diff --git a/x509-cert/src/ext/pkix/crl/dp.rs b/x509-cert/src/ext/pkix/crl/dp.rs
index 7bb96b157..e6b24b3c9 100644
--- a/x509-cert/src/ext/pkix/crl/dp.rs
+++ b/x509-cert/src/ext/pkix/crl/dp.rs
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 //! PKIX distribution point types
 
-use const_oid::{AssociatedOid, ObjectIdentifier, db::rfc5280::ID_PE_SUBJECT_INFO_ACCESS};
+use const_oid::{AssociatedOid, ObjectIdentifier, db::rfc5280::ID_CE_ISSUING_DISTRIBUTION_POINT};
 use der::flagset::{FlagSet, flags};
 use der::{Sequence, ValueOrd};
 
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ pub struct IssuingDistributionPoint {
 }
 
 impl AssociatedOid for IssuingDistributionPoint {
-    const OID: ObjectIdentifier = ID_PE_SUBJECT_INFO_ACCESS;
+    const OID: ObjectIdentifier = ID_CE_ISSUING_DISTRIBUTION_POINT;
 }
 
 impl_extension!(IssuingDistributionPoint, critical = true);
diff --git a/x509-cert/tests/crl.rs b/x509-cert/tests/crl.rs
index af55529a6..6fdfd256a 100644
--- a/x509-cert/tests/crl.rs
+++ b/x509-cert/tests/crl.rs
@@ -1,5 +1,16 @@
-use der::Decode;
-use x509_cert::{certificate::Rfc5280, crl::CertificateList};
+use const_oid::{
+    AssociatedOid,
+    db::rfc5280::{ID_CE_ISSUING_DISTRIBUTION_POINT, ID_PE_SUBJECT_INFO_ACCESS},
+};
+use der::{Decode, Encode, asn1::OctetString};
+use x509_cert::{
+    certificate::Rfc5280,
+    crl::CertificateList,
+    ext::{
+        Extension,
+        pkix::{IssuingDistributionPoint, SubjectInfoAccessSyntax},
+    },
+};
 
 #[test]
 fn decode_crl() {
@@ -15,3 +26,50 @@ fn decode_crl() {
     assert_eq!(2, crl.tbs_cert_list.crl_extensions.unwrap().len());
     assert_eq!(4, crl.tbs_cert_list.revoked_certificates.unwrap().len());
 }
+
+/// `issuingDistributionPoint` is `id-ce-issuingDistributionPoint` (2.5.29.28,
+/// RFC 5280 §5.2.5), not `id-pe-subjectInfoAccess` (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.11, §4.2.2.2),
+/// which is a certificate extension and belongs to [`SubjectInfoAccessSyntax`].
+///
+/// Binding the two types to the same OID makes an `extn_id`-driven lookup for an
+/// `IssuingDistributionPoint` miss every real one, so `indirectCRL` reads as absent
+/// on a CRL that sets it — a silent failure in the permissive direction.
+#[test]
+fn issuing_distribution_point_has_its_own_oid() {
+    assert_eq!(
+        IssuingDistributionPoint::OID,
+        ID_CE_ISSUING_DISTRIBUTION_POINT
+    );
+    assert_eq!(SubjectInfoAccessSyntax::OID, ID_PE_SUBJECT_INFO_ACCESS);
+    assert_ne!(
+        IssuingDistributionPoint::OID,
+        SubjectInfoAccessSyntax::OID,
+        "a CRL extension and a certificate extension must not share an OID"
+    );
+}
+
+/// Locating the extension by its associated OID finds a real one on the wire.
+#[test]
+fn issuing_distribution_point_is_found_by_its_associated_oid() {
+    let idp = IssuingDistributionPoint {
+        distribution_point: None,
+        only_contains_user_certs: false,
+        only_contains_ca_certs: false,
+        only_some_reasons: None,
+        indirect_crl: true,
+        only_contains_attribute_certs: false,
+    };
+    let ext = Extension {
+        extn_id: ID_CE_ISSUING_DISTRIBUTION_POINT,
+        critical: true,
+        extn_value: OctetString::new(idp.to_der().unwrap()).unwrap(),
+    };
+
+    let extensions = vec![ext];
+    let found = extensions
+        .iter()
+        .find(|e| e.extn_id == IssuingDistributionPoint::OID)
+        .expect("IDP extension located by IssuingDistributionPoint::OID");
+    let decoded = IssuingDistributionPoint::from_der(found.extn_value.as_bytes()).unwrap();
+    assert!(decoded.indirect_crl);
+}