From 223688e8cf390607bfa3946834192206bb7e3c20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: rabbitstack Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2026 00:23:16 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] feat(rules): Execution of a file transferred over SMB Identifies the execution of the binary file that was transferred over SMB. This pattern is characteristic of lateral movement via admin shares (C$, ADMIN$) followed by remote service creation or remote command execution, as used by PsExec-style tools, Impacket's psexec/smbexec/atexec, and commodity ransomware/backdoor deployment via SMB. --- ...ecution_of_a_file_transferred_over_smb.yml | 115 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 115 insertions(+) create mode 100644 rules/lateral_movement_execution_of_a_file_transferred_over_smb.yml diff --git a/rules/lateral_movement_execution_of_a_file_transferred_over_smb.yml b/rules/lateral_movement_execution_of_a_file_transferred_over_smb.yml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..77d2888ea --- /dev/null +++ b/rules/lateral_movement_execution_of_a_file_transferred_over_smb.yml @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +name: Execution of a file transferred over SMB +id: 04021379-a498-4ad0-ab46-62b2ed891e51 +version: 1.0.0 +description: | + Identifies the execution of the binary file that was transferred over SMB. + This pattern is characteristic of lateral movement via admin shares (C$, + ADMIN$) followed by remote service creation or remote command execution, + as used by PsExec-style tools, Impacket's psexec/smbexec/atexec, and + commodity ransomware/backdoor deployment via SMB. +labels: + tactic.id: TA0008 + tactic.name: Lateral Movement + tactic.ref: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/ + technique.id: T1021 + technique.name: Remote Services + technique.ref: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/ + subtechnique.id: T1021.002 + subtechnique.name: SMB/Windows Admin Shares + subtechnique.ref: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/ +references: + - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/hunting-for-lateral-movement-using-event-query-language + +condition: > + sequence + maxspan 8m + |create_file and evt.pid = 4 and thread.callstack.kernel_summary imatches ('*|srv2.sys|*', '*|srvnet.sys|*')| by file.path + |spawn_process and + ps.ancestor imatches + ( + 'PAExec*.exe', + 'cmd.exe', + 'psexesvc*.exe', + 'wmiprvse.exe', + 'wsmprovhost.exe', + 'powershell.exe', + 'pwsh.exe', + 'KaseyaEndpoint.exe', + 'RemComSvc*.exe' + ) and + not (ps.signature.subject imatches + ( + '*NinjaOne, LLC', + '*Trellix', + '*Check Point Software Technologies Ltd.', + '*RAPIDFIRE TOOLS INC.', + '*IBM Corporation', + '*PDQ.COM CORPORATION', + '*Veeam Software Group GmbH', + '*Veeam Software AG', + '*LANDesk Software, Inc.', + '*Cynet Security LTD', + '*CyberArk Software Ltd.', + '*Barracuda Networks, Inc.', + '*AVG Technologies Canada, Inc.', + '*ConnectWise, Inc.', + '*Ivanti, Inc.', + '*FUJITSU LIMITED', + '*Kaspersky Lab JSC', + '*Netalytics Security Inc', + '*Elasticsearch, Inc.', + '*Netwrix Corporation', + '*Power Admin LLC', + '*Veritas Technologies LLC', + '*Bitdefender SRL', + '*Kaseya Corporation', + '*Insecure.Com LLC', + '*ZOHO Corporation Private Limited', + '*VMware, Inc.', + '*ServiceNow, Inc.', + '*N-ABLE TECHNOLOGIES LTD', + '*CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.', + '*TeamViewer Germany GmbH', + '*SysAid Technologies LTD', + '*Sophos Ltd', + '*Ericsson', + '*Quest Software Inc.', + '*Commvault Systems, Inc.', + '*Red Gate Software Ltd', + '*Cocobolo Software, LLC', + '*Tenable Network Security Inc.', + '*CS.NIWC-ATLANTIC.001', + '*Lansweeper', + '*Lenovo', + '*Acronis International GmbH', + '*Cisco WebEx LLC', + '*Oracle America, Inc.', + '*Chocolatey Software, Inc.', + '*Micro Focus Group Limited', + '*Solarwinds Worldwide, LLC', + '*Cyberark Software Ltd.', + '*AO Kaspersky Lab', + '*Symantec Corporation', + '*Hornetsecurity GmbH', + '*KASEYA US LLC', + '*ForeScout Technologies, Inc', + '*Kaseya Holdings Inc', + '*ConnectSecure LLC', + '*Red Gate Software Limited', + '*Dell Inc.', + '*WatchGuard Technologies, Inc.', + '*Qualys, Inc.' + ) and ps.signature.exists = true and ps.signature.trusted = true) and + not (ps.exe imatches ('?:\\Windows\\CCM\\*', '?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Configuration Manager\\*')) and + not (ps.parent.name = 'powershell.exe' and ps.exe imatches ('?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*', '?:\\Program Files\\')) and + not (ps.pe.file.name imatches + ( + 'MOMAgentInstaller.exe', 'dotnet-hosting-*-win.exe', 'dpmac.exe', + 'PushClient.exe', 'migrate.exe', 'Ms.Dsp.Do.Inc.Installer.exe', + 'OpenHandleCollector.exe', 'VC_redist*.exe' + ) and ps.signature.subject imatches '*Microsoft Corporation*' and ps.signature.trusted = true) + | by ps.exe + +severity: high + +min-engine-version: 3.1.0