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dependency-review.yml
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name: dependency-review
# Supply-chain guardrails for dependency-update PRs -- for BOTH Dependabot
# and maintainers. `inspect` classifies the PR, then exactly one Socket
# Firewall (sfw) install smoke job runs when Python deps change:
#
# - python-sfw-smoke-enterprise -- trusted authors: any in-repo (non-fork)
# PR other than Dependabot's (i.e. someone with write access). Runs the
# authenticated enterprise edition for full org-policy enforcement. The
# SOCKET_SFW_API_TOKEN is scoped to the `socket-firewall` environment, so
# it is the ONLY job that can read the token.
# - python-sfw-smoke-free -- everyone else (Dependabot + all fork PRs from
# external contributors). Anonymous free edition, no token. This job never
# references the secret.
#
# Splitting the jobs (rather than picking a mode in one job) keeps the token
# out of scope on every untrusted run and satisfies zizmor's
# `secrets-outside-env` audit without suppressing it. The free path runs in
# the unprivileged `pull_request` context with no secret-leak surface.
#
# Pattern adapted from SocketDev/socket-python-cli.
on:
pull_request:
types: [opened, synchronize, reopened, ready_for_review]
permissions:
contents: read
concurrency:
group: dependency-review-${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
inspect:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
outputs:
python_deps_changed: ${{ steps.diff.outputs.python_deps_changed }}
workflow_or_action_changed: ${{ steps.diff.outputs.workflow_or_action_changed }}
is_trusted: ${{ steps.trust.outputs.is_trusted }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
with:
fetch-depth: 0
persist-credentials: false
- name: Inspect changed files
id: diff
env:
BASE_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}
HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
run: |
CHANGED_FILES="$(git diff --name-only "$BASE_SHA" "$HEAD_SHA")"
{
echo "## Changed files"
echo '```'
printf '%s\n' "$CHANGED_FILES"
echo '```'
} >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
has_file() {
local pattern="$1"
if printf '%s\n' "$CHANGED_FILES" | grep -Eq "$pattern"; then
echo "true"
else
echo "false"
fi
}
{
echo "python_deps_changed=$(has_file '^(pyproject\.toml|uv\.lock)$')"
echo "workflow_or_action_changed=$(has_file '^\.github/workflows/|^\.github/actions/|^\.github/dependabot\.yml$')"
} >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Classify PR trust
id: trust
# Trusted == any in-repo (non-fork) PR that isn't Dependabot's. Only
# accounts with write access can push a branch to this repo, so a
# non-fork PR already implies a trusted author -- the same boundary
# GitHub uses to decide whether secrets are exposed at all.
#
# NB: author_association is deliberately NOT used to require strict org
# membership. It only reflects PUBLIC org membership, so private members
# (the common case) show up as CONTRIBUTOR and would be misclassified.
# Reliable strict-membership detection would need a read:org token or
# public membership. This step references NO secret regardless -- it
# only decides which smoke job runs.
env:
IS_DEPENDABOT: ${{ github.event.pull_request.user.login == 'dependabot[bot]' }}
IS_FORK: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name != github.repository }}
AUTHOR_ASSOC: ${{ github.event.pull_request.author_association }}
run: |
is_trusted=false
if [ "$IS_DEPENDABOT" != "true" ] && [ "$IS_FORK" != "true" ]; then
is_trusted=true
fi
echo "is_trusted=$is_trusted" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
{
echo "## Socket Firewall edition: \`$([ "$is_trusted" = true ] && echo enterprise || echo free)\`"
echo "- author_association: \`$AUTHOR_ASSOC\`"
echo "- dependabot: \`$IS_DEPENDABOT\` | fork: \`$IS_FORK\`"
} >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
- name: Summarize review expectations
env:
PR_URL: ${{ github.event.pull_request.html_url }}
run: |
{
echo "## Dependency Review Checklist"
echo "- PR: $PR_URL"
echo "- Confirm upstream release notes before merge"
echo "- Do not treat a dependency PR as trusted solely because of the actor"
echo "- This workflow runs in pull_request context only; no publish secrets are exposed"
} >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
# Untrusted PRs (Dependabot, forks, outside collaborators, externals):
# anonymous free edition. Never references the token.
python-sfw-smoke-free:
needs: inspect
if: needs.inspect.outputs.python_deps_changed == 'true' && needs.inspect.outputs.is_trusted != 'true'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 15
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
with:
fetch-depth: 1
persist-credentials: false
- name: Prepare SFW artifact directory
run: |
mkdir -p sfw-artifacts
{
echo "mode=firewall-free"
echo "pr=${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}"
echo "sha=${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}"
} > sfw-artifacts/context.txt
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-sfw
with:
uv: "true"
mode: firewall-free
- name: Sync project through Socket Firewall (free)
# pipefail keeps sfw's exit code through the tee so a firewall block
# still fails the job; tee captures the report for the artifact upload.
env:
UV_PYTHON: "3.12"
UV_PYTHON_DOWNLOADS: never
run: |
set -o pipefail
sfw uv sync --locked --extra test --extra dev 2>&1 | tee sfw-artifacts/sfw-uv-sync.log
- name: Import smoke test
run: |
set -o pipefail
uv run python -c "
import socketdev
from socketdev import socketdev as SocketDevClient
from socketdev.core.api import API
from socketdev.version import __version__
print('import smoke OK', __version__)
" 2>&1 | tee sfw-artifacts/import-smoke.log
- name: Collect SFW JSON report
# socketdev/action points sfw at SFW_JSON_REPORT_PATH (a $RUNNER_TEMP
# file) and reads it back in its post step to render the job summary, so
# COPY (don't move) the report into the bundle. sfw writes it even when
# it blocks an install -- always() keeps it on failures too.
if: always()
run: |
if [ -n "${SFW_JSON_REPORT_PATH:-}" ] && [ -f "$SFW_JSON_REPORT_PATH" ]; then
cp "$SFW_JSON_REPORT_PATH" "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/sfw-artifacts/sfw-report.json"
echo "Collected SFW report -> sfw-artifacts/sfw-report.json"
else
echo "No SFW JSON report found at '${SFW_JSON_REPORT_PATH:-<unset>}'." \
> "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/sfw-artifacts/sfw-report-missing.txt"
fi
- name: Upload SFW report artifact
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
with:
name: socket-firewall-free-${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
path: sfw-artifacts/
if-no-files-found: warn
retention-days: 14
# Trusted SocketDev members: authenticated enterprise edition. The token is
# scoped to the `socket-firewall` environment, so only this job can read it.
python-sfw-smoke-enterprise:
needs: inspect
if: needs.inspect.outputs.python_deps_changed == 'true' && needs.inspect.outputs.is_trusted == 'true'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 15
environment: socket-firewall
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
with:
fetch-depth: 1
persist-credentials: false
- name: Prepare SFW artifact directory
run: |
mkdir -p sfw-artifacts
{
echo "mode=firewall-enterprise"
echo "pr=${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}"
echo "sha=${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}"
} > sfw-artifacts/context.txt
- uses: ./.github/actions/setup-sfw
with:
uv: "true"
mode: firewall-enterprise
socket-token: ${{ secrets.SOCKET_SFW_API_TOKEN }}
- name: Sync project through Socket Firewall (enterprise)
# See free job for the UV_PYTHON rationale: .python-version pins an
# exact patch that uv would otherwise fetch from GitHub through the
# firewall (blocked by its TLS interception); use the runner's Python.
#
# pipefail keeps sfw's exit code through the tee so a firewall block
# still fails the job; tee captures the report for the artifact upload.
env:
UV_PYTHON: "3.12"
UV_PYTHON_DOWNLOADS: never
run: |
set -o pipefail
sfw uv sync --locked --extra test --extra dev 2>&1 | tee sfw-artifacts/sfw-uv-sync.log
- name: Import smoke test
run: |
set -o pipefail
uv run python -c "
import socketdev
from socketdev import socketdev as SocketDevClient
from socketdev.core.api import API
from socketdev.version import __version__
print('import smoke OK', __version__)
" 2>&1 | tee sfw-artifacts/import-smoke.log
- name: Collect SFW JSON report
# socketdev/action points sfw at SFW_JSON_REPORT_PATH (a $RUNNER_TEMP
# file) and reads it back in its post step to render the job summary, so
# COPY (don't move) the report into the bundle. sfw writes it even when
# it blocks an install -- always() keeps it on failures too.
if: always()
run: |
if [ -n "${SFW_JSON_REPORT_PATH:-}" ] && [ -f "$SFW_JSON_REPORT_PATH" ]; then
cp "$SFW_JSON_REPORT_PATH" "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/sfw-artifacts/sfw-report.json"
echo "Collected SFW report -> sfw-artifacts/sfw-report.json"
else
echo "No SFW JSON report found at '${SFW_JSON_REPORT_PATH:-<unset>}'." \
> "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/sfw-artifacts/sfw-report-missing.txt"
fi
- name: Upload SFW report artifact
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
with:
name: socket-firewall-enterprise-${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
path: sfw-artifacts/
if-no-files-found: warn
retention-days: 14
workflow-notice:
needs: inspect
if: needs.inspect.outputs.workflow_or_action_changed == 'true'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 2
steps:
- name: Flag workflow-sensitive updates
run: |
{
echo "## Sensitive File Notice"
echo "This PR changes workflow, composite-action, or dependabot config files."
echo "Require explicit human review before merge."
} >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
# Aggregator gate -- the single check intended to become the required status
# check on main. The Socket Firewall smoke jobs are conditional (deps-changed
# gates them, and exactly one of free/enterprise runs per PR), so neither can
# be required directly: a required check whose job is `if:`-skipped is never
# created and sits at "Expected -- Waiting for status to be reported"
# forever, permanently blocking merge (this hits every Dependabot/fork PR and
# every PR that doesn't touch deps).
#
# This job runs unconditionally (`if: always()`), depends on all the
# conditional jobs, and fails ONLY when one of them actually failed or was
# cancelled. A `skipped` dependency passes -- so the gate is green when no
# deps changed, and otherwise satisfied by whichever smoke path ran (free for
# Dependabot/forks, enterprise for trusted maintainers). A real Socket
# Firewall block surfaces as a smoke-job failure and thus a gate failure.
#
# NOT YET wired into branch protection -- added during a soak period so the
# check is visible before it becomes blocking. Requiring it before it lands
# on main would strand every other open PR on the trap above.
sfw-gate:
name: Socket Firewall Gate
needs: [inspect, python-sfw-smoke-free, python-sfw-smoke-enterprise, workflow-notice]
if: always()
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 2
steps:
- name: Evaluate dependency-review results
env:
NEEDS_JSON: ${{ toJSON(needs) }}
run: |
echo "$NEEDS_JSON"
# Fail if and only if a needed job reported failure or cancelled;
# success and skipped both pass. jq returns the count of offending
# results.
bad="$(printf '%s' "$NEEDS_JSON" \
| jq '[to_entries[] | select(.value.result == "failure" or .value.result == "cancelled")] | length')"
{
echo "## Socket Firewall Gate"
printf '%s\n' "$NEEDS_JSON" | jq -r 'to_entries[] | "- \(.key): \(.value.result)"'
} >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
if [ "$bad" -ne 0 ]; then
echo "Gate failed: $bad upstream job(s) failed or were cancelled." >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
echo "::error::Socket Firewall Gate failed -- $bad upstream job(s) failed or were cancelled."
exit 1
fi
echo "Gate passed." >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"