diff --git a/dotnet/src/Microsoft.Agents.AI.LocalCodeAct/Resources/validator.py b/dotnet/src/Microsoft.Agents.AI.LocalCodeAct/Resources/validator.py
index 69453999d57..7c3b29268ac 100644
--- a/dotnet/src/Microsoft.Agents.AI.LocalCodeAct/Resources/validator.py
+++ b/dotnet/src/Microsoft.Agents.AI.LocalCodeAct/Resources/validator.py
@@ -271,6 +271,12 @@ def __init__(
         self._allowed_builtins = allowed_builtins if allowed_builtins is not None else ALLOWED_BUILTINS
         self._blocked_builtins = blocked_builtins if blocked_builtins is not None else BLOCKED_BUILTINS
         self._allowed_os_attrs = allowed_os_attrs if allowed_os_attrs is not None else ALLOWED_OS_ATTRS
+        # Names currently bound to the ``os`` module. Enforcement in
+        # ``visit_Attribute`` is keyed on membership here rather than the literal
+        # name ``os`` so that aliases (``import os as x``) and re-bindings
+        # (``_o = os``) cannot slip past the ``os.environ`` / ``os.path``-only
+        # contract with the very same attribute access (``x.system``, ``_o.system``).
+        self._os_aliases: set[str] = {"os"}
 
     def validate(self, code: str) -> None:
         """Validate code and raise CodeValidationError if it violates policy."""
@@ -303,6 +309,16 @@ def visit_Import(self, node: ast.Import) -> None:
                 self._errors.append(f"Import of '{alias_node.name}' is not allowed (blocked: {module_name})")
             elif module_name not in self._allowed_imports:
                 self._errors.append(f"Import of '{alias_node.name}' is not allowed (not in allow-list)")
+            # Record every name bound to the ``os`` module so aliased access is
+            # still subject to the ``os`` attribute allow-list.
+            if alias_node.name == "os":
+                # ``import os`` / ``import os as x`` -> binds the ``os`` module.
+                self._os_aliases.add(alias_node.asname or "os")
+            elif alias_node.name.startswith("os.") and alias_node.asname is None:
+                # ``import os.path`` binds the top-level name ``os``.
+                # (``import os.path as p`` instead binds ``p`` to the submodule,
+                # not ``os``, so it is intentionally not tracked here.)
+                self._os_aliases.add("os")
         self.generic_visit(node)
 
     def visit_ImportFrom(self, node: ast.ImportFrom) -> None:
@@ -324,6 +340,29 @@ def visit_ImportFrom(self, node: ast.ImportFrom) -> None:
                     self._errors.append(f"Import from 'os' of '{alias_node.name}' is not allowed")
         self.generic_visit(node)
 
+    def visit_Assign(self, node: ast.Assign) -> None:
+        """Track re-bindings of the ``os`` module (e.g. ``_o = os``).
+
+        Assigning an existing ``os`` alias to new names must carry the
+        ``os`` attribute allow-list along, otherwise ``_o = os; _o.system(...)``
+        would sidestep ``visit_Attribute``.
+        """
+        if isinstance(node.value, ast.Name) and node.value.id in self._os_aliases:
+            for target in node.targets:
+                if isinstance(target, ast.Name):
+                    self._os_aliases.add(target.id)
+        self.generic_visit(node)
+
+    def visit_AnnAssign(self, node: ast.AnnAssign) -> None:
+        """Track annotated re-bindings of the ``os`` module (e.g. ``_o: object = os``)."""
+        if (
+            isinstance(node.value, ast.Name)
+            and node.value.id in self._os_aliases
+            and isinstance(node.target, ast.Name)
+        ):
+            self._os_aliases.add(node.target.id)
+        self.generic_visit(node)
+
     def visit_Call(self, node: ast.Call) -> None:
         """Validate function calls.
 
@@ -357,7 +396,9 @@ def visit_Attribute(self, node: ast.Attribute) -> None:
         # Enforce the `os` attribute allow-list. Anything outside `ALLOWED_OS_ATTRS`
         # (file I/O, process control, mutating helpers, etc.) is rejected so the
         # validator matches the documented `os.environ` / `os.path`-only contract.
-        if isinstance(node.value, ast.Name) and node.value.id == "os" and node.attr not in self._allowed_os_attrs:
+        # Membership in `self._os_aliases` (not a literal `== "os"`) catches
+        # aliased imports and re-bindings that reach the same module.
+        if isinstance(node.value, ast.Name) and node.value.id in self._os_aliases and node.attr not in self._allowed_os_attrs:
             self._errors.append(f"Access to os.{node.attr} is not allowed")
 
         # Block access to certain dangerous attributes
diff --git a/dotnet/tests/Microsoft.Agents.AI.LocalCodeAct.UnitTests/LocalExecuteCodeFunctionIntegrationTests.cs b/dotnet/tests/Microsoft.Agents.AI.LocalCodeAct.UnitTests/LocalExecuteCodeFunctionIntegrationTests.cs
index f1e6f6e8b99..abc778c8a2e 100644
--- a/dotnet/tests/Microsoft.Agents.AI.LocalCodeAct.UnitTests/LocalExecuteCodeFunctionIntegrationTests.cs
+++ b/dotnet/tests/Microsoft.Agents.AI.LocalCodeAct.UnitTests/LocalExecuteCodeFunctionIntegrationTests.cs
@@ -64,6 +64,55 @@ await Assert.ThrowsAsync<CodeValidationException>(async () =>
             await function.InvokeAsync(args, CancellationToken.None));
     }
 
+    [Theory]
+    // Direct access is the baseline the validator has always caught.
+    [InlineData("import os\nos.system('id')")]
+    // Regression for #7068: aliased and re-bound references to the `os` module
+    // reach the same os.system/os.popen/... and must not bypass the
+    // os.environ/os.path-only allow-list keyed on the module name.
+    [InlineData("import os as x\nx.system('id')")]
+    [InlineData("import os\n_o = os\n_o.system('id')")]
+    [InlineData("import os as x\na = x\nb = a\nb.popen('id')")]
+    [InlineData("import os.path\nos.system('id')")]
+    public async Task ExecuteCode_ValidationBlocksDisallowedOsAccessAsync(string code)
+    {
+        SkipIfNoPython();
+
+        var function = new LocalExecuteCodeFunction(s_python!);
+
+        var args = new AIFunctionArguments
+        {
+            ["code"] = code,
+        };
+
+        var ex = await Assert.ThrowsAsync<CodeValidationException>(async () =>
+            await function.InvokeAsync(args, CancellationToken.None));
+        Assert.Contains("os.", ex.Message, StringComparison.Ordinal);
+    }
+
+    [Theory]
+    // `os.environ`/`os.path` remain reachable, including through an alias, and
+    // `import os.path as p` binds `p` to the submodule (not `os`), so ordinary
+    // `p.join(...)` must not be misflagged as disallowed `os` access.
+    [InlineData("import os\nprint(os.environ.get('PATH') is not None)")]
+    [InlineData("import os as x\nprint(x.path.join('a', 'b'))")]
+    [InlineData("import os.path as p\nprint(p.join('a', 'b'))")]
+    public async Task ExecuteCode_AllowsPermittedOsAccessAsync(string code)
+    {
+        SkipIfNoPython();
+
+        var function = new LocalExecuteCodeFunction(s_python!);
+
+        var args = new AIFunctionArguments
+        {
+            ["code"] = code,
+        };
+
+        // Should validate and execute without throwing.
+        var result = await function.InvokeAsync(args, CancellationToken.None);
+        Assert.NotNull(result);
+    }
+
     [Fact]
     public async Task ExecuteCode_CapturesFilesInWritableMountAsync()
     {