diff --git a/.Rbuildignore b/.Rbuildignore
index 232504f..28b2d85 100644
--- a/.Rbuildignore
+++ b/.Rbuildignore
@@ -22,3 +22,6 @@
 ^\.jules(/.*)?$
 ^\.trivyignore\.yaml$
 ^trivy\.yaml$
+^\.semgrepignore$
+^test_dummy\.R$
+^test_validation\.R$
diff --git a/.jules/sentinel.md b/.jules/sentinel.md
index a8207a4..c4abb44 100644
--- a/.jules/sentinel.md
+++ b/.jules/sentinel.md
@@ -2,3 +2,8 @@
 **Vulnerability:** Unvalidated inputs passed to `if()` statements can cause process crashes (`condition has length > 1`) or unexpected coercion vulnerabilities.
 **Learning:** In R, optional boolean parameters that default to `NULL` should be validated using explicit runtime type validation (e.g., `if (!is.null(flag) && (!is.logical(flag) || length(flag) != 1 || is.na(flag)))`).
 **Prevention:** Always implement explicit runtime type validation for optional boolean parameters.
+
+## 2024-07-26 - Strict bounded regex for interactive inputs
+**Vulnerability:** Weak regex like `^[0-9]+$` on interactive `readline` inputs allows large integers to be entered, which coerce to `NA` in `as.integer()`, bypassing subsequent logic and causing unhandled exceptions or DoS vulnerabilities.
+**Learning:** Using strictly bounded regex, like `^[12]$`, prevents parsing errors and protects the program flow from unexpected user input.
+**Prevention:** Always validate interactive inputs with exact bounded regex before coercion.
diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md
index b60b03d..a177105 100644
--- a/AGENTS.md
+++ b/AGENTS.md
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ Applies to every agent (Claude, Codex, Cursor, opencode, ...) working in this re
   its `private-key` suppression path-scoped in `.trivyignore.yaml` and do not
   blanket-ignore the rule.
 - A local `trivy` scan with a stale DB misses findings: run
-  `trivy --download-db-only` first, and scan the **merge ref**, not just the PR head.
+  `trivy --download-db-only` first, and scan the **merge ref**, not the PR head.
 - The org `code_scanning` ruleset is intentionally **CodeQL-only** (multiple
   code-scanning tools cannot converge on one PR ref). Gating is by the Security
   Scan **job result**, not the `code_scanning` rule; do not add tools to that rule.
diff --git a/R/aFIPC.R b/R/aFIPC.R
index 6254651..918e19b 100644
--- a/R/aFIPC.R
+++ b/R/aFIPC.R
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ autoFIPC <-
       }
       for (attempt in seq_len(3)) {
         n <- readline(prompt = "Is it correct? (1: Yes 2: No) : ")
-        if (grepl("^[0-9]+$", n)) {
+        if (grepl("^[12]$", n)) {
           return(as.integer(n))
         }
       }
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ autoFIPC <-
               readline(
                 prompt = "Do you want to use default BILOG-MG priors for oldform Data? (1: Yes 2: No) : "
               )
-            if (grepl("^[0-9]+$", n)) {
+            if (grepl("^[12]$", n)) {
               return(as.integer(n))
             }
           }
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ autoFIPC <-
               readline(
                 prompt = "Do you want to use default BILOG-MG priors for newform Data? (1: Yes 2: No) : "
               )
-            if (grepl("^[0-9]+$", n)) {
+            if (grepl("^[12]$", n)) {
               return(as.integer(n))
             }
           }