty name is 32 zero bytes" $
+    namehash "" `shouldBe` B.replicate 32 '\NUL'
+
+  it "namehash of \"eth\" matches ENS reference vector" $
+    namehash "eth" `shouldBe` namehashEth
+
+  it "snrcSelector is 4 bytes" $
+    B.length snrcSelector `shouldBe` 4
+
+  it "encodeGetRecord = selector ++ 32-byte node" $ do
+    let node = namehash "alice.eth"
+        bytes = encodeGetRecord node
+    B.length bytes `shouldBe` 36
+    B.take 4 bytes `shouldBe` snrcSelector
+    B.drop 4 bytes `shouldBe` node
+
+abiBoundsSpec :: Spec
+abiBoundsSpec = do
+  let mkBuf n = B.replicate n '\NUL'
+
+  it "decodeWord256Int64 fails when offset + 32 > buf length" $
+    decodeWord256Int64 0 (mkBuf 31) `shouldBe` Left AbiTruncated
+
+  it "decodeWord256Int64 rejects non-zero high 24 bytes (Int64 overflow)" $ do
+    let buf = B.replicate 23 '\NUL' <> B.singleton '\x01' <> B.replicate 8 '\NUL'
+    decodeWord256Int64 0 buf `shouldBe` Left AbiNonZeroHighBytes
+
+  it "decodeWord256Int64 rejects sign bit set in low 8 bytes (silent negative)" $ do
+    -- 0x8000000000000000 would decode to Int64.minBound without the check;
+    -- downstream length math would then see a negative len and silently
+    -- return empty bytes from B.take instead of failing.
+    let buf = B.replicate 24 '\NUL' <> "\x80\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+    decodeWord256Int64 0 buf `shouldBe` Left AbiNonZeroHighBytes
+
+  it "decodeWord256Int64 succeeds for the max representable positive value" $ do
+    let buf = B.replicate 24 '\NUL' <> "\x7F\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF"
+    decodeWord256Int64 0 buf `shouldBe` Right maxBound
+
+  it "decodeWord256Int64 succeeds for low 8 bytes set" $ do
+    let buf = B.replicate 24 '\NUL' <> "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x12\x34"
+    decodeWord256Int64 0 buf `shouldBe` Right 0x1234
+
+  it "decodeAddress rejects non-zero high 12 bytes" $ do
+    let buf = B.replicate 11 '\NUL' <> B.singleton '\x01' <> B.replicate 20 '\NUL'
+    decodeAddress 0 buf `shouldSatisfy` isLeft
+
+  it "decodeString fails on backward offset" $
+    decodeString 100 50 1024 (mkBuf 200) `shouldBe` Left AbiBackwardOffset
+
+  it "decodeString fails when declared length exceeds the per-field cap" $ do
+    let lenBytes = B.replicate 24 '\NUL' <> "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x64" -- length 100
+        buf = lenBytes <> B.replicate 100 'x'
+    decodeString 0 0 10 buf `shouldBe` Left AbiOversized
+
+  it "decodeStringArray fails when depth ≥ 2" $
+    decodeStringArray 2 0 0 8 1024 (mkBuf 64) `shouldBe` Left AbiDepthExceeded
+
+  it "decodeStringArray fails when array count exceeds cap" $ do
+    let lenBytes = B.replicate 24 '\NUL' <> "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x09" -- 9 elements
+        buf = lenBytes <> B.replicate 1024 '\NUL'
+    decodeStringArray 0 0 0 8 1024 buf `shouldBe` Left AbiOversized
+
+zeroOwnerSpec :: Spec
+zeroOwnerSpec = do
+  it "decodeGetRecord returns Nothing for zero-owner buffer" $ do
+    -- 8 slots × 32 bytes; owner at slot 1 (offset 32) is all-zero by construction
+    let buf = B.replicate (32 * 8) '\NUL'
+    decodeGetRecord buf `shouldBe` Right Nothing
+
+  it "decodeGetRecord fails on truncated buffer" $ do
+    let tiny = B.replicate 31 '\NUL'
+    decodeGetRecord tiny `shouldBe` Left AbiTruncated
+
+resolverCacheSpec :: Spec
+resolverCacheSpec = do
+  let mkEnv ethCall = do
+        hitsRef <- newIORef 0
+        missRef <- newIORef 0
+        let cfg =
+              NamesConfig
+                { ethereumEndpoint = "http://stub",
+                  snrcAddress = either error id (mkNameOwner twentyOnes),
+                  rpcAuth = Nothing,
+                  cacheSeconds = 300,
+                  cacheMaxEntries = 100,
+                  cacheMaxBytes = 1024 * 1024,
+                  rpcTimeoutMs = 1000,
+                  rpcMaxResponseBytes = 65536,
+                  rpcMaxConcurrency = 4
+                }
+        env <- newNamesEnvWith cfg ethCall Nothing hitsRef missRef
+        pure (env, hitsRef, missRef)
+
+  it "maps stub zero-owner response to NotFound and counts as cache miss" $ do
+    (env, _, missRef) <- mkEnv $ \_ _ -> pure (Right (B.replicate (32 * 8) '\NUL'))
+    r <- resolveName env "alice"
+    r `shouldBe` Left NotFound
+    misses <- readIORef missRef
+    misses `shouldBe` 1
+
+  it "subsequent NotFound lookups hit the cache (no second RPC)" $ do
+    callCount <- newIORef (0 :: Int)
+    (env, hitsRef, missRef) <- mkEnv $ \_ _ -> do
+      atomicModifyIORef' callCount (\v -> (v + 1, ()))
+      pure (Right (B.replicate (32 * 8) '\NUL'))
+    -- First lookup: miss, eth_call fires, NotFound cached.
+    _ <- resolveName env "alice"
+    -- Second lookup: should hit cache, not call ethCall.
+    r2 <- resolveName env "alice"
+    r2 `shouldBe` Left NotFound
+    callCount' <- readIORef callCount
+    callCount' `shouldBe` 1
+    missCount <- readIORef missRef
+    hitCount <- readIORef hitsRef
+    missCount `shouldBe` 1
+    hitCount `shouldBe` 1
+
+  it "concurrent identical lookups coalesce — only the leader makes the RPC" $ do
+    -- Block the stub on a TMVar so the leader's eth_call doesn't return
+    -- before the 7 waiters race to attach to the inflight TMap. Without
+    -- coalescing, every caller would invoke ethCall and callCount would
+    -- be 8; with coalescing, only the leader fires.
+    gate <- newEmptyTMVarIO
+    callCount <- newIORef (0 :: Int)
+    (env, _, _) <- mkEnv $ \_ _ -> do
+      atomicModifyIORef' callCount (\v -> (v + 1, ()))
+      atomically (readTMVar gate)
+      pure (Right (B.replicate (32 * 8) '\NUL'))
+    -- Run the 8 callers in a background task so we can release the gate
+    -- only after they've all had a chance to register on the inflight map.
+    callers <- async $ replicateConcurrently 8 (resolveName env "alice")
+    threadDelay 50000 -- 50 ms — ample time for the 7 waiters to attach
+    atomically (putTMVar gate ())
+    rs <- wait callers
+    all (== Left NotFound) rs `shouldBe` True
+    n <- readIORef callCount
+    n `shouldBe` 1
diff --git a/tests/Test.hs b/tests/Test.hs
index ae6df6e780..84718a9fcc 100644
--- a/tests/Test.hs
+++ b/tests/Test.hs
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import FileDescriptionTests (fileDescriptionTests)
 import GHC.IO.Exception (IOException (..))
 import qualified GHC.IO.Exception as IOException
 import RemoteControl (remoteControlTests)
+import SMPNamesTests (smpNamesTests)
 import SMPProxyTests (smpProxyTests)
 import ServerTests
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM (AStoreType (..))
@@ -97,6 +98,7 @@ main = do
 #endif
           describe "TSessionSubs tests" tSessionSubsTests
           describe "Util tests" utilTests
+          describe "Names resolver tests" smpNamesTests
           describe "Agent core tests" agentCoreTests
 #if defined(dbServerPostgres)
         around_ (postgressBracket testServerDBConnectInfo) $