diff --git a/HISTORY.md b/HISTORY.md
index e4fd945dd8..d2879c5437 100644
--- a/HISTORY.md
+++ b/HISTORY.md
@@ -6,6 +6,27 @@ dev
 
 - \[Short description of non-trivial change.\]
 
+2.27.1+security.2 (2026-05-28)
+-------------------------------
+
+**Security**
+
+- [CVE-2024-35195] `Session` objects no longer reuse a connection pool created
+  with `verify=False` for subsequent requests expecting TLS verification to the
+  same host. Pool selection now keys on TLS settings.
+  (GHSA-9wx4-h78v-vm56)
+
+- [CVE-2024-47081] `get_netrc_auth()` now uses `ri.hostname` instead of
+  `ri.netloc` for netrc lookups, preventing credential leakage to hosts that
+  share a netloc prefix with the legitimate target.
+  (GHSA-9hjg-9r4m-mvj7)
+
+- [CVE-2026-25645] `extract_zipped_paths()` now extracts to a non-deterministic
+  path via `tempfile.mkstemp()` instead of a predictable `/tmp/<filename>` path,
+  preventing local pre-create attacks. Note: only affects direct callers of this
+  utility function, not standard requests usage.
+  (GHSA-gc5v-m9x4-r6x2)
+
 2.27.1.1 (2023-10-12)
 -------------------
 
diff --git a/requests/__version__.py b/requests/__version__.py
index e973b03b5f..b6453cf583 100644
--- a/requests/__version__.py
+++ b/requests/__version__.py
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 __title__ = 'requests'
 __description__ = 'Python HTTP for Humans.'
 __url__ = 'https://requests.readthedocs.io'
-__version__ = '2.27.1'
+__version__ = '2.27.1+security.2'
 __build__ = 0x022701
 __author__ = 'Kenneth Reitz'
 __author_email__ = 'me@kennethreitz.org'
diff --git a/requests/adapters.py b/requests/adapters.py
index fe22ff450e..3f77866d56 100644
--- a/requests/adapters.py
+++ b/requests/adapters.py
@@ -317,6 +317,54 @@ def get_connection(self, url, proxies=None):
 
         return conn
 
+    def _get_connection(self, request, verify, proxies=None):
+        """Backport of CVE-2024-35195: select connection pool keyed on TLS
+        settings so a verify=False connection is never reused for a subsequent
+        request that expects TLS verification.
+
+        :param request: The :class:`PreparedRequest <PreparedRequest>` being sent.
+        :param verify: SSL verification setting (bool or CA bundle path).
+        :param proxies: (optional) Proxies dict.
+        :rtype: urllib3.ConnectionPool
+        """
+        proxy = select_proxy(request.url, proxies)
+        parsed = urlparse(request.url)
+        scheme = parsed.scheme.lower()
+        host_params = {
+            'scheme': scheme,
+            'host': parsed.hostname,
+            'port': parsed.port,
+        }
+        pool_kwargs = {}
+        if verify is False:
+            pool_kwargs['cert_reqs'] = 'CERT_NONE'
+        else:
+            pool_kwargs['cert_reqs'] = 'CERT_REQUIRED'
+        if isinstance(verify, str):
+            pool_kwargs['ca_certs'] = verify
+
+        try:
+            if proxy:
+                proxy = prepend_scheme_if_needed(proxy, 'http')
+                proxy_url = parse_url(proxy)
+                if not proxy_url.host:
+                    raise InvalidProxyURL(
+                        "Please check proxy URL. It is malformed "
+                        "and could be missing the host."
+                    )
+                proxy_manager = self.proxy_manager_for(proxy)
+                conn = proxy_manager.connection_from_host(
+                    pool_kwargs=pool_kwargs, **host_params
+                )
+            else:
+                conn = self.poolmanager.connection_from_host(
+                    pool_kwargs=pool_kwargs, **host_params
+                )
+        except ValueError as e:
+            raise InvalidURL(e, request=request)
+
+        return conn
+
     def close(self):
         """Disposes of any internal state.
 
@@ -410,7 +458,7 @@ def send(self, request, stream=False, timeout=None, verify=True, cert=None, prox
         """
 
         try:
-            conn = self.get_connection(request.url, proxies)
+            conn = self._get_connection(request, verify, proxies)
         except LocationValueError as e:
             raise InvalidURL(e, request=request)
 
diff --git a/requests/utils.py b/requests/utils.py
index 153776c7f3..0ac98e6ace 100644
--- a/requests/utils.py
+++ b/requests/utils.py
@@ -209,12 +209,10 @@ def get_netrc_auth(url, raise_errors=False):
 
         ri = urlparse(url)
 
-        # Strip port numbers from netloc. This weird `if...encode`` dance is
-        # used for Python 3.2, which doesn't support unicode literals.
-        splitstr = b':'
-        if isinstance(url, str):
-            splitstr = splitstr.decode('ascii')
-        host = ri.netloc.split(splitstr)[0]
+        # Backport of CVE-2024-47081: use hostname (strips port and userinfo)
+        # instead of manually parsing netloc, preventing netrc credential
+        # leakage to hosts that share a netloc prefix with the target.
+        host = ri.hostname
 
         try:
             _netrc = netrc(netrc_path).authenticators(host)
@@ -268,13 +266,15 @@ def extract_zipped_paths(path):
     if member not in zip_file.namelist():
         return path
 
-    # we have a valid zip archive and a valid member of that archive
-    tmp = tempfile.gettempdir()
-    extracted_path = os.path.join(tmp, member.split('/')[-1])
-    if not os.path.exists(extracted_path):
-        # use read + write to avoid the creating nested folders, we only want the file, avoids mkdir racing condition
-        with atomic_open(extracted_path) as file_handler:
-            file_handler.write(zip_file.read(member))
+    # Backport of CVE-2026-25645: extract to a non-deterministic location to
+    # prevent a local attacker from pre-creating a malicious file at a
+    # predictable path in the temp directory.
+    suffix = os.path.splitext(member.split('/')[-1])[-1]
+    fd, extracted_path = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix=suffix)
+    try:
+        os.write(fd, zip_file.read(member))
+    finally:
+        os.close(fd)
     return extracted_path